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The author presents a new list of conflict onsets based on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), designed to address the lack of robustness in conflict literature caused by arbitrary coding decisions. The dataset allows researchers to vary the casualty threshold (
) and the minimum period of peace required before a new conflict is coded between old adversaries (). To demonstrate the utility of this framework, the author re-analyzes the findings of Hegre et al. (2001). The results indicate that while the effect of proximity to regime change on conflict risk is robust across different definitions, the perceived war-proneness of semi-democratic regimes is not robust and varies depending on the onset definition used.

The scoping review identifies a critical shortage of robust quantitative evidence regarding refugee education interventions. Out of 1,873 screened articles, only eight met the strict methodological criteria for impact evaluation. Findings suggest that while cash transfers can increase the time children spend in school, they do not necessarily increase overall enrolment. Promising results for learning quality were found in early childhood development programmes, online game-based solutions, and language-enhanced physical education for second-language acquisition, as well as child and youth learning centres for literacy and numeracy in camp settings. The authors highlight significant gaps in research concerning the Global South, long-term impacts, and gender-specific needs for girls.

The Middle East has hosted the world's deadliest conflicts over the last decade, with Syria being the deadliest since 1989. While state-based conflicts and battle-related deaths declined in 2019, internationalized civil wars reached record levels since 2015. Non-state conflicts peaked in 2014 and have since declined, though they remain higher than pre-2011 levels. One-sided violence fatalities doubled from 2018 to 2019, driven by IS, Syrian insurgents, and Iran. Despite an increase in ceasefires, peace agreements are rare in the region compared to Africa and Asia, with only one full peace agreement recorded between 1989 and 2018.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of global conflict trends from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 54 state-based conflicts in 2019. It highlights the significant role of the Islamic State (IS) in driving recent conflict increases and the prevalence of internationalized civil conflicts. While battle-related deaths have generally decreased over the last 20 years, specific hotspots in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia remain deadly. The paper also analyzes the decline in peace agreements since 2015 and the persistence of non-state conflicts, particularly violent drug cartel activity in Latin America and communal violence in Africa.

The paper analyzes conflict dynamics in Africa from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 25 state-based conflicts in 2019, many of which are low-intensity or involve the Islamic State. While Africa faces rising non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, it also leads other regions in the number of definitive ceasefires and peace agreements. The study further details the growth of UN peacekeeping operations in the region from 1994 to 2018, highlighting a significant increase in troop deployment peaking in 2010.

The document analyzes conflict dynamics in Asia from 1989 to 2019 using UCDP data. It finds that while state-based conflicts are generally declining and often low-intensity, Afghanistan remains a critical exception and the most violent setting in the region and the world. Asia recorded the highest absolute number of ceasefires globally between 1989 and 2018, but peace agreements have declined since 2006. Non-state conflicts in Asia are declining, contrary to global trends, while one-sided violence is generally decreasing but saw a recent increase in 2019 driven by Afghanistan.

The report assesses the effects of opening the Ledra Street/Lokmaci crossing in Nicosia, which connected residential and commercial areas across the 1974 cease-fire line. Survey data indicates that the opening revitalized the city's traditional commercial centre, benefiting shopkeepers from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities despite a global economic downturn. While Turkish Cypriots showed higher levels of optimism and more frequent crossings, the findings suggest a mutually beneficial economic relationship that challenges the notion that reunification would be economically damaging to either community.

The report estimates that a reunification of Cyprus would provide Turkey with an annual peace dividend of EUR 17.4 billion (3.5% of 2009 GDP), comprising EUR 5.1 billion in savings and EUR 12.3 billion in additional export revenue. Key gains for Turkey include the potential for EUR 7 billion from financial and business services, EUR 1.7 billion from transport, and EUR 1.6 billion from tourism. Additionally, Turkey could see foreign direct investment (FDI) rise to EUR 33 billion per year. Greece is projected to benefit from EUR 2.3 billion in annual military savings, EUR 19.8 billion in FDI, and various gains in tourism and energy transit. The document highlights energy as the greatest opportunity, noting that a settlement would unblock Turkey's EU accession energy chapter and facilitate projects like Blue Stream-2.

The study examines whether resource scarcity and inter-group inequalities drive political violence at a sub-national level in Indonesia. While population growth and horizontal inequality show little effect in isolation, their interaction significantly increases the risk of 'routine' violence. The authors find that in provinces with high population growth, greater inequality between religious groups elevates the risk of violence, suggesting that demographic pressure may amplify existing social segmentations.

The study finds that sub-national analysis provides stronger support for the resource scarcity-conflict nexus than global studies. Specifically, organized armed conflict is more likely in Indian states with scarce productive land and declining agricultural wages. Youth bulges are a consistent predictor of all three forms of political violence, with the risk of armed conflict increasing further in states with high male-to-female ratios. While linguistic fractionalization and Hindu relative growth are linked to armed conflict, and religious heterogeneity and non-Hindu majorities are linked to riots, the study finds little evidence that rural inequality or urban growth rates drive political violence.

