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The report maps nearly one hundred agreements on critical minerals between African states and global actors, highlighting the strategic competition for resources. It identifies a lack of transparency in these deals and notes that while China and Russia are prominent, other actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are expanding their footprints. The analysis emphasizes that these partnerships often reflect broader geopolitical and historical ties rather than just economic needs.

The report examines how urban green space access is often socially determined by income, gender, and age, particularly in rapidly growing cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It highlights that lower-income communities often prioritize provisioning services—such as food and fuel—over the aesthetic or health-related benefits typically emphasized in high-income contexts. The authors argue that top-down planning frequently fails these populations and can lead to gentrification or social opposition. Using a case study from the Nakuru River area in Kenya, the report identifies systemic barriers to community-led management, including unclear governmental responsibilities, funding shortfalls, and the influence of external NGOs. It concludes that equitable urban greening requires integrating infrastructure improvements and employment opportunities with participatory design that includes women, youth, and people with disabilities.

The South African Climate Finance Landscape 2025 reports an annual average of ZAR 188.3 billion in climate finance for 2022–2023, though this remains well below the estimated annual need of up to ZAR 499 billion. Investment is heavily skewed toward the energy sector, which receives 74.1% of total flows, primarily for renewable electricity generation. In contrast, adaptation finance is lagging, accounting for only 11.3% of tracked flows. While domestic sources provide nearly 60% of funding, international flows are dominated by public development finance institutions, particularly from Western Europe. The report highlights significant barriers, including grid bottlenecks, policy uncertainty, and a lack of concessional capital for high-risk or non-revenue-generating adaptation and just transition projects.

The report compares 10 SADC cities, revealing stark disparities in economic wealth and infrastructure. While South African cities like Johannesburg and Cape Town are the wealthiest, they face high inequality and unemployment. Most other cities are characterized by high proportions of informal housing (60-86%) and a heavy reliance on national parastatals for engineered services. Sanitation remains the most critical service gap, with sewered sanitation being rare outside of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Local government finance varies wildly, with some cities relying heavily on national transfers while others, particularly in Zimbabwe, receive no transfers despite high service obligations.

The report provides a comprehensive profile of Luanda, highlighting its rapid population growth, extreme economic inequality, and a highly centralised governance structure. While the city has benefited from oil wealth, significant service delivery gaps persist, particularly in housing, water, and sanitation for those in informal settlements. The report notes that Luanda is one of the most congested cities globally and faces increasing climate risks, including flooding and sea-level rise.

The document assesses the effects of US Executive Order 14257, which introduced a 10% universal tariff and higher country-specific tariffs (11% to 50%) on imports from 190 countries. While mineral-exporting nations like Angola and South Africa may find relief through exemptions for oil and critical minerals, countries like Lesotho and Madagascar face severe economic risks, particularly in the textile sector. The analysis highlights a strategic divide: some nations seek bilateral deals, others aim for self-sufficiency, and a group of African WTO members are coordinating through the 'Friends of the System'. The authors argue that African nations should negotiate collectively under the African Union to protect regional integration and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as the AGOA program faces expiration on September 30, 2025.

The paper analyzes the economic consequences of US Executive Order 14257, which introduced universal and country-specific tariffs on imports from 190 territories. While many African nations face a 10% universal tariff, 20 countries face higher rates ranging from 11% to 50%, with Lesotho most affected. The authors highlight the vulnerability of textile industries in Lesotho and Madagascar and the uncertainty surrounding the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which expires on September 30, 2025. The document advocates for a coordinated regional response via the African Union and the African Continental Free Trade Area to mitigate economic risks and negotiate bilateral or sectoral agreements.

The 2025 Progress Report details WWF's global initiatives to safeguard threatened species. Key achievements include the establishment of pangolin monitoring in southern Africa, the launch of the Elly Allies Initiative for Asian elephants, and the development of Shellbank, a DNA-based toolkit for sea turtle traceability. The report also highlights a 74% increase in wild tiger populations since 2010 and the formation of the Tribal Buffalo Lifeways Collaboration to restore bison to Native lands in the Great Plains.

The report finds that 10 major international oil companies (IOCs) are responsible for 7% of global gas flaring on an equity-weighted basis, with a significant portion occurring at non-operated assets. In 2023, total global upstream flaring was 145 billion cubic meters (bcm), with an average intensity of 5.0 m³/bbl. The analysis highlights a gap between corporate commitments to the World Bank's Zero Routine Flaring (ZRF) initiative and actual performance, noting that non-routine flaring remains largely unabated and that no analyzed company meets the IEA's Net Zero Emissions scenario target of 0.3 m³/bbl by 2030. The report argues that IOCs have a broader influence on up to 40% of global flaring through their partnerships with national oil companies (NOCs) and recommends extending emissions targets to non-operated assets and implementing stricter regulatory and financial levers.

The research paper analyzes the withdrawal of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) from Cabo Delgado on 15 July 2024, arguing that the exit was driven by financial constraints and poor coordination rather than security improvements. It highlights that the insurgency, involving groups like Ahlu Sunnah Waljama’a and linked to ISIS, is fueled by a complex mix of religious extremism, poverty, unemployment, and state violence. The author contends that the withdrawal may have created a security void, as attacks have increased in 2024, and argues that military intervention alone is insufficient without addressing the root governance failures and economic inequalities in Mozambique.

