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The document argues that Africa's potential for a demographic dividend depends on accelerating the demographic transition—reducing child mortality and fertility—and converting a larger working-age population into economic growth through job creation and governance. It contrasts the youthful population of Africa with the ageing populations of Europe and the Netherlands, suggesting strategic opportunities for labour mobility and trade. Using the International Futures (ifs) model, the author presents a 'Demographics and Health' scenario where targeted investments in contraceptives, maternal health, and WASH infrastructure lead to a smaller, wealthier, and better-educated population by 2050, reducing extreme poverty by 48 million people.

The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) is identified as one of South Africa's most effective anti-corruption agencies, primarily due to its use of civil law remedies and a culture of integrity. However, it faces significant hurdles, including a cumbersome Presidential proclamation process, a precarious funding model, and a lack of legally binding authority for its recommendations. The document suggests legal amendments to the SIU Act, improved whistleblower protections, and a potential transition into a dedicated Chapter 9 anti-corruption agency.

The policy brief outlines the critical role of maritime transport in Africa's blue economy and the threats posed by climate change, including sea level rise and new global emissions regulations. It advocates for a new continental maritime governance framework to coordinate decarbonisation and resilience efforts. Key recommendations include transforming ports into green logistics hubs, implementing climate risk assessments in infrastructure design, and securing sustainable financing for fleet and port modernisation.

The document argues that Tanzania's 2025 general elections are likely to reinforce authoritarianism due to the ruling party's (CCM) dominance, the disqualification of major opposition parties, and the perceived partisanship of electoral bodies. It highlights Zanzibar as a particular flashpoint for violence due to contentious early voting procedures and the absence of reconciliatory leadership. While some institutional reforms were introduced, the brief contends they are superficial and that executive influence remains strong, leading to a restricted civic space and a high risk of low voter turnout.

The document analyzes the crisis facing ECOWAS in 2025, characterized by the exit of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and a decline in the organization's normative authority regarding democratic governance. It identifies a structural power imbalance where the executive Authority dominates, leading to inconsistent applications of 'zero-tolerance' policies toward unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs). The authors propose a three-phase reform strategy: first, restoring political authority through the operationalization of ECOSOC and revised sanctions; second, rebalancing power by making Court rulings binding and introducing parliamentary confirmation for Commission leadership; and third, transitioning to a supranational model with direct elections for the Parliament and primacy of Community law. The brief emphasizes the need for a coalition of 'reform champions'—including Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana—and strategic financial support from Germany and the EU to ensure regional stability.

The document examines how African youth are transforming peacebuilding through AI and digital tools, shifting from passive consumers to active knowledge creators. It highlights the decentralisation of early warning systems and the use of digital platforms for peace messaging and mobilisation. However, it warns that digital divides, gender gaps, and linguistic biases—where 88% of African languages are ignored by computational tools—threaten to marginalise rural youth and women. The brief notes a disconnect between the AU's Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security and digital strategies, urging for integrated policies and the institutionalisation of youth roles in AI governance to ensure digital peacebuilding is ethical and inclusive.

African cities face extreme climate vulnerability, with 83% rated at 'extreme risk', yet they are largely bypassed by the global climate financial architecture. The document highlights that while cities generate 80% of global GDP and are first responders in disasters, they are not parties to international conventions like the UNFCCC. It urges cities to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments—including non-economic loss and damage—and to leverage city networks and multi-level governance to access the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), the Warsaw International Mechanism, and the Santiago Network. The brief recommends that national governments integrate urban loss and damage into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) to improve funding access and implementation.

The document identifies systemic failures in UN peace operations, including the proliferation of 'Christmas tree mandates' and an over-reliance on bureaucratic templates. It recommends streamlining mandates, strengthening partnerships with regional organisations like the African Union, and reforming budgeting to allow for greater operational flexibility. The authors emphasize the need for proactive transition planning to avoid the 'peacebuilding financing cliff' and urge member states to prioritize political solutions over securitised interventions.

Nigeria faces a growing threat from improvised landmines in its northeastern region, with casualties quadrupling between 2022 and 2024. Current clearance efforts, managed exclusively by the Nigerian Army, rely on slow and risky manual tools like handheld metal detectors. The document argues that integrating airborne remote sensing and AI—technologies that have shown success in NATO and Harvard University experiments—could accelerate detection and improve safety. However, implementation is hindered by stringent drone regulations from the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority and state security concerns regarding the dual-use of UAVs. The brief recommends that federal authorities grant special derogations for humanitarian trials and formalize these technologies within the national mine action strategy currently being developed with the ICRC.

The Borno Model represents a shift from militarized, coercive approaches to a more humane, locally-owned framework for managing defections from Boko Haram factions. While it has successfully processed 160,000 exits by March 2024 through inclusive family-based reception and community engagement, it faces critical challenges including severe under-funding of livelihood support, a lack of transparent operational guidelines, and design flaws that risk reuniting women with their former captors.

The document examines corruption in South Africa as a collective action problem and proposes two primary solutions: anti-corruption collective action and the implementation of effective good faith compliance programmes. It highlights that while corruption may offer short-term gains, long-term costs include decreased productivity and slower financial growth. The brief identifies 'virtuous circles'—such as the corporate renewal of EOH and new legal frameworks like Section 34A of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act—that can shift the private sector toward integrity. It specifically emphasizes the vulnerability of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and recommends tax incentives and capacity building to support their compliance efforts.

The document argues that the COP29 finance goal of US$300 billion is insufficient, covering less than 4.3% of projected global needs, and that Africa receives less than 3% of total global finance for developing countries. It highlights a critical imbalance where only 36% of Africa's climate finance is dedicated to adaptation. The brief calls for African nations to transition from passive actors to co-creators at COP30, advocating for the 'Baku to Belém Roadmap' to reach US$1.3 trillion and demanding that finance be grant-based, accessible, and channeled through African institutions. It also notes the negative impact of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the need for more inclusive participation for least developed countries in UN negotiations.

The policy brief assesses the failure of the Mozambican government's military-first strategy in Cabo Delgado, noting that despite interventions by Rwanda and SADC, the insurgency persists and has expanded in 2025. It identifies local grievances—including youth unemployment, religious discrimination, and economic displacement—as primary drivers of recruitment. The author advocates for a multi-level dialogue approach involving community leaders and civil society to address these root causes, while critiquing the government's tendency to frame the conflict as 'international terrorism' to avoid negotiation.

The policy brief argues that Africa's maritime security efforts are hindered by institutional fragmentation, chronic underfunding, and a gap between high-level policy and operational capacity. It highlights that while regional bodies like SADC and ECOWAS have made progress, the African Union (AU) lacks a permanent coordinating body and a tested naval component for the African Standby Force. To address this, the authors recommend establishing an African Maritime Security Expert Group, convening a permanent Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS), and conducting the AMANI Africa III maritime exercise to validate naval command-and-control.

The report analyzes the digital information ecosystem during South Africa's May 2024 elections, identifying a complex market of paid and ideological influencers who used coordinated strategies to undermine electoral institutions and distort political narratives.

The report analyzes the roles of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt as transit and destination hubs for migrants moving from sub-Saharan Africa toward Europe. It highlights a systemic tension between the European Union's focus on border externalization and the African Union's goal of regional free movement. In Libya, state fragmentation has allowed smuggling networks and militias to control migration routes, leading to severe human rights abuses. Tunisia has seen a surge in sub-Saharan migrants and relies heavily on EU-funded border security despite lacking a national asylum policy. Egypt hosts approximately nine million migrants and maintains a more stable governance structure, though it has recently implemented stricter visa restrictions for Sudanese nationals. The report argues that current securitized approaches often drive migrants toward riskier routes and recommends a shift toward human rights, economic development, and the ratification of the AU Free Movement Protocol.

The report analyzes the complex landscape of African migration governance, highlighting the role of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in promoting free movement and regional integration. It identifies significant gaps between the adoption of policy frameworks—such as the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 2018 Free Movement Protocol—and their actual implementation. The document emphasizes the growing impact of climate change as a driver of mobility and the risks posed by the increasing use of immigration detention. It concludes that while subregional progress exists, overlapping memberships in RECs and a lack of compliance monitoring hinder the achievement of a borderless continent.

The Tigray region faces potential instability due to a split between TPLF factions led by Getachew Reda and Debretsion Gebremichael. While this division has opened space for new political discourse, the situation remains fragile, particularly regarding the neutrality of security forces and the continued presence of Eritrean and Amhara forces in some territories. Full implementation of the CoHA, including the return of over a million displaced persons, is deemed essential to prevent further violence.

The report examines the intersection of Africa's blue economy and the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda, arguing that youth inclusion is essential for sustainable development and maritime security. It identifies climate change, a burgeoning youth population, and coastal migration as critical trends that can either destabilize coastal regions or be harnessed for growth. The document highlights the potential for the blue economy to generate up to US$405 billion by 2030 and provides examples of youth-led initiatives in aquaculture, conservation, and maritime security across various African nations. It concludes that a multidimensional approach, exemplified by the Great Blue Wall initiative, is necessary to build resilience and prevent the radicalization of marginalized youth by providing viable economic alternatives.

The document examines the role of migrant remittances as a resilient financial flow to Africa, highlighting their potential to bypass bureaucratic barriers in climate adaptation. It notes that while remittances reached US$100.1 billion in 2022, high transaction costs and low climate literacy hinder their effectiveness. The brief recommends lowering remittance costs, enhancing diaspora engagement through mechanisms like diaspora bonds, and improving climate literacy to empower local communities in building resilience.