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The document analyzes the January 2013 escalation of conflict in Mali, where Islamist rebels captured the city of Konna, prompting a French military intervention. It attributes the rebel offensive to a lack of progress in negotiations and delays in the deployment of the UN-authorized African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). While the French intervention is viewed as timely due to the Malian army's limited operational capacity, the author warns of humanitarian risks and the long-term challenge of controlling liberated areas. The briefing concludes by questioning the effectiveness of previous initiatives to strengthen African national armies and calls for a rethink of regional defense strategies.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) cautions the UK government against proposing changes to human rights laws to facilitate counter-terrorism, arguing that such 'heavy-handed tactics' often fuel terrorist recruitment. Citing examples from Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, Egypt, and Chad, the letter asserts that state abuses provide justification for groups like Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. The ISS highlights that in Africa, militant attacks rose from 171 in 2009 to 738 in 2015, suggesting that neglecting the rule of law undermines intelligence gathering and international cooperation. The document concludes that upholding human rights is a strategic necessity for defeating groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The document examines the establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) following the 2010 Cancun and 2011 Durban agreements. It critiques the World Bank's historical role in climate finance, citing conflicts of interest, a bias toward mitigation over adaptation, and the promotion of private sector instruments that may marginalise the poorest nations. The author advocates for the GCF to maintain a distinct legal personality, an independent secretariat, and a grant-based approach to adaptation to ensure direct access for developing countries, particularly in Africa.

The document explores the tension between formal 'due process' and substantive justice, arguing that criminal law is often a tool for political and economic power rather than a neutral instrument. It contrasts consensus-functionalist and radical-conflict paradigms of law and evaluates the impact of colonial legacies on the current state of criminal justice in Africa, where corruption and repression remain prevalent.

The report analyzes UN discourse on small arms and light weapons (SALW) from 2001 to 2003, concluding that gender perspectives remain marginalized. The authors find that when gender is mentioned, women are almost exclusively characterized as passive victims, while the specific impacts on men and the active roles of women as peace-builders are largely ignored. While NGOs and international organizations demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of gender, member state delegations often lack expertise or prioritize other issues. The document recommends bridging the gap between gender experts and policymakers through targeted education and coordinated advocacy to ensure that the 2006 Review Conference on SALW reflects the diverse experiences of both men and women.

The handbook provides a comprehensive guide for African environmental and land rights defenders (ELRDs), detailing the threats they face—including SLAPP suits and gender-based violence—and the legal avenues available for redress. It outlines the roles of the African Commission and African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as sub-regional courts like the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. The document emphasizes the vulnerability of women, youth, and Indigenous communities, and provides a directory of emergency funds and support organizations.

The research paper develops a formal model and provides empirical analysis to argue that third-party military intervention in civil wars is driven by economic factors. The authors find that the likelihood of intervention increases when the conflict state has large oil reserves, when the global oil market is more oligopolistic (less competitive), and when the potential intervener is a net oil importer. Using a dyadic dataset from 1945-1999, the study demonstrates that the value of oil reserves and the intervener's balance of trade in oil are significant predictors of intervention, often exerting a larger impact than traditional factors like ethnic ties or Cold War dynamics.

The study analyzes 285 conflict episodes to determine how natural resources affect the duration of postconflict peace. It identifies three primary mechanisms: distribution, financing, and aggravation. The findings indicate that while natural resource conflicts generally show shorter peace periods bivariately, only conflicts driven by disagreements over the distribution of resources and revenues significantly increase the risk of recurrence in a multivariate analysis. This suggests that resource-related grievances are a more persistent driver of conflict relapse than the mere opportunity to finance warfare.

The research examines the transition from Yahya Jammeh's autocracy to the 'New Gambia' under President Adama Barrow, noting a surge in public accusations of 'tribalism'. The authors argue that these accusations are 'anticipatory and speculative', driven by fears of future ethnic monopolies on power rather than current organised mobilisation. Historically, Gambian politics has largely downplayed ethnicity, with the exception of the late Jammeh era where he used anti-Mandinka rhetoric. In the 'New Gambia', the discourse focuses on the moral character of political actors, where accusing an opponent of tribalism serves to delegitimise them as 'indecent' or 'uncivilised'. The authors conclude that while ethnic identification exists in daily life and is linked to livelihoods, it remains a marginal tool for formal political power compared to the potent use of tribalist slurs as a meta-political weapon.