The authors argue that national-level GDP per capita is an ambiguous proxy for the drivers of civil war, as conflict is typically a localized phenomenon. Using a global grid of 0.5-degree cells and G-Econ data for 1990, they test three hypotheses: that poorer areas are more prone to conflict (H1), that pockets of wealth in poor countries attract insurgency (H2), and that deviations from national income averages increase risk (H3). Preliminary results indicate that conflict onsets are more likely in poorer areas of a state and that the relationship between Gross Cell Product (GCP) per capita and conflict risk follows an inverted U-shape, peaking at approximately $1,300 per capita.

The research examines the causal chain from formal (de jure) power-sharing institutions to peace, arguing that institutions operate primarily by inducing specific behavioral practices (de facto power-sharing). Using a global dataset of 180 countries from 1975 to 2010, the authors find that inclusive institutions increase the share of ethnic groups in government, which reduces the likelihood of rebellions by excluded groups but increases the risk of infighting among coalition partners. Dispersive institutions, such as federalism, are found to decrease the risk of ethnic conflict by increasing regional autonomy for minorities, although this effect is less statistically robust than that of inclusive institutions.

The document examines the contested nature of 'power sharing,' noting that it is often implemented as a tool for conflict resolution but yields contradictory results in research. It identifies four primary types of power sharing: political, military, territorial, and economic. The author argues that findings vary based on whether researchers view power sharing as a means to achieve stable democracy (consociationalism) or as a tool for postconflict conflict management. While some studies suggest inclusive institutions prolong peace by addressing rebel security concerns, others argue they reward violence, strengthen ethnic divisions, and hinder democratic accountability by marginalizing opposition.

The paper analyzes the 'business-peace nexus,' where multinational corporations (MNCs) are reframed as peace actors. While B4P aims to embed corporations in public accountability structures, the authors argue it creates 'asymmetrical governance' locally, where corporate power is amplified and accountability is obscured.

The research examines the intersection of Norway's national identity as a gender-equal and peace-promoting nation with its diplomatic practices. Through interviews with ten diplomats, the authors analyze how 'state feminism' has transitioned from domestic policy to foreign policy, specifically within the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The findings highlight a strategic tension: while Norway promotes gender equality to enhance its international branding and credibility as a neutral facilitator, it avoids the explicit label of 'feminist foreign policy' to prevent being perceived as too value-driven or Western, which could jeopardize its role as a benign peace facilitator. The document notes a shift from early, male-dominated peace efforts to more professionalized, gender-balanced teams in recent processes like those in Colombia and the Philippines.

The research paper examines a divergence in Catholic thought during the 1930s regarding the validity of just war doctrine in the face of evolving international law. One approach, represented by the Fribourg Conventus, argued that traditional just war doctrine was superseded by international law and the 'natural sociability of states,' advocating for a narrow definition of 'legitimate defense' as the only permissible use of force. Conversely, Robert Regout argued for the permanent applicability of just war theory to provide a normative foundation for international law, allowing for the redress of objective injustice. The author concludes that the Fribourg Conventus's perspective—specifically the move away from 'just war' terminology toward 'legitimate defense' and the rejection of offensive war—is reflected in the teachings of Popes Pius XII, Paul VI, and John Paul II.

The study finds that autocratic regimes are systematically associated with higher levels of industrialization, measured by railway freight, energy consumption, and manufacturing value added. The authors attribute this to three mechanisms: the narrow social bases of autocracies (which benefit industrial elites), heightened security concerns (driving military-industrial capacity), and the availability of coercive policy tools to override opposition to dislocating industrial reforms.

The document analyzes the ethical dilemmas of trust and fairness during the JCPOA negotiations (2013-2015). It argues that while deep-seated distrust between the US and Iran initially hindered progress, a shift in US policy and the efforts of second-tier negotiators helped build a 'minimal' level of trust necessary for a procedurally fair agreement. However, the authors contend that the use of threats and sanctions undermines this trust, and the decision to limit the agreement's scope for short-term success may have jeopardized its long-term sustainability, as evidenced by the US withdrawal in 2018.

The document details the methodology for operationalizing religious variables in the study of internal conflicts. It justifies the use of an identity-based definition of religious cleavages over an issue-based one, citing higher reliability and lower data collection costs. The author describes the use of the Religion and State (RAS) dataset to measure religious discrimination and demography (fractionalization and polarization), and the use of official state religion as a proxy for religious legitimacy. The methodology also includes the treatment of non-religious groups, specifically coding Communist regimes and rebels as non-religious, and the application of control variables such as regime type based on the Polity IV project.

The authors examine the Patani conflict in Southern Thailand to illustrate how the 'jihadist' label can misinterpret local political struggles. They argue that while religion is a key motivating factor, it is intertwined with ethnic Malay identity and nationalistic goals of independence from the Thai state. The paper rejects the notion that the insurgency is driven by transnational Salafi-Jihadism or groups like ISIS, asserting instead that the conflict is driven by a 'nation-oriented' rationale rooted in local grievances and historical colonization.