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The 2021 report by the Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance (CCFLA) finds that annual urban climate finance averaged US$ 384 billion in 2017/2018, which is significantly lower than the estimated requirement of US$ 4.5 to 5.4 trillion. Investment is heavily concentrated in OECD countries and China, with severe underfunding in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Mitigation efforts, particularly in sustainable transport and buildings, dominate the funding landscape, while adaptation and resilience receive less than 10% of project-level finance. The report emphasizes that cities act as both providers of infrastructure and administrators of regulations, and recommends strengthening municipal financial capacities, aligning local and national climate policies, and utilizing blended finance to bridge the investment gap.

The 2021 report on the state of cities climate finance reveals a significant gap between current investment levels and the trillions of dollars needed for urban climate action. While global urban climate finance averaged 384 billion USD annually in 2017/2018, funding is heavily concentrated in OECD countries and China, leaving developing regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia severely underfunded. The report emphasizes a critical shortage in adaptation and resilience funding, which accounts for less than 10% of urban climate finance. It argues that mobilizing further investment requires 'enabling conditions' across national, city, and climate-specific levels, urging governments and international financial institutions to provide predictable funding and technical support to help cities transition to sustainable development paths.

The report argues that India's post-pandemic recovery should prioritize 'building back better' by investing in natural capital and nature-based solutions (NbS). It examines the role of public and private finance, the need for a green finance taxonomy, and the importance of integrating biodiversity values into agriculture, infrastructure, and sub-national climate action plans. Key focus areas include land restoration targets, the conservation of wetlands within the Central Asian Flyway, and the mitigation of illegal wildlife trade.

The report estimates that an average of USD 384 billion was invested annually in urban climate finance during 2017-2018, a figure significantly lower than the estimated annual need of USD 4.5 to 5.4 trillion for low-emission and resilient urban infrastructure. Mitigation efforts, particularly in sustainable transport and green buildings, dominate the landscape, while adaptation finance remains severely underfunded, representing only 9% of tracked project-level data. The analysis highlights a geographic imbalance, with the majority of finance flowing to China and developed economies, while regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia remain critically underfunded. Key barriers to scaling this finance include low creditworthiness of city governments, a lack of bankable projects, and institutional restrictions on local borrowing.

The report establishes a conceptual framework for urban climate finance, emphasizing that mobilization depends on the alignment of country-specific, city-specific, and climate-specific enabling conditions. It details the five roles city governments play—consumer, provider, fundraiser, regulator, and champion—and argues that a lack of administrative capacity, fragmented authority, and limited revenue sources in developing countries create significant barriers. The document recommends integrating climate considerations into all levels of city planning (strategic, spatial, capital investment, and budgetary) and suggests using carbon pricing, land-value capture, and conditional intergovernmental transfers to close the urban financing gap.

The World Climate and Security Report 2021 assesses how climate change acts as a threat multiplier for global security, emphasizing the urgent need to move from strategic planning to concrete implementation. It introduces a new Climate Security Risk Matrix to evaluate comparative risks among countries and presents a risk perception survey where experts predict severe-to-catastrophic risks by 2031. The report details regional vulnerabilities, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union, and analyzes the role of militaries as first responders and contributors to emissions. It concludes with recommendations for updating international law regarding the law of the sea and geoengineering governance, and calls for deeper integration of climate security into UN and EU institutional frameworks.

The report argues that stopping the expansion of fossil fuels is insufficient to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement; instead, an active wind-down of existing production is required. It proposes specific annual decline rates for coal (9.5%), oil (8.5%), and gas (3.5%) between 2021 and 2030. The authors conclude that this transition is technically feasible because global solar and wind potential could meet primary energy demand more than 50 times over, ensuring 100% energy access without risking energy security.

The report finds that 2,277 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) of new coal mining capacity is under development globally, with 614 mtpa already under construction. This expansion is heavily concentrated in China, Australia, India, and Russia, which together represent 77% of global development. The authors argue that this trajectory is incompatible with the Paris Agreement, as coal production would need to decline 11% annually through 2030 to limit warming to 1.5°C. If all proposed capacity is realized, 2030 production would be over four times the 1.5°C-compliant pathway. The report also highlights a potential $91 billion USD in stranded assets and significant greenhouse gas emissions, estimated between 5,000 and 5,800 Mt of CO2-equivalent annually from these projects.

The report highlights a significant downturn in the LNG sector, characterized by widespread final investment decision (FID) delays, cost overruns, and a shift in perception of LNG from a climate solution to a climate problem. While import capacity continues to expand rapidly, particularly in Asia and Brazil, export projects—especially in North America—are struggling with financing and competition from lower-cost producers in Qatar and Russia.

The global steel sector, responsible for 11% of CO2 emissions, remains heavily reliant on carbon-intensive blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) pathways. While over 75% of global capacity is now covered by net-zero pledges, the report warns of significant stranded asset risks—estimated between 47 and 70 billion USD—due to the continued construction of BF-BOF plants. The analysis emphasizes a transition toward electric arc furnaces (EAF), green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI), and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS), while leveraging existing global overcapacity to retire inefficient plants.

