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A coalition of 70 organizations warns that a 'Super El Niño'—a phenomenon not seen since 1870—will cause extreme rainfall, floods, and droughts in Brazil. The letter criticizes the government's history of reacting only after disasters and its tendency to prioritize economically valued central urban areas over peripheries inhabited by Black, quilombola, and traditional populations. The authors demand transformational climate adaptation that prioritizes racial and gender equity, secure housing over forced removals, and the integration of community-led risk management into federal policy. Specific requests for information and meetings are directed to the Casa Civil, the Ministry of Integration and Regional Development, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, and the Ministry of Cities.

In February 2026, intense rainfall in Minas Gerais, Brazil, caused over 70 deaths and displaced nearly 10,000 people, with Juiz de Fora being the most affected city. While climate models project a 7% increase in February rainfall with future warming, the immediate severity of the disaster was driven by high social vulnerability and unplanned urban expansion on steep slopes. Risk assessments had previously identified 130,000 residents in high-risk zones in Juiz de Fora. The study found that while early warnings were issued, topographical constraints and a lack of evacuation options hindered their effectiveness.

Analysis by Climate Central indicates that all 25 analyzed coffee-producing countries, representing 97% of global production, experienced an increase in 'coffee-harming heat' (temperatures above 30°C) between 2021 and 2025 due to carbon pollution. The top five producers—Brazil, Vietnam, Colombia, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—saw an average of 57 additional days of such heat annually. Brazil, the largest producer, experienced 70 extra days of coffee-harming heat per year on average. These conditions threaten both arabica and robusta coffee varieties, with arabica being more sensitive to heat. The report warns that land suitable for coffee farming could decrease by 50% by 2050 without adaptation, potentially leading to deforestation as farmers move to higher elevations.

The 2025 report on Brazil's Forest Code implementation reveals a significant increase in CAR registration validation, rising from 3.3% to 9% of the national database, driven largely by automation in states like São Paulo and Paraná. While federal governance of the SICAR system has improved through new intergovernmental coordination and the operationalization of Environmental Reserve Quotas (CRAs), progress remains uneven across regions. The Northern region shows limited progress, while the Southeast is the most advanced. A critical bottleneck remains the lack of verifiable land tenure information, with approximately 30% of registrations in Mato Grosso showing spatial overlaps. Implementation of the PRA remains limited, with a small number of Environmental Compliance Agreements (TCs) relative to the volume of properties requiring restoration.

The document examines how traditional communities in western Bahia, such as the Fecho de Pasto Clemente and Beira Rio, maintain the Cerrado biome through sustainable practices like extensive cattle grazing. It highlights the severe threats posed by industrial agribusiness, including land grabbing and water depletion, and argues that formal recognition of these territories as Omecs or TICCAs is essential for inclusive conservation and social justice.

The report examines methane emissions from Brazil's waste sector, which accounts for 15% of the country's methane emissions. It identifies significant infrastructure gaps, such as the continued operation of approximately 2,000 inadequate disposal sites and a low organic waste recovery rate of 1%. While Brazil has a comprehensive regulatory framework, including the National Solid Waste Policy (PNRS) and the 'Fuel of the Future' law, implementation is hindered by financial constraints and a lack of technical capacity at the municipal level. The report recommends expanding composting, anaerobic digestion, and landfill gas capture to meet Paris Agreement commitments and the targets of the National Solid Waste Plan (PLANARES).

International climate finance for Brazil grew by 84% between the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 biennia, reaching an average of US$ 5.1 billion per year. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and was characterized by a shift toward commercial financing instruments. While Western Europe, led by France, was the largest regional provider, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions—received only 11% of the total finance. Public institutions provided 58% of the funds, with multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) playing a dominant role, while private finance grew fourfold to reach 42% of the total.

International climate finance for Brazil averaged US$ 5.1 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from the 2019–2020 period. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, particularly solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private capital from commercial financial institutions. While Western Europe was the largest regional provider, the report highlights a stark imbalance in sectoral allocation: the AFOLU sector, responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions, received only 11% of total finance. The majority of funds were earmarked for mitigation (80%) and delivered via commercial debt and equity, while grants and concessional finance declined by 43%.

International climate finance to Brazil averaged R$ 26.6 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from 2019–2020. Growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private commercial financing. While Western Europe, led by France, was the primary source, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's emissions—received only 11% of total funding, mostly through public multilateral sources.

The document examines the 'PRA autodeclaratório' as a mechanism to overcome administrative bottlenecks in Brazil's Forest Code implementation, specifically the slow validation of CAR registrations. It analyzes experiences in Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Goiás, and Bahia, concluding that while the model can accelerate restoration, its success depends on robust post-execution monitoring, clear result indicators, and effective accountability mechanisms to prevent the underestimation of environmental liabilities.

