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The report argues that existing financing for South Africa's just transition, such as the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP), prioritises private profit over social justice and is insufficient in scale. It proposes a cohesive framework anchored in worker demands and a new macroeconomic structure. Key recommendations include the creation of a Climate Response Fund (CRF) funded by carbon taxes and fuel levies, a shift toward 'promotional' monetary policy by the South African Reserve Bank to incentivise green lending, and the recapitalisation of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to provide long-term, patient capital for public goods.

The report argues that South Africa's current Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) relies too heavily on private finance and de-risking, which may increase energy costs and fail to ensure a socially just transition. It proposes a cohesive framework based on worker demands, featuring a Climate Response Fund (CRF) funded by carbon taxes and fuel levies, a promotional monetary policy to direct credit toward green industrialisation, and the reform of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) like the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to provide long-term, patient capital.

The G20 is a consensus-seeking dialogue mechanism established in 1999 to address global financial crises, comprising 19 countries, the European Union, and the African Union. It operates through a rotating presidency—with South Africa hosting in 2025—and is organized into Finance and Sherpa tracks. While it lacks a formal international mandate or binding decision-making power, it provides a platform for global economic coordination and civil society engagement via 'Engagement Groups' such as the C20.

The fact sheet examines how loopholes in the international tax system allow multinational corporations (MNCs) and the super-rich to avoid taxes, resulting in an estimated US$492 billion in global revenue losses for governments in 2024. It critiques the OECD/G20 Two-Pillar Solution for favoring developed nations and lacking transparency, while advocating for the 'Taxing the Super Rich' initiative and the establishment of a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation to ensure more democratic and progressive global taxation.

This fact sheet from the Institute for Economic Justice examines the structural causes of the African debt crisis, the impact of high interest rates on public services, and the limitations of G20 initiatives. It argues that the crisis is rooted in a 'rigged global system' and calls for systemic reform and debt cancellation through movements like Jubilee 2025.

The document asserts that global hunger is caused by a profit-driven system rather than food scarcity, highlighting the role of the 'ABCD firms' and financial speculators in driving up prices. It links food systems to 34% of global greenhouse gas emissions and notes the severe impact of climate-driven droughts in Southern Africa. While acknowledging previous G20 efforts, it criticizes the lack of systemic reforms, such as regulating food speculation or implementing buffer stocks. Under its G20 presidency, South Africa has established a Food Security Task Force to study commodity price volatility and stabilization techniques.

The document analyzes the systemic difficulties G20 nations face in transitioning from fossil fuels, citing economic dependencies, infrastructure lock-in, and social risks to workers. It notes a failure to meet 2009 G20 commitments to phase out subsidies, with G7 and developing nations spending hundreds of billions in 2023. The text emphasizes South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency as an opportunity to champion a people-centered approach involving green industrial hubs and socio-economic safeguards for coal-dependent regions.

The document argues that G20 climate finance often prioritizes private profit over public welfare, trapping vulnerable nations in debt through loan-based funding and 'de-risking' strategies. It calls for a shift toward grant-based funding and public investment based on the 'polluter pays' principle to ensure a just energy transition.

Zimbabwe is characterized by a deep crisis of confidence and a trust deficit in its leadership and institutions. The ZANU-PF government prioritizes short-term survival and power retention over structural reforms, utilizing a system of patronage and 'lawfare' to neutralize political opposition and civil society organizations (CSOs). Economically, the country suffers from extreme poverty, hyperinflation, and a volatile currency environment, exemplified by the introduction of the gold-backed ZiG. While the government pursues a 'constructive re-engagement' agenda with international creditors and Western powers, the report suggests that these efforts may be deflection tactics rather than genuine commitments to democratic reform. State capacity is hampered by the conflation of party and state interests, and the opposition remains fragmented and ineffective.

The Mineral Resources Development Bill 2025 (MRDB) seeks to reform South African mining laws by amending the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 and introducing artisanal and small-scale mining permits. While the government aims to accelerate projects and increase domestic mineral processing, including minerals for clean energy, the document highlights risks to water, soil, air, and land rights for rural communities. It specifically notes that the Bill requires only "meaningful consultation" rather than the standard of free, prior and informed consent.

The Mineral Resources Development Bill 2025 (MRDB) seeks to amend South Africa's mining laws to boost the economy, speed up project approvals, and regulate artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). While the government aims to increase local mineral processing ('beneficiation') and create jobs, the document highlights significant risks for rural communities, including the lack of a right to give or deny consent to projects and the absence of strict penalties for companies that fail to meet Social and Labour Plan (SLP) commitments.

The Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) assessed the implementation of the State Capture Commission (SCC) recommendations in South Africa. While progress was noted in asset recovery (R10.9 billion recovered by March 2025) and the establishment of the permanent Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC), the report highlights significant systemic failures. Key concerns include the delayed appointment process for the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the lack of a finalized whistleblower protection framework, and the continued politicization of the public administration. The report argues that the government has relied too heavily on legislative bills that are either not yet in effect or incomplete, and that accountability for members of the Executive remains insufficient.

The document argues that digital public infrastructure (DPI)—comprising digital identity, payments, and data-sharing systems—can increase the visibility of economic activities in Africa's shadow economy, which accounts for roughly 35% of GDP. It contrasts the approach of some African nations, which tax digital financial services (DFS) transactions directly, with the strategies of South Korea and India, which used digital systems to create audit trails and improve broader tax compliance. The brief recommends that African governments adopt a multi-layered DPI ecosystem, prioritize strategic compliance targeting of high-value non-compliant actors, and leverage South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency to foster an 'Africa stack' for scalable deployment.

Two years after the COP28 agreement to triple global renewable capacity by 2030, national targets remain largely stagnant. As of July 2025, the global sum of national targets has increased by only 2% since COP28, reaching 7.4 TW, which is significantly below the 11 TW required to meet the tripling goal. Only 22 countries have updated their targets, with the majority of these being EU member states revising plans through the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) process. Most non-EU updates occurred through routine planning cycles rather than as a direct response to COP pledges. Major electricity markets, including the US, Russia, and Canada, have either not set explicit targets or are unlikely to update them in 2025.

The document argues that while the core vision of the 1998 White Paper on Local Government remains relevant, the operational assumptions—particularly regarding funding and administration—are outdated. PARI identifies a cycle of decline driven by financial stress, patronage-based appointments, and infrastructure decay. It proposes a differentiated local government design where powers and functions are allocated based on a municipality's capacity and location in the space-economy. Key recommendations include reforming the political-administrative interface to reduce patronage, establishing clear affordability standards for basic services, and integrating climate-appropriate infrastructure requirements into the updated policy framework.

The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources has granted Environmental Authorisation for the Northern Cape Ultra Deep (NCUD) project, allowing Shell Offshore Upstream South Africa B.V. and its partners to begin drilling activities in 2026 or 2027.

The report identifies a significant gap in the integration of climate action within Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI), noting that while high-level executive interest exists, bureaucratic capacity and policy coherence are lacking. It highlights contradictions between Nigeria's climate commitments, such as its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) targeting a 45% emissions reduction by 2030, and its continued state-led investment in oil exploration. The document argues that the FMITI must align industrial and trade policies with environmental goals, leveraging carbon markets and public-private partnerships to transition away from fossil fuel dependence. It recommends the development of a new 'green' industrial policy and draws on South Africa's experience with the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) as a model for coordinated national strategy and international funding.

The document examines the threats to Africa's development financing, including trade fragmentation, the 'securitisation' of economic policy, and high debt burdens. It proposes five ring-fencing mechanisms—public expenditure reviews, medium-term expenditure frameworks, independent funds, statutory protections, and debt-relief linkages—to ensure continuity in funding for education, infrastructure, and climate resilience. It further suggests that African governments frame development as complementary to security to leverage international financing and calls for reforms in the international financial architecture to support these protections.

The Nature-Based Infrastructure Global Resource Centre conducted a cost-benefit analysis of nature-based infrastructure (NBI) in Cape Town's Diep/Sand River and Zeekoe catchments. The study finds that NBI interventions—such as creating retention ponds, establishing wetlands, and removing invasive species—offer significant economic returns, with benefit-to-cost ratios up to 2.07 and net benefits reaching ZAR 133 million over 25 years. These gains are primarily driven by avoided costs in dredging and canal refurbishment, reduced flood damages, and the creation of over 60 local jobs annually. The analysis indicates that NBI is particularly valuable under pessimistic climate scenarios with high flood risks, providing a cost-effective alternative to grey infrastructure upgrades.

The Climate Change Citizenship for a Just Transition in South Africa project, co-funded by the European Union and delivered by GreenCape, focused on empowering urban and rural communities in the Eastern, Northern, and Western Cape. The initiative established nine active climate clubs reaching 422 high school learners and facilitated community engagement in national policy processes, including the National Climate Change Bill and the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan. With over 500 participants in training workshops and a high rate of female participation, the project was rated as highly effective by an independent evaluation based on OECD-DAC criteria, demonstrating sustained local ownership and impact.