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This fact sheet defines green industrial policy (GIP) as government strategies to promote sustainable industries and phase out greenhouse gas emitters. It highlights the success of China's electric vehicle industry as a model for GIP but warns that developing countries face significant financing, skills, and technological barriers. The document emphasizes the role of the G20 in shaping global GIP principles, particularly under South Africa's agenda, which focuses on leveraging critical minerals to drive inclusive economic growth and manufacturing in Africa.

The report examines how technology transfer for climate change adaptation is handled within the UNFCCC and WTO frameworks, noting that these policy domains have largely evolved in isolation. It defines adaptation technology as comprising hardware, software, and orgware, and highlights that while trade is recognized as a driver for transfer, it is rarely explicitly integrated into national adaptation plans (NAPs) or technology needs assessments (TNAs). The author identifies significant divergences between developed and developing countries over intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the role of government incentives. Analysis of Small Island Developing States' BAEF reports reveals that high import duties and reliance on foreign imports are key barriers. The report recommends involving trade experts in the NAP process and developing actionable guidance to operationalize technology transfer.

The paper examines how the geopolitical contest between the US and China over critical minerals creates a strategic window for African countries to diversify investors and build domestic green value chains.

Morocco possesses significant reserves of green transition minerals (GTMs), including approximately 72% of global phosphate, positioning it as a strategic partner for the EU and China. While the EU emphasizes regulatory compliance and sustainability standards, China provides rapid industrial scale and technical expertise in refining. The authors argue that Morocco's current bilateral engagements are fragmented and propose a five-step trilateral framework—including a joint task force, dedicated industrial zones, and a sustainability charter—to transform geopolitical competition into coordinated investment and technology transfer.

The report confirms that the FP211 Hardest-to-Reach programme is classified as ESS Category I-2 and has established an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS). This system, which includes a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Policy and Guidance on Indigenous Peoples, is disclosed in English, French, Portuguese, and Arabic. The ESMS is available at Acumen's offices in Kenya and Nigeria, as well as at the Nationally Designated Authority offices in the target countries. An updated version of the ESMS was released on June 30, 2025, to provide more detail on investing strategy and safeguarding roles, and to include Liberia in the programme scope.

Turkey is aggressively expanding its presence in Africa's critical minerals sector to support its domestic defence, electric vehicle, and renewable energy industries. While Turkey employs a pragmatic, commercially driven approach—often coupling mining with defence cooperation in volatile regions like the Sahel—the paper argues that aligning Turkish commercial agility with EU financial instruments and ESG standards through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) could create more sustainable, trilateral value chains that benefit African host nations.

The document analyzes the resurgence of military coups in West Africa between 2020 and 2023, specifically in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. It argues that these events are not a uniform trend but are driven by a 'crisis of the democracy norm' initiated by 'pouvoiristes'—politicians who manipulate democratic systems to maintain power, such as by transgressing presidential term limits. The author distinguishes between the 'junta building' model seen in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), which leverages sovereigntist ideology and Russian alignment, and a 'supervisory junta' model in Guinea and Gabon. The paper concludes that geopolitical polarization has weakened Western influence on democratic norms, and that sustainable democracy requires supporting the 'culture of democracy' and a free press rather than just institutional 'hardware'.

The document analyzes the interdependencies between the EU, China, and Africa regarding critical raw materials (CRMs). While the EU seeks to reduce its reliance on China through initiatives like the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway, the paper argues that complete decoupling is unfeasible due to China's dominance in midstream processing and the high costs of establishing independent European supply chains. It highlights that African nations, particularly the DRC and Zimbabwe, are increasingly pushing for local value addition and processing rather than mere extraction. The author proposes a trilateral cooperation model, using a hypothetical cobalt project in the DRC, where the EU provides technical training and financing, China provides refining technology and market access, and the DRC ensures resource ownership and local industrial development.

The report examines how transition finance is being leveraged to decarbonise China's steel industry, focusing on the impact of the first subnational regulatory framework introduced in Hebei Province in December 2023. It finds that the market responded quickly to these guidelines, with steel transition loans in Hebei exceeding CNY20bn (USD2.8bn) by the end of 2024. The document estimates that the sector requires at least USD18bn in capex over the next five years to invest in electric arc furnaces (EAF), direct reduced iron (DRI) shaft furnaces, and electrolysers. While large state-owned enterprises lead in transition planning, smaller firms face greater financing gaps. The report recommends that the People's Bank of China introduce further incentives, such as interest subsidies, and that steel companies secure offtake contracts to improve the bankability of green steel projects.

The document outlines a methodological framework for gender mainstreaming within Senegal's climate adaptation planning. It identifies specific entry points across 14 process steps—from launch to notification—and provides seven key tools, including gender analysis and gender-responsive budgeting. It highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change on women in Senegal and offers a series of national and international best practices to ensure equitable benefits from adaptation measures.

