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Mozambique possesses high agricultural potential but remains a net food importer due to low productivity and high climate vulnerability. The report identifies four primary areas for improvement: simplifying bureaucratic tax administration to reduce investment costs, developing public financial incentives and public-private partnerships (PPPs) to mitigate risk for farmers, prioritizing critical infrastructure in energy and irrigation, and enhancing revenue-sharing mechanisms to protect natural resources. It highlights that administrative delays and high interest rates (often over 20%) are more significant barriers than tax rates themselves. The document also emphasizes the need for better community consultation in PPPs and the implementation of a more transparent fiscal rule for sharing extractive industry royalties with local communities.

The briefing advocates for a binding UN treaty to end the impunity of transnational corporations (TNCs) in Africa. It details systemic environmental degradation and human rights abuses by companies like Shell in Nigeria, Vale in Mozambique, and ArcelorMittal in South Africa, arguing that national legal systems are often insufficient to provide justice and reparations.

The document analyzes the state of democracy in Africa, arguing that while electoral democracy has increased since 1989, it is often constrained by neopatrimonialism and a lack of governance capacity. It explores the 'sequencing debate' regarding whether democracy precedes or follows economic development, noting that while authoritarian models have sometimes delivered rapid growth, long-term human development is robustly linked to high-quality electoral democracy. Using the International Futures (IFs) system, the author forecasts that a 'Fourth Wave' of democracy could significantly increase Africa's GDP and reduce extreme poverty by 2070 compared to an 'Authoritarian Regress' scenario.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coalition of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, along with Benin, was established to combat Boko Haram. While the force has achieved some operational gains since early 2016, it continues to struggle with significant financial shortfalls, political mistrust among member states, and a gap between official claims of operationality and the reality on the ground. The African Union (AU) serves as a critical strategic and technical partner, filling an institutional vacuum left by the Lake Chad Basin Commission's (LCBC) limited experience in peace operations.

The document examines the tension between international regulatory norms, such as those established by CITES, and the varied local values associated with elephants and ivory. It argues that a 'one-size-fits-all' prohibition often fails because it ignores the complex socio-economic and cultural drivers of poaching and consumption. Using case studies from Cameroon's Congo River basin and Southern Africa, the authors illustrate how the commodification of ivory during the colonial era and the subsequent imposition of Western conservation models have alienated local communities, sometimes driving hunting underground or creating resentment. The paper concludes that for the ivory ban to succeed, policymakers must reconcile global norms with local realities, ensuring that communities derive tangible benefits from conservation.

The document examines China's use of large-scale infrastructure projects in Africa as a tool of economic statecraft to challenge Western-led global norms and promote a 'democratised' global order. It analyzes the role of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and compares African initiatives with similar Chinese regional forums in the Arab world, Central Asia, and Latin America. Despite a slowing domestic economy and falling commodity prices affecting resource-rich African states, the author contends that China's strategic geopolitical goals ensure the continued resilience of its African investments.

The document evaluates a capacity development programme on water security and climate resilient development involving 140 participants and 30 mentors across eight African nations. While it notes that the capacity to integrate climate change into national planning remains limited in most of these countries, the programme successfully fostered individual and institutional learning and sparked ongoing initiatives to include climate considerations in national development. The brief suggests that future iterations of the programme would be more cost-effective due to existing investments in learning materials and training of trainers.

The document examines how political instability, corruption, and a focus on onshore security led to 'sea blindness' in the Gulf of Guinea, creating a security gap exploited by pirates and transnational criminal networks. It details the region's vast natural resources, including oil, gas, and minerals, and analyzes the shift toward maritime security since 2012. The author evaluates various responses, from national naval upgrades in Nigeria and Ghana to regional frameworks like the Yaoundé Declaration and international support from the EU and UN, concluding that the primary challenge remains translating high-level policy into operational action.

The SEI Initiative on Climate Services focuses on creating a Participatory Framework for Climate Services (PFCS) to better connect climate science with the practical needs of users, ranging from national governments to smallholder farmers. The initiative is structured around four work packages: understanding user needs, exploring collaborative co-generation processes, improving communication methodologies, and developing a community learning space via the weADAPT platform. It draws on interdisciplinary research and case studies from both industrialized and developing countries to ensure climate information is timely, relevant, and accessible.

The report finds that Indonesia's current tax system does not incentivize sustainable land use in the palm oil industry, characterized by low tax-to-GDP ratios and minimal revenue redistribution to local governments. It proposes six fiscal reforms, including increasing land taxes and tying revenue sharing to sustainability indicators, to reduce deforestation and improve land productivity.

