Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency
Summary
The policy brief assesses the failure of the Mozambican government's military-first strategy in Cabo Delgado, noting that despite interventions by Rwanda and SADC, the insurgency persists and has expanded in 2025. It identifies local grievances—including youth unemployment, religious discrimination, and economic displacement—as primary drivers of recruitment. The author advocates for a multi-level dialogue approach involving community leaders and civil society to address these root causes, while critiquing the government's tendency to frame the conflict as 'international terrorism' to avoid negotiation.
Key insights
- President Daniel Chapo has maintained the militarised strategy of his predecessor, Filipe Nyusi, which has failed to contain violent extremists who continue to threaten human and military security.
- Interventions by the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) reduced large-scale attacks and helped 600,000 internally displaced persons return, but failed to end the insurgency.
- Insurgents have adapted by adopting a 'hearts and minds' strategy in coastal communities and leveraging state security force abuses to present themselves as defenders of Muslim communities.
- The insurgency expanded in the first half of 2025, with attacks occurring in 12 districts of Cabo Delgado and extending into Niassa province.
- The government's framing of the conflict as 'international terrorism' and its claim that there is 'no one to talk to' undermine the potential for dialogue and obscure local grievances.
- Local drivers of extremism vary by district: Pemba faces youth unemployment and police extortion; Mueda reports religious discrimination and security force abuses; and Palma experiences economic displacement and loss of livelihoods due to LNG concessions.
- Various dialogue initiatives—including the Interreligious Centre for Peace (CIPAZ), the Peacemaking Advisory Group (PAG), and the Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG)—have been hindered by a lack of government support, insufficient funding, and poor coordination.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Nhamirre, B. (2025). Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1764761015551-PB-204.pdf
- Chicago
- Nhamirre, Borges. Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Institute for Security Studies, 2025. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1764761015551-PB-204.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Nhamirre |first1=Borges |title=Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2025 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1764761015551-PB-204.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{nhamirre2025inclusive, author = {Nhamirre, Borges}, title = {{Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2025}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1764761015551-PB-204.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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