Search Climate Insights Directory

The document examines the progress of five EU Member States in developing policies for a climate-neutral industry. It finds that while most have set 2030 targets, these are generally conservative and focused on energy efficiency. The Netherlands and Germany are the most advanced, implementing specific incentives for advanced technologies, whereas Hungary, Poland, and Spain remain largely in the agenda-setting and policy-formulation stages. The brief emphasizes the need for a predictable legal environment and harmonized EU policies to avoid distorted competition in the basic materials sector.

The document analyzes the EU's Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) as a political tool to overcome national resistance to decarbonization, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. By 'rescaling' support to subnational NUTS 3 regions, the EU aims to empower local actors and generate bottom-up support for climate goals. However, the author warns that national governments may act as gatekeepers to funding, and that a regional focus may fail to protect the most vulnerable groups if not paired with broader social policies. The brief also argues for integrating just transition into EU foreign policy to support fossil-fuel-producing countries outside the bloc.

The study analyzes the 'El Morro' catchment in Argentina, where the conversion of native forests to agriculture has led to rising water tables and the emergence of new streams. The authors identify five mechanisms of competition: plants taking water from streams via unsaturated uptake (mechanism 1), focalized saturated uptake in wetlands (mechanism 2), and distributed saturated uptake in forests (mechanism 3); and streams taking water from plants through streambed deepening (mechanism 4) and sediment deposition (mechanism 5). Findings indicate that while unsaturated uptake previously suppressed streamflow, current high water tables have made saturated uptake by forests and wetlands significant, though deepening streams are now actively reclaiming water by lowering local water tables.

The report finds that 11 of 18 EU coal-using countries lack Paris-compatible phase-out plans, with seven not planning to exit coal by 2030 and four replacing coal with increased fossil gas. It argues that the Just Transition Fund's current allocation methodology risks funding 'climate laggards,' as nearly two-thirds of the fund would go to countries without 2030 phase-out plans. The authors recommend making fund access conditional on ambitious coal phase-out dates and strictly excluding all fossil fuels, including gas, from the fund's scope.

The briefing argues that contemporary national populists in Europe employ a systematic strategy to capture the state by eroding liberal norms, dominating the information space, and subordinating the judiciary and civil service. By treating the government as a 'contractor' for a national majority, these movements justify the removal of institutional restraints to concentrate power in the executive. The author details a multi-stage assault involving 'trolling', 'building' parallel infrastructures, and 'automating' disinformation to create a facade of democracy while maintaining an effective monopoly on power.

In the first half of 2020, renewable electricity generation in the EU-27 reached 40%, surpassing fossil fuel generation at 34%. This shift was driven by record wind and solar penetration and a 7% drop in electricity demand caused by COVID-19. Coal generation fell by 32%, contributing to a 23% reduction in power sector CO2 emissions. While grids remained stable, the increase in renewables led to more frequent negative wholesale electricity prices, indicating a need for greater system flexibility. Poland emerged as the most coal-dependent EU country, generating as much coal-fired electricity as the other 25 EU members combined.

As of July 2020, 19 countries and the European Union have adopted net-zero targets. The document compares these targets across several dimensions: the coverage of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and domestic sectors, the target year for achievement, whether separate emissions reduction targets exist, the use of international GHG mitigation, and the legal status of the targets.

The authors contend that the EU suffers from diffuse accountability and a 'double deadlock' caused by a reliance on closed-door Franco-German agreements. They argue that Germany's role as a 'benevolent hegemon' is problematic because Berlin seeks to minimize costs and maximize control over debtor states while remaining reluctant to fully embrace its power. The text suggests that the only way to break this impasse is through 'transnational politics'—the creation of shifting alliances across national borders and the engagement of civil society—to replace the current 'constructive ambiguity' of European diplomacy.

The statement argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has created an urgent need for governments to focus all resources on public health, specifically the procurement of medical supplies, vaccines, and medicines. It calls for the immediate suspension of trade and investment negotiations at the WTO, bilateral, and regional levels, asserting that such activities divert critical resources and personnel. The authors highlight that intellectual property rules under the WTO's TRIPS agreement and free trade agreements may obstruct the affordability and accessibility of life-saving supplies. The document demands the removal of all trade barriers and unilateral sanctions that hinder medical procurement and urges a fundamental rethink of trade rules that encourage monopolies and limit healthcare access.

Friends of the Earth International and a broad coalition of global endorsers call for an immediate cessation of trade and investment treaty negotiations. They argue that governments, particularly in developing and least developed countries, lack the resources to engage in these negotiations while managing the COVID-19 health crisis. The statement demands that trade negotiators focus exclusively on removing obstacles, such as intellectual property rules and unilateral sanctions, that hinder access to affordable vaccines, medicines, and diagnostics.

