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In 2019/2020, Burkina Faso received USD 567 million in climate finance, covering only 13% of the USD 4.1 billion needed by 2050 to meet its NDC targets. Public finance dominated the landscape, accounting for 80% of total flows, with a heavy reliance on international multilateral and bilateral DFIs. Energy systems and Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) were the primary recipients of funds, though significant gaps remain in water and wastewater sectors. The report highlights critical barriers, including political instability, a lack of domestic climate budget tagging, and the absence of a robust Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) framework, which hinders the attraction of further donor funding and private investment.

In 2019/2020, Nigeria received an average of USD 1.9 billion annually in climate finance, representing only 11% of the USD 17.7 billion needed annually for its conditional NDC. Public finance dominated at 77% of total flows, primarily delivered as concessional debt. Mitigation finance (USD 1.1 billion) outweighed adaptation finance (USD 663 million), despite high vulnerability to climate shocks. Energy systems received the most investment, particularly solar, while sectors like waste and industrial processes remained severely underfunded. The report highlights a significant contradiction between climate finance flows and continued heavy investment in fossil fuels, noting one LNG project alone received USD 2.77 billion. Key barriers include limited private sector mobilization, capacity constraints in GHG reporting, and a lack of national climate budget tagging.

In 2019/2020, Nigeria received an average of USD 1.9 billion annually in climate finance, representing only 11% of the USD 17.7 billion needed to meet its conditional NDC target. Public finance dominated the landscape, accounting for 77% of flows, primarily through concessional debt. Mitigation finance (USD 1.1 billion) outweighed adaptation finance (USD 663 million), despite the country's high vulnerability to climate risks. Energy systems received the largest share of investment (41%), with a strong focus on solar technologies, while sectors like waste and industrial processes remained severely underfunded. The report highlights a significant contradiction between climate finance goals and continued heavy investment in fossil fuels, noting that a single LNG project received USD 2.77 billion—more than the total tracked climate finance for the period.

The report finds a massive gap between Africa's annual climate finance needs (USD 277 billion) and actual flows (USD 29.5 billion). While international public finance dominates, private sector contribution is low at 14%. Finance is heavily concentrated in a few countries and sectors, with energy receiving the most investment, while agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) remains underfunded. The report recommends scaling up concessional finance, improving data tracking, and catalyzing private investment to meet 2030 goals.

The paper examines the failure of the 'billions to trillions' agenda to mobilize private capital for biodiversity, noting that while some success exists in renewable energy, biodiversity funding remains critically low. It introduces the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) as a tool to analyze the financial 'regime' and 'landscape' that obstruct biodiversity investment. The author suggests six policy intervention points—stimulating and accelerating niches, destabilizing the regime, addressing repercussions, coordinating multi-regime interactions, and tilting the landscape—to drive a systemic transition toward effective biodiversity financing.

The document reviews 24 financing strategies for adaptation in developing countries, categorizing them as either discrete adaptation strategies or general climate action strategies. It finds a wide variation in approach, ranging from high-level awareness documents to detailed costing frameworks. The analysis suggests that countries do not necessarily need to calculate precise finance gaps and should instead focus on the strategic use of public finance to leverage private investment and improve the tracking of international finance flows. It emphasizes the importance of involving ministries of finance and international funders to increase the likelihood of securing resources.

The report reviews 24 financing strategies from developing countries, categorizing them into discrete adaptation strategies and general climate action strategies. It finds that while these documents help communicate priorities and attract international grants, there is a significant gap in strategic analysis regarding how to leverage public finance to attract private investment. The report emphasizes the need for stronger engagement from ministries of finance and planning, as well as improved country-level tracking of climate finance to measure the actual impact of these strategies.

