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Between 1989 and 2019, Africa experienced a complex conflict landscape. While battle-related deaths have remained relatively low and stable since the early 2000s, the number of state-based conflicts reached a record high in 2019. There is a concerning increase in the involvement of the Islamic State and a rise in non-state communal conflicts. UN peacekeeping operations in the region saw a significant increase in troop size from 1999 to 2010.

The document argues that standard lockdown measures are often impractical and potentially more damaging than COVID-19 in Africa due to high poverty levels, weak democratic institutions, and a large informal economy. It highlights risks such as the erosion of democratic processes, food insecurity, and a disproportionate burden on women. The author advocates for localized, flexible responses and calls for wealthier Northern states to provide debt cancellations and aid to prevent regional instability.

The report argues that the 'Sustainable Agriculture Initiative' (SAI), 'New Vision for Agriculture' (NVA), and 'Food and Land Use Coalition' (FOLU) promote a version of 'junk agroecology' (agroecología chatarra). This approach selectively adopts agroecological techniques to mitigate environmental damage while preserving the industrial, profit-driven corporate model. The authors contrast this with a transformative agroecology rooted in food sovereignty and social justice, which requires shifting power from corporations to small-scale producers.

The report critiques the 'corporate capture' of agroecology by three major global initiatives: the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), the New Vision for Agriculture (NVA), and the Coalition for a New Economy of Food and Land Use (FOLU). It argues that these entities promote a restricted, 'junk' version of agroecology that focuses on productivity and technological innovation (such as precision agriculture and gene editing) rather than the social justice, redistribution of power, and food sovereignty central to genuine agroecology. The document concludes that these corporate-led models aim to 'change everything so that nothing changes,' preserving the dominance of transnational agribusiness while adopting a 'green' veneer.

The report critiques 'junk agroecology,' a corporate-led interpretation of agroecology promoted by initiatives like the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), the New Vision for Agriculture (NVA), and the New Food and Land Use Economy Coalition (FOLU). It argues that these entities use agroecological language to mask a commitment to 'productivism' and 'sustainable agricultural intensification,' focusing on increasing yields through technology and market inclusion rather than the redistribution of power and resources. The authors contrast this with a transformative vision of agroecology that emphasizes food sovereignty, social justice, and the rights of small-scale producers.

The report argues that big agrifood capital is developing 'junk agroecology'—a selective appropriation of agroecological techniques integrated into a productivist, market-driven framework. Through an analysis of three major initiatives—the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), the New Vision for Agriculture (NVA), and the Food and Land Use Economy Coalition (FOLU)—the authors demonstrate how corporations use 'sustainable intensification' to greenwash the industrial food system. These initiatives prioritize technological determinism (such as gene editing and big data), the integration of smallholders into global value chains, and multi-stakeholder governance models that shift power from public institutions to private entities. The report concludes that a true agroecological transition requires participatory public policies rooted in food sovereignty and social justice, rather than corporate-led reforms.

The report argues that multinational corporations are promoting a 'fake agroecology' (agroécologie bidon) through initiatives like the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), the New Vision for Agriculture (NVA), and the Food and Land Use Coalition (FOLU). These initiatives are characterized as 'sustainable intensification' rather than true agroecology, as they prioritize technological productivism, market-driven value chains, and public-private governance over social justice and structural transformation. The authors contend that this approach allows industrial giants to 'greenwash' their image while maintaining the existing power structures of the global food system.

The report critiques the 'corporate capture' of agroecology by three major global initiatives: the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), the New Vision for Agriculture (NVA), and the Coalition for Food, Land and Use (FOLU). It contends that these entities promote a version of 'junk agroecology' that focuses on 'sustainable intensification' and technological fixes—such as big data, blockchain, and genomic editing—rather than the holistic, social, and political transformation central to genuine agroecology. The authors argue that these initiatives aim to 'transform small farms into sustainable agro-industries' to integrate smallholders into global value chains controlled by multinationals, thereby maintaining systemic inequalities and the dominance of industrial agriculture.

The document examines how COVID-19 exposes weaknesses in global institutions and threatens Africa through economic shocks, reduced development aid, and a retreat from multilateralism. It highlights the risk of increased trade protectionism and the potential for climate goals to be sidelined. The author advocates for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the creation of a continental climate finance fund, and a proactive African role in reforming global governance to mitigate these risks.