The author argues that the OACPS should move beyond traditional tariff liberalization to a 'muscular' trade and sustainability agenda at the WTO. This proposed plan includes negotiating a plurilateral agreement on green industrialization, creating a dedicated technical facility for sustainable development, and establishing a coherence platform to align trade with global sustainability initiatives like the UNFCCC and UN SDGs. To support this, the document suggests replicating EU models of strategic partnerships on critical raw materials and Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs), which combine private investment with public guarantees and technology transfer. The author emphasizes that such an integrated approach is essential for OACPS members—particularly Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and commodity-dependent nations—to mitigate climate vulnerability and transition toward green industrialization.

This policy note examines the Compact with Africa (CwA), an initiative launched in 2017 to increase private investment and infrastructure in African countries through coordinated reform agendas and stakeholder cooperation.

The G20 Compact with Africa (CwA), initiated in 2017, aims to boost private investment and infrastructure in Africa through reform agendas in macroeconomic, business, and financing frameworks. While CwA countries often show stronger growth and trade performance, a direct causal link to investment flows remains unproven, and foreign direct investment to Africa rose only by $4.5 billion between 2017 and 2023. To enhance the initiative, the author recommends that South Africa's G20 presidency facilitate the admission of interested countries such as Angola, Kenya, and Zambia, and elevate the African Advisory Group (AAG) to a permanent G20 working group. Additionally, the note suggests spotlighting critical minerals and energy investment, improving investment grades to reduce Africa's $75 billion risk premium, and implementing 'country platforms' to increase private sector engagement in reform agendas.

The document outlines a comprehensive approach to electrifying rural health centers in sub-Saharan Africa using solar PV. It emphasizes the necessity of professional technical consultancy to avoid project failure, provides detailed mathematical formulas for dimensioning components (panels, inverters, and batteries), and compares different system architectures (Off-Grid, On-Grid Backup, and On-Grid). The guide also details various financing models, including Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), and stresses the importance of a two-level maintenance strategy and the appointment of an energy manager ('Monsieur/Madame Energie') to ensure long-term system viability.

The document examines systemic barriers in Africa's mining sector, including tax avoidance, high borrowing costs, and technological monopolies. It proposes a 'resource leverage strategy' to exchange mineral access for technology transfer and local beneficiation, while advocating for the adoption of African-led financial frameworks like the African Continental Ratings Agency (AfCRA) and AMREC-PARC to foster economic independence.

The report maps nearly one hundred agreements on critical minerals between African states and global actors, highlighting the strategic competition for resources. It identifies a lack of transparency in these deals and notes that while China and Russia are prominent, other actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are expanding their footprints. The analysis emphasizes that these partnerships often reflect broader geopolitical and historical ties rather than just economic needs.

The report examines the prevalence and impact of mining tax incentives in Africa, concluding that they are largely ineffective at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and instead facilitate revenue loss and illicit financial flows. It highlights that factors such as mineral quality and political stability are more critical to investors than tax breaks. The document argues for a shift toward performance-based incentives, the adoption of the OECD/G20 global minimum tax, and regional tax harmonization to prevent a 'race to the bottom' and support the goals of the Africa Mining Vision.

The report analyzes the prevalence and effects of tax incentives in Africa's mining sector, concluding that these measures frequently result in substantial public revenue losses and encourage aggressive tax avoidance. It argues that mining investments are driven more by resource quality and political stability than by tax breaks. The document recommends that African nations move away from generous, contract-based incentives and instead adopt regional tax harmonization and targeted, time-limited incentives linked to specific development goals, such as mineral processing and the energy transition.

The document analyzes the crisis facing ECOWAS in 2025, characterized by the exit of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and a decline in the organization's normative authority regarding democratic governance. It identifies a structural power imbalance where the executive Authority dominates, leading to inconsistent applications of 'zero-tolerance' policies toward unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs). The authors propose a three-phase reform strategy: first, restoring political authority through the operationalization of ECOSOC and revised sanctions; second, rebalancing power by making Court rulings binding and introducing parliamentary confirmation for Commission leadership; and third, transitioning to a supranational model with direct elections for the Parliament and primacy of Community law. The brief emphasizes the need for a coalition of 'reform champions'—including Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana—and strategic financial support from Germany and the EU to ensure regional stability.

The document examines the resurgence of military coups in Africa since 2020 and the fragmented reactions of BRICS nations. It argues that while Russia engages in 'coup protection schemes' and China maintains a 'non-interventionist policy' to secure economic interests, India, Brazil, and South Africa have taken more muted or supportive stances toward constitutional order. This lack of unity suggests BRICS operates as a 'house of cards' with disaggregated interests, potentially limiting its ability to effectively challenge US and European influence in Africa.