The DRC and Zambia are attempting to transition from extractive economies to value-added battery producers to support the global green transition. While they possess critical reserves of cobalt and copper, their efforts are complicated by a history of privatization, problematic governance, and a geopolitical tug-of-war between the USA and China. To succeed, both nations must expand local processing capacity and improve infrastructure, such as the Lobito Corridor, while managing the social and environmental impacts of mining.

Since 2023, Chinese firms have committed over US$100 billion in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) across at least 130 major cleantech transactions, spanning solar, wind, batteries, and new energy vehicles (NEVs). This 'going global' strategy is driven by domestic overcapacity, which has caused solar module prices to drop 60% and battery prices 50% year-on-year, and a need to circumvent trade barriers from the US and EU. The report highlights China's dominance in the global battery supply chain, where it holds over 80% of manufacturing capacity, and its expansion into markets like Morocco, Brazil, and Thailand. For Australia, the report notes that Chinese OFDI reached a multi-decade low of US$613 million in 2023, and argues that Australia should clarify its foreign investment rules to attract Chinese private capital for onshore value-adding in critical minerals and renewable energy infrastructure.

The report examines the intersection of Africa's blue economy and the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda, arguing that youth inclusion is essential for sustainable development and maritime security. It identifies climate change, a burgeoning youth population, and coastal migration as critical trends that can either destabilize coastal regions or be harnessed for growth. The document highlights the potential for the blue economy to generate up to US$405 billion by 2030 and provides examples of youth-led initiatives in aquaculture, conservation, and maritime security across various African nations. It concludes that a multidimensional approach, exemplified by the Great Blue Wall initiative, is necessary to build resilience and prevent the radicalization of marginalized youth by providing viable economic alternatives.

The document examines the complementary strengths of China, as a global leader in green technology manufacturing, and Africa, which possesses vast renewable energy potential and critical mineral reserves. It highlights the shift in China's approach toward treating Africa as a business partner and details the specific clean energy commitments made during FOCAC 2024. However, it argues that Africa must enhance its own internal resource mobilization, reduce dependency on external aid, and improve project implementation timelines to fully realize these opportunities.

The document advocates for a progressive tax agenda to address extreme poverty and wealth concentration, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It proposes several instruments: Financial Transaction Taxes (FTTs) to curb speculation and raise billions annually; net wealth taxes to target the super-rich; property taxes to leverage immobile assets; and Resource Rent Taxes (RTT) for the extractives sector. Using South Africa as a case study, the brief demonstrates that a combination of these taxes could generate substantial revenue to fund social protection, healthcare, and a Universal Basic Income Guarantee, potentially increasing GDP growth.

The EU CRMA and UK CMS aim to reduce dependence on China and secure supplies for the green transition, but their domestic focus may hinder African industrialization. While the EU targets 10% domestic mining and 40% processing by 2030, its international partnerships are criticized as extractivist. The brief highlights a misalignment in 'criticality' definitions, where African states prioritize regional industrialization and specific minerals like gold or coal, which may conflict with Western climate goals or sanctions. It concludes that without a shift toward supporting in-country processing and reducing certification costs for local firms, these strategies will fail to create mutually beneficial partnerships.

The document analyzes China's dominance in Africa's critical minerals landscape, highlighting its role as a primary investor and buyer. It argues that while Africa's reserves are vital for the global energy transition, the current model of exporting raw materials without local processing limits socioeconomic benefits and risks environmental degradation. The brief recommends that African governments pursue strategic partnerships, invest in research and development, and build energy infrastructure to move up the value chain, while urging international partners to support technology transfer and local capacity building.

Carbon Market Watch (CMW) assessed several market-based proposals for international shipping decarbonization, scoring them based on alignment with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal, emission reductions, and equity. The analysis highlights that while the IMO's 2023 strategy aims for net-zero emissions by 2050, current measures are insufficient. CMW identifies the proposal by Canada as the strongest (Score A+), citing its high carbon levy of 150 $/tCO2e, while criticizing the Bahamas et al. proposal (Score C) for its reliance on a flexibility compliance mechanism that disincentivizes decarbonization.

Carbon Market Watch (CMW) assessed several market-based measure (MBM) proposals for the international shipping sector, using a methodology developed by CE Delft. The evaluation focused on alignment with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal, immediate emission reductions, support for vulnerable nations and workers, and funding for research and development. The analysis highlights that current IMO strategies are insufficient for 1.5°C alignment and that only proposals with high carbon levies—such as those from Canada and Austria et al.—provide a strong enough price signal to drive the transition to zero-emission technologies.

Carbon Market Watch evaluated several greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing proposals for the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), scoring them based on criteria such as emission reduction potential, support for vulnerable nations, and revenue use for R&D. The analysis finds that while some proposals, such as those from Canada and Belize et al., show strength in levy levels and support for vulnerable nations, others, like the Bahamas et al. proposal, are insufficient as they do not function as robust market-based measures. The document argues that meeting the IMO's net-zero goals by or around 2050 requires ambitious levies and strong enforcement to incentivise zero-emission technologies.