The research finds that while Libyan arms significantly enhanced the military capacity of insurgents in Mali and the Sinai, the overall proliferation was less destabilizing and widespread than initially feared, abating after 2013 due to international interventions and increased domestic demand within Libya.

The report finds that 2025 was the third most violent year since 1989, with 245,000 battle-related deaths. It highlights a record high of 65 state-based conflicts and a concerning doubling of international conflicts to eight in 2025. While non-state conflicts decreased slightly, one-sided violence surged to 76,500 fatalities, primarily driven by massacres in Sudan.

The research concludes that China's security force assistance (SFA) in Africa is consistent with a strategy of economic alignment rather than a military alignment strategy aimed at supplanting the US. While China has expanded its SFA to almost every African state since 2015, the assistance is described as being "spread widely but thin," focusing on non-lethal equipment and training to protect economic interests and foster long-term relationships. In contrast, the US remains the dominant SFA provider in financial terms, with annual provision worth hundreds of millions of dollars compared to China's estimated tens of millions. The authors argue that this approach creates a viable alternative for authoritarian African governments who may otherwise face human rights-based restrictions from Western donors.

The research examines the framing of gender in P/CVE policies from 2001 to 2017, identifying a dichotomy between a transformative approach to preventing women's radicalization and a traditionalist approach that instrumentalizes women's domestic roles as security assets. It finds that while women are heavily scrutinized as either victims or preventers, men's gendered roles are largely assumed and less analyzed, and there is a significant policy gap regarding far-right extremism in the global North.

The authors use geo-coded data from 31 federal states to argue that both relatively rich and relatively poor regions are more prone to secessionist conflict than those with average wealth. The study also finds that the presence of politically excluded ethnic groups and the existence of regional autonomy further elevate the risk of violent secessionist conflict.

The report examines SFA in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Somalia since 2010, finding that billions in spending have often been ineffective or counter-productive. It identifies a 'piecemeal approach' where multiple providers with diverging interests create fragmented security forces, undermining professional standards and civilian oversight. Case studies of Mali and Somalia highlight issues such as high personnel turnover, a focus on technical skills over ethics, and the diversion of equipment to illicit markets. The authors recommend long-term, coordinated partnerships based on detailed local capacity assessments to foster cohesion rather than fragmentation.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of global conflict trends from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 54 state-based conflicts in 2019. It highlights the significant role of the Islamic State (IS) in driving recent conflict increases and the prevalence of internationalized civil conflicts. While battle-related deaths have generally decreased over the last 20 years, specific hotspots in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia remain deadly. The paper also analyzes the decline in peace agreements since 2015 and the persistence of non-state conflicts, particularly violent drug cartel activity in Latin America and communal violence in Africa.

The paper analyzes conflict dynamics in Africa from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 25 state-based conflicts in 2019, many of which are low-intensity or involve the Islamic State. While Africa faces rising non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, it also leads other regions in the number of definitive ceasefires and peace agreements. The study further details the growth of UN peacekeeping operations in the region from 1994 to 2018, highlighting a significant increase in troop deployment peaking in 2010.

The research analyzes the geographical evolution of African civil wars using the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED). It argues that rebel groups with strong ethnic ties or significant military strength tend to maintain stable, localized conflict zones, whereas groups lacking these attributes—or those receiving external military support—are more likely to be 'roving.' The study finds that the greatest mobility occurs when rebels have neither strong local ties nor the strength to compete conventionally with government forces.

The authors examine the rise of Security Force Assistance (SFA)—the training and equipping of foreign armed forces—as a preferred alternative to large-scale combat deployments and expensive security sector reform. They argue that in fragile states, SFA often fails because providers misread local political dynamics, where ruling elites may manipulate security fragmentation for their own survival. The paper critiques the standard principal-agent theory of SFA, suggesting it lacks the nuance to account for the heterogeneity of programs and the lack of cohesiveness among multiple providers and recipients. Through various case studies, the authors highlight unintended consequences, such as the creation of elite units that serve as instruments for regime protection rather than national security.

The research argues that the expansion of jihadist groups in central Mali is fueled by a 'predatory and corrupt state' and a development model that ignores pastoral priorities. By analyzing land-use conflicts in the Mopti region, the authors find that pastoralists support jihadist groups because they offer an anti-elite discourse and a perceived alternative to a state that extracts rent through corrupt courts and a paramilitary Forest Service. The study concludes that recruitment is largely a strategic response to material interests and political exclusion.