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The report examines the impact of global decarbonisation on Africa's natural gas sector, distinguishing between existing and emerging producers. It argues that faster global transitions to net-zero emissions will reduce LNG demand and prices, creating 'external' climate transition risks that threaten the viability of future projects. The analysis suggests that domestic demand is an insufficient hedge against these risks due to regulated low prices and the increasing competitiveness of renewable energy. Emerging producers are identified as particularly vulnerable due to weaker sovereign credit ratings and the timing of their infrastructure investments.

The report analyzes the African medical manufacturing landscape, highlighting a heavy reliance on imports (over 70% for health technology) and a concentration of capabilities in North Africa, South Africa, and Nigeria. It identifies critical gaps in Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) production and medical device manufacturing, while noting that vaccine production is limited to four countries. The study argues that localization is a political project requiring a shift from generic-drug business models to more complex technologies, supported by patient capital, innovative public procurement, and the establishment of specialized pharmaceutical parks. It emphasizes the need for regulatory harmonization and the development of local 'notifying bodies' for medical devices to reduce compliance costs.

The document examines the role of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in facilitating the shift from fossil fuels to clean energy in five emerging economies. It argues against the use of natural gas as a 'bridging fuel,' citing price volatility, the risk of stranded assets, and methane emissions. Instead, it advocates for 'leapfrogging' directly to renewables, noting that solar and wind are cost-competitive and better suited for expanding energy access in rural areas. The brief emphasizes that a gas-led transition would be economically disadvantageous and inconsistent with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal.

The document examines the gap between scientific recognition of transboundary climate risks and the current local focus of multilateral adaptation finance. It proposes a shift toward 'systemic resilience' to address risks that cross borders via shared ecosystems, trade, and financial flows.

The document argues that the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing inequities in the UNFCCC process, particularly for Global South negotiators and civil society organizations. It highlights how travel restrictions, vaccine inequality, and the digital divide hindered participation and coordination, while broader geopolitical power dynamics and aid dependencies allowed Global North countries to maintain disproportionate influence over negotiation outcomes. The authors recommend short-term funding and logistical reforms, long-term institutional changes such as capping delegation sizes and shifting COP venues to the Global South, and a broader effort to decolonize research and build allyship to shift global power dynamics.

The document provides an overview of COP27, the 27th United Nations conference on climate change, which brings together approximately 200 countries to discuss plans for reducing carbon emissions to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C. It identifies three overarching themes for the conference: emissions reductions, climate finance, and prioritising people through the lens of 'loss and damage'.

The Clean Air Task Force calls for COP27 leadership to move beyond prescribed solution sets toward 'region-centric flexibility' and 'technology optionality'. It emphasizes that climate strategies must align with national interests and energy security, particularly for emerging economies, while advocating for the deployment of a broad range of carbon-free technologies including nuclear, hydrogen, and carbon capture and storage to address hard-to-abate sectors.

The document serves as an introduction to a briefing on 'loss and damage'—defined as climate impacts that cannot be adapted to—ahead of the COP27 negotiations in Egypt. It outlines the focus of a panel discussion involving experts from Climate Analytics, IIED, C2ES, and E3G, who addressed the international community's tools for managing loss and damage, the status of negotiations, and the specific relevance of these issues to U.S. policymakers. The briefing highlights that such impacts are global, citing examples of land loss in Louisiana and North Carolina.

The author contends that reducing food loss and waste is a non-contentious solution to climate change and biodiversity loss, yet it remains under-adopted by governments. While some countries have set targets aligned with SDG 12.3, only 38 nations have included food loss and waste in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). The text highlights that agriculture drives 70% of terrestrial biodiversity loss and 30% of greenhouse gas emissions, with rotting food in landfills serving as the third largest cause of methane emissions.

Projected emissions for the analysed major economies under current policies (36.2-41.8 GtCO2e by 2030) remain far above the 43% reduction from 2019 levels required by the Paris Agreement. While average per capita emissions are projected to decrease slightly from 9.6 tCO2e in 2015 to approximately 8.8-8.9 tCO2e by 2030, significant disparities exist, with emissions per capita expected to more than double in Türkiye and Viet Nam while halving in Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Only eleven countries are currently on track to meet their latest NDC targets, with Brazil and Indonesia moving off track due to increased land-use emission projections.