The document advocates for Community Forest Management (CFM) as a critical tool for biodiversity conservation and climate mitigation. It presents evidence that CFM often outperforms strict protection regimes in reducing deforestation, particularly when supported by secure land tenure and local autonomy. The briefing highlights the role of CFM in carbon sequestration and climate adaptation, while warning against 'false solutions' like REDD+ and the financialisation of nature, which it claims threaten community rights and traditional governance.

The report advocates for community forest management (CFM) as a superior strategy for environmental conservation and social justice. It provides evidence that forests managed by indigenous peoples and local communities often have lower deforestation rates and higher carbon storage than state-protected areas. The document identifies secure land tenure, local autonomy in decision-making, and strong social capital as critical success factors. It also warns against 'false solutions' like REDD+ and the financialization of nature, which it claims can lead to land grabbing and the erosion of traditional knowledge. The report concludes by recommending that governments prioritize collective land rights and traditional knowledge over market-based conservation mechanisms.

The document presents community forest management (CFM) as a superior alternative to industrial logging and strict protected areas for preserving biodiversity and mitigating climate change. It highlights that CFM can be more effective at reducing deforestation, as evidenced by data from Brazil and Costa Rica, and provides critical livelihood support to approximately 1.6 billion people. The text identifies key success factors for CFM, including secure land tenure, local decision-making autonomy, and strong social capital. Conversely, it warns against 'false solutions' such as REDD+ and the financialization of nature, which it claims risk land grabbing and the erosion of traditional governance. The document concludes by recommending the prioritization of decentralized, authentic CFM and the legal protection of indigenous and local community rights to ensure ecological and social justice.

The report evaluates forest governance through three indicators: institutional policy scores, the rule of law (illegal logging and violence), and land tenure rights for indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs). While some progress is noted in policy frameworks and the total area of recognized IPLC rights, the report highlights a slowdown in tenure recognition since 2008, a rise in absolute volumes of illegal timber imports—particularly into China—and persistent violence against land defenders, especially in Latin America.

The document identifies infrastructure, human settlements, and mining as the primary non-agricultural drivers of deforestation, while logging is the main driver of forest degradation. Due to a lack of disaggregated global data, the report does not define quantitative indicators but instead reviews public policy interventions and private sector sustainability initiatives. Key public measures include import bans on illegal timber in the US, EU, and Australia, and the use of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) for infrastructure. Private sector efforts are highlighted through forest certification schemes like FSC and PEFC, though their global impact remains limited, and emerging responsible mining initiatives like IRMA and the Oro Verde Program in Colombia.

A coalition of 98 global entities argues that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) fails to comply with international human rights obligations, specifically those recognized in the 2010 Cancun Agreements. The letter calls for the establishment of an independent accountability mechanism, the adoption of international sustainable development safeguards, and the implementation of improved stakeholder consultation processes to prevent environmental and social harms.

The document examines the challenges and necessity of resolving maritime boundary disputes in Africa, highlighting how these conflicts hinder the 'Blue Economy' and regional security. It discusses the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), while recommending a preference for bilateral and regional resolution mechanisms over international courts.

The document examines China's deepening security role in Africa, shifting from traditional military concerns to non-traditional threats. It analyzes how China protects its citizens from crime and terrorism, its response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and its dual role in the illegal wildlife and timber trades. The authors argue that these transnational challenges are compelling China to increase its engagement with multilateral organizations and move beyond its traditional policy of non-interference.

The paper argues that Africa's institutional crisis stems from a mismatch between Western-imported formal institutions and local socio-cultural realities, compounded by a colonial legacy of authoritarianism and neo-patrimonialism. It identifies operational failures such as weak state capacity, toxic leadership, and political apathy. Using Botswana as a positive example, the author suggests that resilient institutions require economic diversification to reduce rent-seeking, the establishment of 'embedded autonomy' for the bureaucracy, and a new generation of ethical, visionary leaders.

The report evaluates the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and its peace and security architecture, specifically the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) and the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC). It finds a significant gap between the organization's ambitions and its operational reality, noting that conflict prevention is hampered by a highly centralized, state-focused structure and a narrow military approach to security. The document highlights critical regional threats, including the Boko Haram insurgency, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, and the instability in the Central African Republic (CAR). It concludes that ECCAS lacks a credible regional lead nation and a shared vision, remaining heavily dependent on external funding, primarily from the European Union, which undermines regional ownership of the peace and security process.