Since 2015, the Law and Justice (PiS) party has led Poland toward Euroscepticism and the erosion of the rule of law. The author argues that PiS's worldview creates critical contradictions: while seeking to reduce dependence on Russian gas and oil, the government has increased imports of cheaper Russian coal and lacks a strategic plan for renewable energy, leading to a rise in carbon emissions. Simultaneously, while opening the labor market to Ukrainian workers for economic reasons, PiS has overseen a deterioration in bilateral relations with Ukraine and tightened citizenship laws, potentially priming the country for a nationalistic backlash.

The document examines the erosion of the EU's longstanding consensus on a two-state solution for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It highlights how internal divisions—exemplified by the opposing positions of Sweden and Hungary, and the alignment of the Visegrád Four with the Israeli government—undermine the EU's capacity for a concerted foreign policy. Despite possessing a wide array of policy tools to pressure both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, the authors argue that the EU's risk-averse nature and complex structure make significant policy shifts unlikely, leaving the bloc 'stuck in the logic of Oslo'.

The analysis examines the shift in Germany's relationship with the Visegrad Group from one of normative leadership to pragmatic economic cooperation. While economic ties remain strong, political rifts over democracy, the rule of law, and migration have eroded Berlin's influence. The author argues that Germany's avoidance of these contentious issues to protect geoeconomic interests hampers the EU's collective sovereignty and effectiveness, particularly as Germany prepares for its 2020 EU presidency.

The report finds that the EU ETS region is increasingly importing electricity from non-EU neighbors with high carbon intensities, effectively importing emissions and creating 'offshore carbon havens'. In 2019, the EU ETS region imported 26 million tonnes of CO2, with a net import of 20 million tonnes. The authors argue that the disparity in carbon pricing gives a competitive advantage to high-carbon generators in countries like Turkey, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans. To combat this, the report recommends a border carbon adjustment (BCA) on gross electricity imports to protect the integrity of EU climate policy and incentivize decarbonization in neighboring states. It also warns that planned increases in interconnection capacity (31% by 2030) and new coal power projects (up to 57GW) in connected non-EU countries will exacerbate the problem.

The report examines six specific policy cases from the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and Austria to provide a roadmap for decarbonising the non-ETS transport and buildings sectors in CEE countries. It uses a participatory transferability assessment involving experts from Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to identify regional barriers and opportunities for 'leap-frogging' to best practices.

The document details Carbon Market Watch's efforts to ensure a 'green recovery' following the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically by countering corporate lobbying and pushing for more ambitious EU climate targets. It critiques the lack of progress in global carbon market rules (Article 6) and the perceived irrelevance of the CORSIA aviation scheme. The briefing advocates for expanding the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to include international shipping and phasing out free pollution permits for heavy industry. It also assesses the inadequacy of national energy and climate plans in several EU member states and warns against the misuse of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies as a substitute for emission cuts.

The document examines the Covid-19 pandemic as a systemic shock that exposed deep inequalities and the fragility of market-driven systems. It explores the intersection of public health and biodiversity loss, the role of the welfare state versus authoritarian and populist models, the digital divide in urban centers, and the disproportionate impact of the crisis on marginalized groups, including migrant workers and the elderly. The text advocates for a 'green recovery' that prioritizes a 'foundational economy' of basic needs over growth, promotes digital inclusion as a human right, and recognizes the link between environmental degradation and zoonotic disease emergence.

The document is a comprehensive collection of essays and interviews exploring the evolution of green politics. It analyzes the tension between 'green growth' and 'degrowth', the rise of Green parties in Europe, and the intersection of climate action with feminism, labor rights, and geopolitics. Key discussions include the critique of the European Green Deal as 'greenwashing', the impact of lignite mining in Germany, and the role of the 'Green New Deal' in the US as a tool for socio-economic transformation.

The SDG16DI 2020 Global Report argues that official data from National Statistical Offices (NSOs) are often insufficient, unreliable, or unavailable for monitoring SDG16 targets, particularly regarding conflict-related deaths, corruption, and press freedom. It highlights the critical role of 'non-official data'—produced by NGOs and academic institutions—in filling these gaps. The report provides case studies on sex-disaggregated data for violent deaths, trade-related illicit financial flows in developing nations, corruption and vote-buying in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the use of expert-based indices to measure representative decision-making. It also notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated governance challenges while simultaneously reducing the capacity of NSOs to collect data.

The production of basic materials accounts for approximately 25% of global CO2 emissions and 16% of EU GHG emissions. While industry commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 is growing, current innovation funds and carbon pricing are insufficient to make climate-friendly technologies commercially viable. The Climate Friendly Material Platform proposes a policy package including a 'Climate Contribution' as an alternative to Border Tax Adjustments, Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCFDS), Contracts for Difference for Renewables, Green Public Procurement (GPP), and Product Carbon Requirements to stimulate investment and prevent the relocation of production to regions with less stringent climate policies.