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The document outlines the role of CCUS in low-carbon scenarios, noting its potential to contribute 4% of global CO2 reductions by 2030 and 12% by 2050. It highlights that while CCUS has historically underperformed, investment is increasing, with a global market potentially reaching $4–$10 billion by 2026-27. Canada is positioned as having an early advantage due to expertise in enhanced oil recovery (EOR), geological storage in Alberta and Saskatchewan, and early adoption in coal-fired electricity and oil sands. Notable investments include $685 million for a network in Norway and significant funding for Direct Air Capture (DAC) from the US, UK, and private entities.

The document analyzes the diverse structures of Canada's provincial electricity markets, noting that a lack of coordination creates economic inefficiencies and hinders the integration of renewable energy. It identifies key barriers to integration, such as constitutional jurisdictional splits and political inertia, and proposes four strategies—bilateral collaboration, a Nordic-inspired bottom-up approach, a free-trade framework, and a health-care-style principles-based model—to foster a more integrated national grid necessary for deep decarbonization.

The report argues that Canada lacks a comprehensive national system to evaluate the effectiveness of its climate adaptation policies, noting that current efforts are largely focused on tracking policy implementation (outputs) rather than actual resilience outcomes. It proposes a four-pillar foundation for a new M&E system: context, content, operationalization, and communication. The authors recommend that the federal government establish a legally binding mandate for M&E, integrate Indigenous knowledge, and employ a mix of quantitative indicators and qualitative methods to ensure iterative policy improvement.

The document argues that while Canada possesses a competitive advantage in clean energy, its electricity grids are often optimized for legacy technologies and lack sufficient planning for industrial growth. It compares Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia with international peers, highlighting that hydro-dominant provinces have a flexibility advantage, while others must proactively develop storage and interconnections. The report recommends that the federal government support interprovincial planning, provide targeted funding for grid development, ensure climate policy stability, and prioritize grid flexibility to avoid wasting renewable energy and to attract global capital.

The document analyzes four international policy mechanisms—US hydrogen tax credits, Norway's carbon capture and storage in the North Sea, the UK's Contracts for Difference for renewable electricity, and Australia's Green Bank—to derive strategic lessons for Canada's clean energy transition. It evaluates the strengths, limitations, and applicable lessons of each approach, focusing on reducing financial risk, leveraging comparative advantages, and ensuring cost-efficiency in public spending.

Climate Strategies proposes five operational avenues for the first 2025 JTWP dialogue, including a non-prescriptive governance framework, a case study repository, a resource database, justice-focused metrics, and a global governance architecture. For the second 2025 dialogue, it recommends addressing climate resilience, restorative justice, transition minerals, and deep dives into neglected sectors like food and health systems. The submission also suggests reforming the dialogue format to combine workshops with discussions to better facilitate the sharing of real-world practitioner experiences.

The document argues that because the energy transition is already underway due to technological shifts, countries must proactively plan for a Just Transition to avoid economic dislocation. It highlights opportunities for economic diversification, such as Ghana's investment plan to generate 400,000 net jobs by 2060, and best practices like Brazil's reallocation of petroleum revenues to reforestation. However, it identifies critical barriers, including fiscal dependence on fossil fuels in countries like Azerbaijan (where oil and gas constitute 90% of exports) and a lack of granular data on workforce impacts in Indonesia. The author proposes actionable solutions including the repurposing of coal infrastructure, the expansion of local financing mechanisms, and the anchoring of transition policies in legal frameworks to ensure long-term stability.

The document analyzes Brazil's unique energy landscape, where a predominantly renewable electricity mix coexists with a significant reliance on petroleum for transport and a growing oil production sector. It highlights the tension between the government's climate commitments and its plans to expand oil production, particularly in the Equatorial Margin. The briefing suggests that Brazil can leverage its G20 and COP30 leadership to promote the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies and use oil revenues to fund green innovation and forest conservation, while recommending the introduction of an upstream carbon tax to manage environmental externalities.

The document argues for a broad interpretation of Just Transitions that encompasses procedural and distributional justice across multiple sectors, moving beyond a narrow focus on the energy workforce. It provides six practical recommendations for operationalisation, including the need for reliable data, stakeholder forums, and place-based solutions. The submission highlights specific challenges in the Global South, such as high employment informality and unequal energy access, and suggests that the JTWP can enhance ambition by integrating Just Transitions into NDCs and fostering high-level political buy-in. It includes case studies from various countries to illustrate different transition pathways and the importance of coordinating top-down and bottom-up approaches.