The document assesses the GRP Incubator's approach to scaling resilience solutions, focusing on five grantees: Groundswell, IFPRI, Mahila Housing Trust, MetaMeta, and Producers Direct. It details the Incubator's support mechanisms, including mentoring, leadership training, and financial networking, and evaluates the progress of these grantees across a three-stage scaling framework. Key findings highlight the importance of context-specific adaptation, stakeholder engagement, and the transition from grant-funded projects to sustainable business models.

The Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) has compiled a directory of resilience-focused initiatives, categorising them into funds and financing facilities, networks and alliances, organisations, and specific programmes and projects. The mapping covers a wide array of mechanisms, from large-scale funds like the Green Climate Fund to specialised regional initiatives such as the Africa Risk Capacity and the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. These initiatives target various sectors including agriculture, urban infrastructure, water management, and financial risk disclosure, with a strong emphasis on supporting Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and vulnerable populations.

The report assesses the legal frameworks for artisanal gold mining in UEMOA member states, identifying significant gaps in strategic planning, institutional coordination, and regulatory alignment. It highlights that most national laws are reactive and out of touch with field realities, particularly regarding mechanization and environmental protection. The document recommends the creation of 'reserved gold mining zones' as an integrated approach to formalize the sector, introduce cleaner gravimetric processing technologies, and improve fiscal collection and social protections for vulnerable miners.

The document argues that the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process is uniquely suited to support peacebuilding in fragile states because its long-term, holistic, and participatory nature aligns with the timelines and goals of conflict recovery. It highlights that climate risks and conflict often share drivers, such as poverty and weak governance, and that failure to adapt can exacerbate resource competition. The briefing provides examples of countries like Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Palestine that have integrated conflict dynamics into their NAPs, while noting ongoing challenges such as the lack of climate data in conflict zones and the exclusion of refugees from planning processes.

The document argues that for fragile states, climate change and conflict often share drivers and mutually reinforce each other, making the integration of adaptation planning and peacebuilding essential. It highlights how the NAP process, through its long-term, holistic, and participatory nature, can serve as a platform for conflict prevention and trust-building. The text provides examples from countries like Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Palestine where climate adaptation is used to mitigate resource-based conflicts or where active conflict severely hinders adaptation capacity. It concludes by identifying key challenges, including the need for transboundary planning and the inclusion of marginalized populations like refugees.

The document argues that while large youth cohorts are not inherently a security threat, they increase the risk of armed conflict and terrorism when combined with high unemployment, poor governance, and economic marginalization. In the Sahel, particularly Mali, these demographic pressures, coupled with environmental degradation and resource scarcity, create conditions where disenfranchised youth are more susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups. The author recommends a holistic approach focusing on demographic policies to lower fertility and political and economic reforms to boost youth employment, rather than relying solely on military solutions.

The document examines the shortcomings of current border security reforms in North and West Africa, noting that they often ignore the unique needs of borderland communities and the complexity of overlapping security mandates. It recommends a shift toward community consultation, the reduction of military roles in favour of law enforcement, and increased cross-border cooperation between neighbouring states.

The report examines the technical, legal, and strategic landscape of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), arguing that current technology is often ineffective and hindered by outdated legal frameworks. It assesses specific risks to Norwegian infrastructure, such as airports and oil platforms, and explores how Norway can leverage EU and NATO initiatives to enhance its capabilities while avoiding the over-securitization of civilian airspace.

The report argues that framing migration as a security threat—driven largely by EU policies to stem migration to Europe—leads to restrictive border controls and the criminalisation of smuggling. Using Agadez, Niger, as a case study, the author demonstrates that these securitised approaches do not stop irregular migration but instead increase local insecurity, empower high-level smugglers, expose migrants to greater risks, and erode trust between citizens and governments. The document recommends shifting the narrative toward evidence-based migration management and expanding legal pathways for movement within Africa and between Africa and the EU.

The report examines the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution' in mining, identifying key technologies such as AI, automation, and IoT that improve productivity and safety but threaten low-skilled jobs. It highlights the disproportionate impact on Indigenous communities and men, and suggests policy responses including STEM-focused skills development, revised local content requirements, and new fiscal arrangements between governments and mining firms.

The report details a workshop on global economic governance and its impact on income inequality. It examines four key areas: market access, where duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access for least developed countries (LDCs) is often undermined by domestic subsidies in rich nations; e-commerce, where data localization and source code bans are debated to protect policy space; industrial policy, which faces a trend of shrinking policy space due to WTO and regional trade agreement restrictions; and competition policy, which struggles with the market power of tech giants and a lack of international coordination. The workshop concludes that these areas are deeply interlinked and require a systemic approach to governance to support sustainable development and reduce inequality.