The document examines how the war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, leading to a sharp increase in fertilizer prices across Africa. It notes that these price hikes, combined with high input costs for natural gas and coal, threaten crop yields and increase food prices. While short-term input subsidies are common, the brief advocates for industrialization and the utilization of Africa's natural gas, coal, and phosphate rock reserves to build domestic fertilizer production capacity.

Türkiye can reduce its reliance on imported fossil fuels for power generation from 50% in 2021 to less than 25% by 2030 by accelerating the deployment of solar and wind energy. Achieving this requires reaching 40 GW of solar and 30 GW of wind capacity by 2030, which would result in these sources providing 34-38% of total power generation. This transition is framed as a means to both achieve the 2053 net zero target and improve energy independence and trade balances.

WRI identifies six critical objectives for COP27: establishing a loss and damage financing mechanism, scaling adaptation support, strengthening national emissions targets (NDCs), ensuring the $100 billion climate finance goal is met, advancing the Global Stocktake, and converting previous Glasgow commitments into tangible actions.

The document opposes the push for new gas infrastructure in Africa, which it describes as a short-term solution for European energy security that risks irreversible climate disaster. It highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change on Africa, the environmental damage caused by gas extraction in Nigeria and Mozambique, and the inadequacy of 'net zero' pledges. The authors call for an immediate end to fossil fuel financing and the implementation of a 100% renewable energy goal for Africa by 2050, funded by climate debt repayments from the Global North.

The document opposes the promotion of natural gas as a 'transition fuel' in Africa, arguing that such projects primarily benefit European energy security and corporate profits while exacerbating climate vulnerability and poverty on the continent. It highlights the environmental damage in the Niger Delta and Cabo Delgado, criticizes 'Net Zero' as greenwashing, and proposes a 100% renewable energy target for Africa by 2050. The authors call for an end to fossil fuel financing and demand an annual climate debt payment of $2 trillion from industrialized nations to fund loss, damage, and a just transition.

The Catalysing Climate Resilience (CCR) programme, funded by the FCDO and managed by FSD Africa, aims to build climate resilience in Africa through a three-part strategy: seeding new solutions via the Triggering Exponential Climate Action (TECA) venture launcher, accelerating growth through the Catalyst Fund, and developing the broader innovation ecosystem. The programme focuses on products and services that enable vulnerable households and businesses to adapt to climate change. Reported outcomes include the support of 70 start-ups, the creation or protection of 2,164 jobs, and the mobilisation of $11 million in public and private finance for resilience solutions.

The document outlines Africa's objectives for COP27, focusing on the African Group of Negotiators' (AGN) demands for increased climate finance and the recognition of the continent's special circumstances. It highlights a tension between the African Union's (AU) support for natural gas as a transition fuel and the goals of renewable energy activists. The brief also details the roles of specific 'climate champion' countries and the impact of global geopolitical tensions, such as the US-China standoff and the Russia-Ukraine war, on climate negotiations.

The paper examines the 'digital Grand Canyon' in Africa, identifying infrastructural, financial, and regulatory barriers to internet connectivity. It highlights the disproportionate impact of the digital divide on women and youth and proposes a combination of top-down government strategies and bottom-up market initiatives to foster inclusion. The authors argue that the AfCFTA framework should be used to harmonise digital trade rules, encourage diverse infrastructure financing, and implement comprehensive digital upskilling to ensure the continent's participation in the 4th Industrial Revolution.

The GCF is implementing a four-pillar operational framework to enhance coordination with other climate funds. Key achievements include the establishment of a joint steering committee for the Long-Term Vision (LTV) with the GEF, the fast-track reaccreditation of nine entities with the AF, and the development of a joint GCF-GEF pavilion for COP 26 and COP 27. The report details specific funding proposals and readiness grants that demonstrate national programming coherence, as well as ongoing technical dialogues to harmonize results indicators and impact measurement methodologies across funds.

The report finds that air quality is severely underfunded, accounting for only 0.5% of international development funding and less than 0.1% of philanthropic spending between 2015 and 2020. While 72% of development funding for air quality also addresses climate change, only 2.2% of international public climate finance explicitly targets air pollution. The analysis highlights a critical misalignment in priorities, noting that international development funders committed $46.6 billion to projects prolonging fossil fuel use between 2015-2021, more than four times the amount spent on air quality. Geographically, funding is concentrated in Asia, the US, China, and India, leaving Africa and Latin America underserved; in Africa, funding for fossil fuel-prolonging projects was 36 times higher than for clean air measures from 2015-2021.