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The report examines Indonesia's energy transition through a lens of national interest, highlighting a significant gap between the high investment needs for Net Zero Emissions (NZE) and the limited availability of domestic and international funding. It argues that foreign climate finance often arrives as debt rather than grants, potentially exacerbating Indonesia's chronic fiscal deficits and public debt. The document analyzes the capacity of the Indonesian banking sector to fund renewable energy projects, finding that while capital adequacy is generally high, systemic bottlenecks in foreign exchange liquidity and long-term stable funding persist. It also evaluates the nascent Indonesian carbon market, noting a lack of clear emission caps (PTBAE) and low carbon prices. The authors propose 'The Indonesian Way,' a strategy focusing on eight action paths, including the dekarbonization of transport and electricity, targeted subsidies, and the development of a domestic green manufacturing ecosystem to reduce technological dependency.

The report examines Indonesia's path toward net-zero emissions by 2060, highlighting a significant gap between current investment levels and the estimated annual need of USD 73–76 billion. It argues that foreign climate finance is often debt-heavy and unreliable, urging a shift toward domestic funding and structural reforms. The analysis covers the banking sector's limited capacity to finance renewable energy, the underperformance of the national carbon market, and the socioeconomic disparities in energy access. It proposes an "Indonesian Way" consisting of eight strategic actions, including targeted subsidies and the development of a domestic clean-tech ecosystem, to ensure a just and sovereign transition.

In 2024, low-carbon electricity generation exceeded 40% of the global total for the first time in decades, driven by unprecedented solar energy growth. Despite this, extreme heatwaves increased electricity demand for cooling, leading to a slight rise in fossil fuel generation and record-high sector emissions. Solar energy has doubled its generation over the last three years, with China contributing over half of the 2024 increase. The report concludes that while short-term weather fluctuations can cause temporary fossil fuel spikes, the long-term trend is dominated by clean energy growth and electrification.

The document proposes an "energy park" model that co-locates renewable generation with flexible industrial loads and long-duration storage to replace retiring coal capacity. Using Pueblo, Colorado, as a case study, the authors model a system combining 2,000 MW of solar, 1,600 MW of wind, short-duration batteries, and flexible loads (thermal batteries and electrolyzers). The findings indicate that such a park can achieve 99% reliability in mimicking the dispatch of the Comanche Unit 3 plant while providing significant local economic benefits, including over $40 million in annual property taxes and 350 permanent jobs. Financially, the energy park is estimated to be at least 50% cheaper for electricity ratepayers than a comparable small modular nuclear reactor.

The document outlines a training curriculum focused on 'energy justice' and 'energy sufficiency' to ensure the transition to renewables does not replicate the injustices of fossil fuel systems. It explores the risks of 'energy extractivism'—where resources are exploited in the Global South for consumption elsewhere—and provides examples of community-owned energy models in The Gambia, Brazil, Denmark, and the UK. The module guides participants through a process of identifying barriers to just transitions and developing local projects based on circular design and 'people power'.

The manual outlines a pedagogical framework to move beyond simple renewable energy substitution toward a systemic change based on energy sufficiency and sovereignty. It critiques 'energy extractivism'—the exploitation of resources in the Global South for external consumption—and 'green extractivism,' where climate mitigation narratives justify local land and resource loss. The guide promotes circular design to combat planned obsolescence and provides examples of community energy models in Gambia, Brazil, Denmark, and the UK, while detailing Scotland's policy strategy for local renewable ownership.

The report identifies Iraq as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries globally, facing severe water scarcity, rising temperatures, and desertification. It proposes a strategic framework to prioritize GCF funding across key sectors, including energy, agriculture, water, and urban development. The document details a prioritized list of 19 projects, with high-priority initiatives focusing on climate-resilient livelihoods in southern Iraq and the transformation of the agricultural and water sectors. It emphasizes the need for international financial support, technology transfer, and the mobilization of private sector investment to bridge significant development gaps and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, particularly from the energy sector, which accounts for 85% of national emissions as of 2019.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

Southeast Asia is facing a potential surge in gas production, with 14 projects potentially reaching final investment decisions (FIDs) in 2025. If approved, these would add over 20 bcm/y of capacity, an 18% increase over current output. However, many projects have a history of delays, and the expansion threatens ecologically sensitive areas like the Coral Triangle and Mekong Delta. The report highlights contradictions between these extraction plans and the net-zero commitments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei.

The report provides a comprehensive framework for negotiating international agreements on fossil fuel subsidies (FFS), detailing six key building blocks: objectives, scope, disciplines, carve-outs/exceptions, special and differential treatment (SDT), and enforcement. It analyzes various legal approaches, including those based on the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and highlights the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) as a primary precedent for specific FFS disciplines.

The report evaluates the first 3.5 years of Suriname's NAP implementation, noting significant progress in forestry, environment, and spatial planning, but highlighting systemic barriers such as a lack of a formal coordinating entity, insufficient funding, and low stakeholder awareness.

The document argues that the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy in South Africa's Steve Tshwete Local Municipality (STLM) is 'unjust' for youth due to their exclusion from meaningful employment and productive assets. It highlights how the closure of the Komati Power Station has devastated local livelihoods and how current municipal land disposal conditions effectively bar unemployed youth from ownership. Furthermore, it notes that renewable energy projects, such as solar installations in Doornkop, provide only short-term, low-skill work that fails to create sustainable career paths for young people.

The report identifies a persistent presence of climate disinformation in French mainstream media, noting 128 certified cases over three months. It highlights a significant over-representation of such content in private media, particularly Sud Radio, and observes peaks in disinformation coinciding with major political events. The analysis also employs the CARDS framework to identify 373 instances of 'inaction discourse,' primarily targeting climate solutions and messengers. The authors call for increased environmental coverage, better journalist training, and stronger regulatory action by ARCOM.

The report identifies 128 instances of climate disinformation and 373 narratives of inaction in French audiovisual media between January and March 2025. It highlights a significant concentration of disinformation in private media, particularly Sud Radio, and notes spikes in misleading content during major political events such as Donald Trump's inauguration. The analysis finds that energy and mobility are the most targeted sectors, with a strong tendency to discredit green transition solutions and messengers. The authors argue that traditional media are becoming catalysts for the normalization of climate disinformation, exacerbated by low overall airtime dedicated to environmental issues (2%) and a lack of journalistic challenge to inaccurate claims during interviews.

The report finds that Eni's strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over renewable energy investments. Eni's projected 2030 production levels and LNG capacity expansions significantly overshoot NZE requirements, while its diversification into renewables remains marginal, representing only 5.8% of its projected 2030 energy mix.

The report finds that Equinor is prioritizing oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over renewable energy investments, backtracking on previous low-carbon capital expenditure and production targets. Its projected 2030 production levels and planned LNG and gas power capacities are identified as inconsistent with the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.

The report argues that Repsol's climate strategy is insufficient, as the company continues to prioritize oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over sustainable energy investments. It finds that Repsol's 2030 production targets exceed NZE requirements by 38%, and its diversification into renewables and green hydrogen remains a small fraction of its overall energy mix. Additionally, the report notes that Repsol has weakened its 2030 emissions targets, specifically regarding scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions.