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The author argues that while the EU views the energy transition as a path to energy security and global leadership, it currently lacks a comprehensive strategic plan. Internally, the EU faces risks of redundant spending and political friction between Western and Eastern member states over the distribution of benefits. Externally, the transition shifts dependencies from fossil fuel imports to critical materials and clean technology competition with the US and China. The document suggests the EU must integrate energy, infrastructure, and industrial policy to secure its markets and maintain stability in its neighborhood.

The report finds that 40 financial institutions fund a combined methane footprint that could exceed 503 Mt CO2e. It highlights a significant gap between the climate commitments of the countries where these institutions are domiciled and the institutions' own internal policies, which are described as weak or non-existent regarding agri-methane.

The report argues that current global economic responses to COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and the climate crisis have been too focused on short-term stabilisation and stimulus rather than long-term structural reform. It highlights that only 18% of the USD 14.6tn allocated to COVID-19 recovery in 2020 was green spending, and that such investments have been concentrated in wealthier nations and focused primarily on decarbonisation. The authors advocate for a 'systems mind-set' that integrates circular economy principles, nature-based solutions, and just transition policies. Key recommendations include the use of debt-for-nature swaps, increased multilateral funding for the Global South, and the implementation of a 'Green Structural Recovery Menu' featuring fiscal reforms and the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies.

The report finds that GFANZ members, including major banks and asset managers, have provided hundreds of billions of dollars to companies expanding fossil fuel production. It argues that the alliance's sectoral guidelines and individual member policies are insufficient to prevent this expansion, often relying on flawed decarbonization targets that do not explicitly prohibit new fossil fuel supply. The document calls for the adoption of robust 'no-expansion' policies, alignment with UN Race to Zero criteria, and the implementation of meaningful accountability mechanisms to ensure financial flows are redirected toward clean energy.

The report finds that while 92% of surveyed business leaders view reducing carbon emissions as an urgent priority, many struggle with the 'how' of decarbonization due to budget and technological constraints. Businesses increasingly view the voluntary carbon market (VCM) as a critical tool for immediate action, though concerns over greenwashing and market transparency persist. While science-based targets are widely supported, there is a significant demand for clearer, more realistic guidance to help organizations meet their 2030 and 2050 goals.

The report outlines a two-tiered approach to an EU methane import standard: an initial prescriptive standard focusing on practices and technologies, followed by a more ambitious emission intensity standard. It argues that there are no insuperable legal obstacles to such a standard under WTO or UNFCCC rules, provided the EU applies equivalent burdens to domestic production. Key recommendations include using an equivalence principle for exporting countries and companies, implementing financial penalties for non-compliance, and establishing an EU methane fund to support mitigation in developing countries. The document also highlights the need for robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) and warns of 'methane leakage' where high-emitting gas is redirected to less regulated markets.

The document outlines the environmental crisis caused by fast fashion, specifically the over-reliance on fossil-fuel derived synthetics and the failure of current recycling systems. It proposes that the EU implement Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) schemes to shift waste management costs from municipalities to producers. Key recommendations include harmonising performance targets at the EU level, using eco-modulated fees to incentivise better product design, and prioritising waste prevention and reuse over recycling. The briefing also suggests complementary policies such as a virgin plastic tax and bans on hazardous chemicals to further reduce overproduction and environmental impact.

The briefing, based on a CE Delft study, finds that the EU could reduce domestic methane emissions by 49-68% by 2030 if all available mitigation measures are implemented. Agriculture is the largest source of EU methane, contributing 53% of emissions (8 Mt/year), yet it is the most neglected sector in current policy, with only a 3.7% reduction expected under business-as-usual trends. The most significant reduction potential comes from shifting consumer diets toward lower meat and dairy consumption, which alone could reduce total EU methane emissions by 15-19%. Technical measures, including feed additives and manure management, offer further reductions, though they are less impactful than dietary shifts. The document recommends that the EU set science-aligned methane targets for agriculture, promote plant-rich diets through the Sustainable Food Systems Framework Law, and impose binding methane-reporting and reduction targets on corporations.

The document reviews CEDAW's 2022 activities, noting that the committee issued climate-related recommendations or questions to 30 out of 49 States considered, with a primary focus on disaster risk reduction and adaptation over mitigation. It highlights specific concerns regarding fossil fuel extraction in Uganda and Namibia and details General Recommendation No. 39, which emphasizes the rights of Indigenous women and girls to free, prior and informed consent regarding extractive and climate projects on their territories.

The document reviews the 2022 activities of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), focusing on its Concluding Observations for the United States, France, and Cameroon. It highlights the Committee's concerns over the disproportionate impacts of climate change and extractive industries on racial and ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples. Additionally, it discusses the development of General Recommendation No. 37 on the right to health, noting civil society efforts to ensure the climate crisis and environmental racism are integrated into this framework, supported by findings from the IPCC and WHO.