The first week of COP30 was characterized by significant friction between developed and developing nations over finance, trade measures, and the 1.5C temperature goal. While some progress was made in operationalizing the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage and advancing Article 6 carbon market standards, negotiations on the Just Transition Work Programme and the Gender Action Plan stalled due to disagreements over terminology and the role of unilateral trade measures. The Brazilian Presidency launched the Belem Health Action Plan and proposed a framework for synergies between the three Rio Conventions, though many thematic areas remain bracketed heading into the second week.

The COP30 Week 2 debrief details the adoption of the 'Global Mutirão' cover decision, which calls for tripling adaptation finance by 2035 but omits references to fossil fuels and deforestation. Key outcomes include the recommendation for a Just Transition mechanism (BAM) to be operationalized in 2026, the transfer of $26.8 million to the Article 6.4 PACM, and the adoption of the Belém Gender Action Plan. However, significant tensions persisted regarding unilateral trade measures, the 1.5°C temperature goal, and the lack of concrete targets in climate finance and the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA).

The document provides a detailed analysis of the second week of COP28, highlighting the adoption of the first Global Stocktake (GST) and its call to 'transition away from fossil fuels'. It examines progress and failures across several domains, including the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, the tripling of renewable energy targets, and the lack of binding language in mitigation and adaptation goals. The report also notes the influence of fossil fuel lobbyists and the marginalization of Small Island Developing States and gender-specific concerns during the final decision-making processes.

The Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme (MWP), established at COP26, aims to accelerate global emissions reductions through non-prescriptive dialogues and capacity-building. While COP30 confirmed the programme's continuation through 2026 and improved finance matchmaking and inclusiveness, significant divergences remain between developed and developing nations regarding the level of prescriptive guidance for sectoral pathways and the scale of financial commitments. Key areas of ongoing debate include the design of a digital platform for information sharing and the balance between global guidance and national sovereignty in managing forests and waste.

The document identifies specific steel clusters in India—including Angul, Rourkela, Raigarh, Raipur, Jamshedpur, Durgapur, and Vizag—and assesses their CO2 emissions against available storage capacities in saline aquifers, coal fields, and basalt formations. It provides a comparative list of global operational CCUS projects and outlines the regulatory and financial support mechanisms for CCUS in the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and China.

Climate TRACE estimates that anthropogenic methane emissions in 2025 were just over 410 million tonnes, with agriculture, fossil energy, and waste accounting for 97% of the total. The report argues that slashing methane is the most impactful way to keep global warming under 2 degrees Celsius due to the gas's powerful near-term warming effect. It identifies specific actionable opportunities: reducing methane intensity in oil and gas production (particularly in the US and Mexico), capturing coal mine methane, targeting a small number of high-emitting landfills, and addressing enteric fermentation and rice cultivation in agriculture.

The report finds that EU member states are failing to responsibly govern negative emissions, often relying on vulnerable land-based sinks that are declining due to climate impacts. It highlights a systemic lack of separate, binding targets for permanent CDR and a failure to clearly define 'residual emissions' that CDR is intended to balance. While some countries like Sweden and Germany have initiated research or funding for bio-CCS, the report argues that most plans lack feasibility assessments and conflate permanent removals with fossil-fuel-related carbon capture and storage (CCS).

The briefing examines the impact of aviation emissions and the failure of international measures, specifically CORSIA, to align with the Paris Agreement. It details the 'stop-the-clock' derogation that paused EU ETS enforcement for flights entering and leaving Europe and warns that continuing this exemption risks the EU's 2030 climate targets and increases the oversupply of emission allowances.

Carbon Market Watch argues for stringent rules to prevent double counting, 'hot air' credits, and the inclusion of REDD-plus in carbon markets. It advocates for a 'net atmospheric benefit' through discounting, the establishment of a share of proceeds for adaptation and loss and damage, and the integration of a human rights-based approach into the core agreement to protect vulnerable populations.

The report argues that deep decarbonisation of EU energy-intensive industries requires a combination of process innovations, product shifts, and business model transformations. For chemicals, this involves transitioning to bio-based feedstocks and enhanced plastics recycling. In steel, the HIsarna process and a shift toward electric arc furnace (EAF) production from scrap are highlighted. For cement, the report emphasizes calcium looping carbon capture and storage (CCS) and clinker substitution. It concludes that public policy, specifically the EU ETS Innovation Fund, is essential to bridge the gap between demonstration and commercialisation of these technologies by 2030.

The report argues that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to US national security by intensifying physical impacts and mounting geopolitical tensions over the energy transition. It identifies a likely increase in cross-border conflicts over water and migration, strategic competition in the Arctic, and the risk of unilateral solar geoengineering. The document highlights 11 highly vulnerable countries and two regions (Central Africa and Pacific island states) where climate-induced instability may necessitate increased US diplomatic, humanitarian, and military resources. It also notes that current global policies are insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals, leading to competition over critical minerals and technologies.