The paper addresses the lack of clarity regarding who is responsible for managing climate risks that propagate across borders. It introduces a framework to identify stakeholders, assets, and objectives at risk, applying it to the supply chain of Brazilian non-GMO soy protein concentrate imported for the Norwegian aquaculture industry. The analysis demonstrates that while national-level risk ownership may be clear, transboundary responsibility—such as Norway's role in supporting adaptation in Brazil—remains ambiguous.

The document analyzes climate obstruction in Argentina and Brazil, identifying a shift toward explicit climate denial under President Javier Milei in Argentina and a complex mix of agribusiness-led obstruction and state-driven fossil fuel expansion in Brazil. It highlights how developmentalist ideologies and economic lobbying in both nations hinder the transition to low-carbon economies, despite Brazil's recent efforts to reduce Amazonian deforestation.

The research examines how traditional communities in Northern Minas Gerais transitioned their territorial struggles into an environmental framework through the 'Vazanteiros em Movimento' movement. Using ethnographic fieldwork from 2006 to 2012 and the 'extended-case method', the study identifies contradictions in sustainable development ideologies, noting that compensatory parks for irrigated fruit farming projects actually facilitated the consolidation of agribusiness in the region while simultaneously sparking a social movement for territorial claims within the environmental sphere.

The document serves as a legal reference guide, listing the specific laws and regulations used to implement the Brazilian Forest Code (Lei nº 12.651/2012). It details federal legislation and provides a state-by-state breakdown of the legal frameworks for the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) and the Environmental Regularization Program (PRA) in 26 Brazilian states and the Federal District. The listed legislation covers topics such as ecological-economic zoning, legal reserve compensation, the restoration of degraded areas, and the administrative procedures for validating rural property registrations.

The document clarifies the distinction between the CAR (the national database of rural properties) and Sicar (the technological platform that operationalizes it). It details the complex shared governance between the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) and the Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services (MGI), particularly following the 2024 migration of data to Dataprev. The briefing assesses the progress of CAR data analysis, noting that while all states have begun the process, only about 3.3% of registries nationwide have been concluded. It highlights the role of automation tools—such as Análise Dinamizada, CAR Digital, and CAR 2.0—in scaling these analyses, while identifying persistent barriers including low data quality and insufficient technical staff.

The report provides a snapshot of the implementation of Brazil's Forest Code in 2024, focusing on the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) and the Environmental Compliance Program (PRA). It highlights a steady increase in CAR registrations, reaching 7.65 million by November 2024, and notes that all states have now initiated the analysis stage, though this remains a significant bottleneck. While some states like São Paulo and Mato Grosso have made substantial progress through automation and legislative changes, only about 3.3% of all registrations nationwide have completed analysis. The report also details the expansion of the PRA, with 19 states and the Federal District having regulated it, and notes the increasing use of Terms of Commitment (ToC) for environmental recovery in states such as Mato Grosso and Pará.

This report analyzes international development and cooperation finance flows for land use in Brazil from 2021 to 2023, identifying multilateral development banks and international governments as the primary sources of funding, with a strong emphasis on the forest sector.

Brazil is positioned as a potential global leader in green steel due to high-quality iron ore and vast renewable energy resources, though its industry remains heavily reliant on coal-based blast furnaces. While the country leads in biochar use, a full transition requires shifting to electric arc furnaces (EAF) and green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI). The report emphasizes that strategic policy and the upcoming COP30 summit are critical to overcoming the longevity of existing coal-based infrastructure and the high capital costs of new technologies.

The report identifies critical gaps in the governance of legal deforestation in the MATOPIBA region (Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia), where agricultural expansion for soy and corn drives significant vegetation loss. It highlights a lack of clarity in legal competence between state and municipal authorities for issuing Authorizations for the Suppression of Vegetation (ASV) and the failure of the national SINAFLOR system to serve as an effective management tool. Key issues include underreporting of ASVs, a lack of public transparency regarding georeferenced data, and technical incompatibilities between state and federal systems. The authors recommend that the federal government clarify issuing competencies, improve SINAFLOR's functionality, and ensure open access to complete ASV data to support the goal of zero deforestation by 2030.

The document examines the systemic failures in managing legal deforestation in Brazil's Matopiba region, highlighting the inefficiency of the Sinaflor system and the lack of transparency in ASV data. It argues that the current governance framework allows for significant underreporting of legal land conversion, which undermines the goal of zero deforestation by 2030 in the Cerrado biome.