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Colombia is planning LNG import capacity that could exceed double its projected 2030 gas demand, potentially creating stranded assets and hindering its energy transition. While the country faces a domestic gas deficit and energy security risks from El Niño and geopolitical tensions, the report argues that current and planned projects—such as the SPEC LNG expansion and the Puerto Bahía or Coveñas terminals—could satisfy demand without the need for the full suite of nine planned initiatives. The document emphasizes that prioritizing flexible, temporary LNG capacity while shifting investment toward renewables and energy efficiency would align with Colombia's international climate leadership and its roadmap to reduce fossil fuel dependence by 90% by 2050.

Colombia is planning at least nine major LNG import terminal projects and expansions between 2026 and 2030, which would create a capacity of approximately 2,500 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d). This figure is more than double the government's projected gas demand of 1,000 MMcf/d for 2030. The report warns that such an overbuild could lead to stranded assets, lock the country into long-term fossil fuel contracts, and divert resources from renewables and energy efficiency. While the country faces a domestic gas deficit and energy security challenges exacerbated by El Niño and geopolitical tensions, the document suggests that near-term needs could be met without overbuilding infrastructure, aligning instead with a roadmap to reduce fossil fuel dependence and emissions by 90% by 2050.

The report finds that between 2019 and 2025, 240 global banks provided US$590.8 billion to the top fifteen petrochemical companies, with a high concentration of funding from US, Japanese, Chinese, German, and UK institutions. Institutional investors held US$146.6 billion in exposure to these companies as of September 2025, dominated by US-based asset managers like Vanguard and BlackRock. The document argues that this financing persists despite structural risks such as overcapacity and collapsing profit margins, and often contradicts the public climate commitments of the financial institutions involved.

Kenya faces a significant economic burden from fossil fuel imports and subsidies despite having a nearly 90 percent renewable electricity grid. The report argues that transitioning away from fossil fuels is an economic imperative, as revenues from potential oil and coal projects are insufficient to address the national debt. It proposes a three-step pathway: immediate integration of phase-out plans, short-to-medium term divestment and investment in high-growth sectors (renewable energy, e-mobility, climate-smart agriculture, green manufacturing, and the digital economy), and long-term decarbonisation of hard-to-abate sectors. The document also highlights the risks of stranded assets and 'debt trap diplomacy' and recommends joining a Fossil Fuel Treaty to unlock international finance and technical support.

Nigeria's economy is heavily reliant on oil, which accounts for roughly 50% of the national budget and over 90% of foreign exchange earnings. This dependency has led to 'Dutch Disease', severe environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, and fiscal fragility due to oil price volatility. With global oil demand projected to peak by 2030, the report argues for an urgent transition. It recommends diversifying into solar and hydro power, agro-processing, green manufacturing, and the digital economy. Key policy proposals include establishing a National Economic Diversification Master Plan, redirecting fossil fuel subsidy savings toward green investment, and joining a Fossil Fuel Treaty to secure transition finance and debt resolution.

The report argues that reliance on fossil fuels creates unstable government revenues, locks countries into outdated infrastructure, and exposes them to stranded asset risks as global energy systems shift. It categorizes African economies into export-dominant, import-dependent, and dual-role types, noting that no single transition pathway fits all. To mitigate these risks, the document advocates for diversification into manufacturing, agro-processing, digital services, and the domestic processing of transition minerals. It outlines a phased transition timeline from 2026 to beyond 2045, emphasizing that domestic governance reforms must be supported by international cooperation to reduce the 'African premium' on borrowing costs and improve technology access.

The South African Wholesale Electricity Market (SAWEM) is a proposed short-term trading platform for bulk electricity, expected to commence at the end of 2026. Governed by the Market Code and Rules, it allows power producers and large buyers to trade electricity one day ahead or in real-time. While intended to increase competition and transparency, concerns are raised regarding the conflict of interest since the Market Operator is housed within the National Transmission Company of South Africa (NTCSA), a subsidiary of Eskom. The document highlights that the market's design could either facilitate a transition to affordable renewable energy or entrench fossil fuel generation and financial risks for municipalities.

The International Institute for Sustainable Development asserts that a new MOU between Canada and Alberta undermines the country's climate commitments by lowering the industrial carbon price floor to CAD 110 by 2040, promoting new bitumen pipelines, expanding LNG facilities, and increasing natural gas power generation.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as new plants are increasingly built for backup reliability rather than primary generation. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting most new demand. While the number of countries developing coal projects fell to 32, political interventions in the US and energy security concerns in the EU have delayed planned closures. The EU continues a terminal decline in coal, with solar and wind producing more energy than all fossil fuels combined for the first time in 2025.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

The report highlights a growing gap in 2025 where global coal capacity increased by 3.5% despite a 0.6% decrease in generation, signaling a shift where coal serves as a backup rather than a primary power source. While China and India continue to expand capacity for energy security, the total number of countries proposing or building new coal plants fell to 32 in 2025. The document specifically contrasts the policies of South Korea, which has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, with Japan, which maintains a large coal fleet and focuses on abatement technologies like ammonia co-firing and CCS without a binding national phase-out date.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal is increasingly used as system 'insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While Latin America achieved a 'No New Coal' status in 2025, several countries in the region, including Brazil and Chile, experienced delays or reversals in planned plant retirements. China and India continue to lead global capacity expansions, accounting for 95% of all coal capacity under construction worldwide.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

The report asserts that metallurgical coal demand is plateauing as the steel industry shifts toward low-carbon technologies like electric arc furnaces (EAFs) and green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI). While some governments and financial institutions remain bullish on long-term growth, particularly in Asia, the document predicts a 4.8% drop in met coal consumption between 2025 and 2030. It highlights the risk of stranded assets, noting that 145 companies are planning expansions that could increase global capacity by 580 million tonnes per year. The report recommends scrapping subsidies for traditional steel, lowering industrial electricity prices, and using public procurement to prioritise green steel to accelerate the transition.

A coalition of environmental organizations demands that the South Korean government stop the expansion of LNG power generation in the upcoming 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, citing price volatility, carbon lock-in risks, and the economic viability of renewable energy alternatives.

The document examines 58 active fossil fuel production restrictions across 25 countries and 27 subnational jurisdictions, noting a sharp increase in such policies since the 2010s. It highlights that while these measures are expanding, they remain politically fragile and susceptible to rollbacks during high energy price cycles or government changes. The analysis emphasizes the role of subnational governments as early adopters and the importance of strong legal anchoring to prevent repeals.

The report analyzes how high debt-service obligations and fossil fuel reliance create a structural trap for Global South nations, where fiscal pressures force governments to prioritize short-term liquidity and fossil fuel extraction over long-term renewable energy transitions. Through case studies of Colombia, Egypt, Guyana, Jordan, and Sri Lanka, it demonstrates that this nexus is systemic, often reinforced by the conditionalities of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the interests of multinational corporations. The document advocates for comprehensive debt cancellation, the end of fossil fuel finance, and a global transition framework based on 'extraction equity' to dismantle these structural barriers.