Search Climate Insights Directory

The document analyzes the interdependencies between the EU, China, and Africa regarding critical raw materials (CRMs). While the EU seeks to reduce its reliance on China through initiatives like the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway, the paper argues that complete decoupling is unfeasible due to China's dominance in midstream processing and the high costs of establishing independent European supply chains. It highlights that African nations, particularly the DRC and Zimbabwe, are increasingly pushing for local value addition and processing rather than mere extraction. The author proposes a trilateral cooperation model, using a hypothetical cobalt project in the DRC, where the EU provides technical training and financing, China provides refining technology and market access, and the DRC ensures resource ownership and local industrial development.

The document outlines a strategy for South Africa to develop its green hydrogen ecosystem by prioritizing trade-focused investments that deliver local benefits. It identifies critical hurdles, including inefficient ports and a lack of domestic electrolyser manufacturing, and proposes solutions such as 'green corridors' for marine fuels and regional certification standards. The brief emphasizes that social acceptance, particularly regarding water scarcity and community consultation, is essential for the sector's viability.

The Lobito Corridor is positioned as a transformative route for critical raw materials (CRMs) from the Copperbelt of the DRC and Zambia to the port of Lobito in Angola, aimed at supporting the global green energy transition. While it promises significant reductions in transport time and costs, and has attracted up to USD 6 billion in funding from the US, EU, and other institutions, the project faces substantial risks. These include geopolitical competition with China, which dominates regional mining and infrastructure, and concerns over 'modern plundering' where raw materials are exported without local value addition. Furthermore, the project faces sustainability challenges regarding human rights in cobalt mines, land tenure disputes, and the regulation of artisanal and small-scale mining. The re-election of Donald Trump is identified as a major risk factor that could lead to the freezing of US federal and USAID funding, potentially shifting the project's control toward Chinese interests.

In 2024, global coal power capacity increased by 18.8 GW, as 44.1 GW was commissioned and 25.2 GW retired. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK completed its coal phaseout, global progress was offset by significant expansion in China and India. China commissioned 30.5 GW (70% of the global total) and saw 94.5 GW in new construction starts. India recorded its highest-ever level of new coal proposals at 38.4 GW. Conversely, coal proposals in OECD countries dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, though retirements in these nations must triple to align with the Paris Agreement.

The document examines the Trump administration's efforts to secure critical minerals and reduce dependence on China, focusing on proposed deals in Ukraine and the DRC. It argues that these 'minerals-for-security' arrangements face significant feasibility hurdles and risk mirroring neocolonial patterns. The author recommends that African nations adopt 'strategic neutrality' and focus on domestic value addition to maximize their agency in the global energy transition.

The document examines the 'climate-debt trap' facing low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where escalating external debt—reaching nearly US$6.5 trillion in 2023—crowds out climate investment. It analyzes existing financial mechanisms such as Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDCs), Catastrophe (CAT) bonds, and debt swaps, while critiquing the G20 Common Framework for its inadequacy. The authors advocate for the cancellation of 'odious debt' linked to fossil fuel projects and propose that a Fossil Fuel Treaty could establish a Debt Resolution Facility to help member nations renegotiate debts in exchange for phasing out fossil fuels.

The report details how climate change drives biodiversity loss through mechanisms like ocean acidification and species range shifts, while biodiversity loss weakens the planet's carbon sinks. It critically assesses 'false solutions'—including monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsetting, and geoengineering—arguing that these policies often cause further ecological damage and land grabbing. The document calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, energy sufficiency, and the protection of Indigenous Peoples' land rights to address the polycrisis holistically.

The document analyzes how climate change accelerates biodiversity loss and how the loss of ecosystems further destabilizes the climate. It critiques 'false solutions' such as monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsets, and geoengineering, arguing they often cause more harm than good. The report calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, community-led energy transitions, and the protection of Indigenous rights.

In 2024, global coal power saw a contradiction: while new completions reached a 20-year low of 44 GW and the EU increased retirements fourfold, China and India saw record-breaking activity. China's new coal starts reached a ten-year high of 94 GW, driven by approval surges in 2022-2023 and supportive policies like capacity electricity tariffs and long-term power purchase agreements. Conversely, OECD nations have significantly reduced planned projects, though their retirement pace remains too slow to meet Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8 GW despite the lowest number of new commissions in 20 years, driven primarily by record construction activity in China and India. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK eliminated coal entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to expand capacity. The report highlights a stark divide between OECD countries, where projects have plummeted, and Asia, where China and India account for 92% of new projects.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

The report examines how rising external debt service costs in Africa are crowding out essential spending on health, education, and climate adaptation. It critiques the G20's Common Framework as slow and insufficient, proposing reforms such as automatic debt standstills, enhanced Debt Sustainability Analyses (DSAs) that include climate risks, and a 'fair' comparability of treatment rule for creditors.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades at 44 GW, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in plant closures and the UK shut its last coal plant, Indonesia faces a contradictory trend: overall proposed capacity is down 90% since 2015, but 'captive' coal plants for industrial use are surging. Indonesia's transition is further complicated by conflicting government statements on a 2040 phase-out, the withdrawal of the US from the JETP leadership, and record coal production reaching 831 million tons in 2024.