The report finds that global methane abatement finance reached USD 13.7 billion in 2021/22, yet remains far below the estimated annual need of USD 48 billion by 2030. While the AFOLU sector saw a 77% increase in funding, the fossil fuel sector—which has the highest mitigation potential—received less than 1% of tracked finance. Private sources provided 70% of total funding, primarily through debt and equity, while public finance declined by 10%. Geographically, East Asia and the Pacific, the U.S. and Canada, and Western Europe are the top recipients, leaving a significant support gap in Latin America and South Asia.

The report analyzes how different audiences perceive the intersection of climate change and health and evaluates the effectiveness of various communication frames. It finds that framing climate change as a public health issue, particularly by emphasizing the health benefits of solutions (gain framing) and the harms of air pollution, can increase public engagement and reduce political polarization. The document highlights health professionals as highly trusted messengers who are generally willing to engage in advocacy but face barriers such as lack of time and specialized knowledge. It also notes that public officials exhibit varying levels of awareness and face institutional barriers to prioritizing climate-health issues. The report concludes with a research agenda calling for more diverse geographic data, better integration of equity in messaging, and the expansion of climate-health curricula in medical education.

The report finds that low-cost, repeated behaviors like reducing food waste are significantly more common than high-cost, one-time installations like heat pumps or solar panels. While many who adopted these behaviors faced minimal difficulty, non-adopters cited lack of awareness and lack of interest for low-cost actions, and high cost and home ownership issues for high-cost technologies.

The document outlines sustainability standards for the mining and processing sectors, such as the ICMM Mining Principles and IRMA Standard, which emphasize biodiversity conservation and the mitigation hierarchy. It provides financial estimates for forest protection, noting a global need of USD 45–460 billion annually to meet Paris Agreement goals, while contrasting this with 'gray finance'—including agricultural subsidies estimated between USD 378 billion and USD 635 billion per year—that may risk deforestation. Additionally, it identifies the emergence of green taxonomies in the EU and Colombia and risk assessment frameworks in countries like Brazil and Malaysia to align financial flows with nature preservation.

This document consists of two annexes. Annex 2 lists sustainability schemes for the mining and processing sectors, such as the ICMM Mining Principles and the ResponsibleSteel Standard, focusing on their requirements for biodiversity and ecosystem services. Annex 3 analyzes forest finance, estimating global needs between USD 45 billion and 460 billion annually to meet Paris Agreement goals, while contrasting 'green finance' (e.g., REDD+ funding) with 'gray finance,' including agricultural subsidies estimated between USD 378 billion and 635 billion per year and private finance to forest-risk commodity supply chains totaling USD 343 billion from 2010-2022.

The analysis reveals that only 24% of the 67 sampled countries demonstrated a climate risk responsive recovery. A significant paradox was identified: a country's income level was a stronger determinant of whether it used COVID-19 funds for adaptation than its actual climate vulnerability. High-income countries were more likely to integrate physical climate risks into their recovery plans, while the most vulnerable countries were the least likely to do so, with only Kenya and Vanuatu among the 20 most vulnerable countries approving explicit adaptation actions. Most responsive measures focused on water resources management, disaster prevention, infrastructure, and nature-based solutions, primarily targeting drought and flooding.

The document explores the 'anti-green backlash' and the practical dilemmas of the energy transition, focusing on social inequality, territorial disputes over renewables and mining, and the geopolitical implications of critical raw material sourcing. It argues that a just transition requires rebuilding the welfare state, increasing democratic participation, and addressing historical ecological debts to avoid 'eco-apartheid' and political polarisation.

The policy brief examines the shortcomings of South Africa's current climate finance landscape, specifically the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) and the initial implementation of Climate Budget Tagging (CBT). It argues that current efforts suffer from horizontal and vertical incoherence, limited transparency regarding debt and private financing, and a top-down approach that marginalizes social justice and adaptation needs. To remedy this, the author proposes a comprehensive Climate-Responsive Budgeting (CRB) framework that integrates positive and negative expenditure tagging, revenue tracking, gender-responsive budgeting, and regular Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIR).

The document outlines the methodology for a briefing on public money for fossil fuels, detailing how the authors tracked subsidies, state-owned enterprise (SOE) investments, and international public finance. It specifies the use of IMF and IEA data for 2022 subsidies and explains the 50% government ownership rule for SOE analysis. The note also highlights significant data gaps, particularly regarding subnational support and transparency in Chinese SOE reporting, suggesting that total government support for fossil fuels is likely underestimated.

The report examines the information asymmetry between social media platforms and public interest researchers, identifying technological, legal, and ethical barriers to data access. It evaluates existing mechanisms such as transparency reporting, API access, and crowdsourced data donations, while analyzing the impact of the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) and GDPR. The authors recommend the creation of an independent intermediary body to vet researchers and the alignment of international standards to ensure a safe, transparent, and evidence-based approach to studying the societal impacts of digital platforms.