The document examines the ongoing negotiations within the WTO's E-commerce Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) regarding services market access. It highlights a significant trade imbalance where developed countries are net exporters of the targeted services, while most developing countries are net importers. The brief discusses the 'challenging' nature of these negotiations, the ambiguity of the legal architecture for the final outcome, and the lack of gender and social inclusion considerations. It suggests that developing countries could benefit from liberalizing 'core' telecommunications and computer services to bridge the digital divide, provided that progressive liberalization and special and differential treatment—similar to the Trade Facilitation Agreement—are incorporated into the final agreement.

The document highlights the critical need for long-term, coordinated planning to manage the socio-economic shift away from coal in India, where the sector provides 70% of electricity and employs nearly 4 million people. It identifies seven priority elements for a just transition: long-term planning, union engagement, community engagement, addressing coal as a generational identity, local economic diversification, securing worker pensions, and environmental remediation. The brief argues that because coal is deeply embedded in the economy—contributing significantly to federal and state revenues in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha—unplanned contractions could cause severe instability. It recommends leveraging international experience, such as Germany's mine closures and Denmark's Ørsted's diversification, while developing domestic mechanisms like the expanded use of District Mineral Foundations (DMFs) for local job creation.

The report finds that international public finance for gas in low- and middle-income countries is four times higher than for wind or solar, risking a 'dash for gas' that locks economies into high-carbon pathways. It argues that gas is no longer a necessary 'bridge fuel' because renewables are often cheaper and more effective for power, cooking, and industry. The document recommends that international financial institutions end support for gas and instead scale up clean energy finance, focusing on grid integration, technology transfer, and a just transition for workers.

The report finds that international public financing for gas projects in low- and middle-income countries is four times higher than for wind or solar, creating a 'lock-in effect' that threatens climate goals. It argues that gas is no longer a necessary 'bridge technology' because renewables are often cheaper and more effective for energy access. The document recommends that international financial institutions cease all support for gas infrastructure and instead fund grid integration, technology transfer, and a just transition for affected workers.

The report finds that international public finance for gas projects in low- and middle-income countries averaged nearly USD 16 billion per year from 2017 to 2019, which is four times the amount provided for wind or solar. It argues that the 'bridge fuel' concept is obsolete due to the urgency of the climate crisis, methane leakage, and the falling costs of renewables. The document recommends that international public finance institutions end all support for gas exploration, production, and long-lived infrastructure, instead scaling up finance for grid integration, technology transfer, and universal clean energy access. Case studies of Argentina, Egypt, and India illustrate risks such as high subsidies, dependence on volatile export markets, and the creation of redundant parallel infrastructures for gas and electric vehicles.

The report finds that international public finance disproportionately supports natural gas in low- and middle-income countries, often exceeding support for wind and solar by four times. It argues that the 'bridge fuel' narrative is obsolete due to the falling costs of renewables and the risks of stranded assets and methane leaks. The document recommends that international financial institutions cease funding gas infrastructure and instead support clean energy integration, technology transfer, and a just transition, particularly for the poorest nations.

The report finds that international public finance disproportionately supports natural gas over renewables in the Global South, creating risks of stranded assets and carbon lock-in. It argues that renewables are now cost-competitive for most gas uses and recommends that public financial institutions cease support for gas infrastructure to prioritize clean energy transitions.

The document examines the transition of the mining sector from diesel and grid power to renewable energy (RE), primarily solar PV and wind. It argues that while RE has high initial capital expenditure, it offers lower long-term operating costs and provides a hedge against volatile fuel prices. The paper highlights the role of hybrid systems and energy storage in overcoming the intermittency of RE to meet the constant baseload demands of mines. It also explores the potential for portable RE systems for exploration sites and the use of rehabilitated mine land for utility-scale RE generation.

Cooking poverty affects 3.83 billion people across 71 countries, causing over four million deaths annually. The report argues that the current 'clean cooking' sector is fragmented and underfunded, with an annual funding gap of approximately $10 billion. It proposes a shift toward the term 'cooking poverty' to better reflect the scale of the crisis and suggests a 'Playbook' to centralize sector knowledge. Key recommendations include merging electrification and cooking efforts, utilizing carbon markets for small business finance, and adopting an incremental approach to transition households from unimproved to modern cooking.

Power Forward 4.0 finds that 60% of Fortune 500 companies have set at least one climate or energy target, a 12-percentage-point increase since 2017. While GHG reduction targets are most common (54%) and Science-Based Targets (SBTs) have increased sixfold, only 20% of the Fortune 500 have set or committed to an SBT. The report highlights a rise in net-zero commitments (17%) and 100% renewable energy targets (58 companies), though it notes significant gaps in the financial, fossil fuel, and retail sectors. Despite progress, the report argues that voluntary action is insufficient and calls for federal and state policies, such as carbon pricing, to align the US private sector with the Paris Agreement and the US Nationally Determined Contribution.