The research employs a Fixed Effect design to analyze how mining royalties per capita correlate with socioeconomic indicators (health, education, employment, and income) and homicide rates, as well as municipal fiscal spending. While simple correlations suggest mining royalties improve socioeconomic outcomes and increase violence, the application of municipality and year fixed effects removes the statistical significance for economic outcomes and reveals a negative correlation with homicide rates. In terms of fiscal impact, an increase of R$ 1 in mining royalties is associated with a corresponding R$ 1 increase in total expenditures, primarily affecting public sector wages and pensions, followed by health and education. The study also notes that mining royalties are not associated with increased urban property tax (IPTU) revenue, suggesting a potential reduction in fiscal effort by benefited municipalities.

The report compares the Proagro and PSR rural insurance programs in Brazil, finding that Proagro's design—where the government assumes risk while financial institutions operate the program—creates significant information asymmetries and moral hazard. This leads to higher claim rates and increasing costs for the National Treasury. In contrast, the PSR, where private insurers bear the risk, shows greater efficiency and growth, though it struggles to reach small-scale producers. The authors recommend migrating resources toward the PSR, improving claim verification through technology and training, and integrating sustainable farming criteria into risk zoning to enhance the sustainability of Brazilian agriculture.

The document highlights the urgency of loss and damage finance following devastating floods in Bangladesh and Northern India. It argues that existing mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund and humanitarian aid, are insufficient due to stringent requirements, slow disbursement, and overstretched resources. The author calls on G7 nations to provide bilateral grants, support existing pilot facilities, or fund national disaster funds to provide immediate relief while working toward a formal loss and damage finance facility at COP27.

The Institute for Economic Justice argues that bureaucratic delays at SASSA have prevented the payment of April and May 2022 SRD grants, affecting up to 10 million people. The letter proposes emergency measures, such as payment based on applicant declarations or prioritizing previously verified beneficiaries, to prevent widespread hunger.

The briefing outlines the complexities of establishing the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance, emphasizing the need for a science- and equity-based approach over purely political targets. It highlights the lack of a common definition for climate finance and the necessity of aligning the NCQG with the Paris Agreement's articles and the actual needs of developing countries. The text argues for a more balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation, the inclusion of loss and damage, and a focus on fair access to finance that avoids increasing the debt burden of vulnerable nations.

The report finds that implementing Africa's NDCs will cost approximately USD 2.8 trillion between 2020 and 2030, with a 'climate finance need' of USD 2.5 trillion after accounting for USD 264 billion in domestic public commitments. Current annual flows of USD 30 billion cover only about 12% of the required USD 250 billion per year. Mitigation accounts for 66% of needs, dominated by the transport sector (largely due to South Africa), while adaptation represents 24%, likely underestimated due to data gaps. The report highlights a heavy reliance on public finance (87%) and recommends that the UNFCCC provide standardized guidance and capacity support to improve the robustness of national needs assessments.

The report finds that implementing Africa's NDCs will cost approximately USD 2.8 trillion between 2020 and 2030, with a 'climate finance need' of USD 2.5 trillion after accounting for domestic public commitments. Current annual flows of USD 30 billion cover only about 12% of the required USD 250 billion per year. Mitigation accounts for 66% of needs, heavily skewed toward South Africa's transport sector, while adaptation represents 24%, likely underestimated due to data gaps. The report highlights a significant reliance on public funding (87%) and recommends that the UNFCCC develop standardized guidance and that countries adopt more participatory, bottom-up needs assessments to mobilize private capital.

The report finds a significant disparity in India's energy support, with fossil fuel subsidies remaining substantially higher than those for clean energy, reaching 9 times the amount in FY 2021. While overall fossil fuel subsidies decreased by 72% between 2014 and 2021, public finance institutions and state-owned utilities continue to prioritize fossil fuel projects over renewables. The study emphasizes the need to shift financial support toward clean energy technologies to meet the target of 500 GW of non-fossil power capacity by 2030.

The report provides a comprehensive tracking of global coal-fired power plant capacity, highlighting a divergence between the decline of coal in most OECD and non-OECD countries and the continued expansion of coal capacity in China. It evaluates the effectiveness of COP 26 commitments, the role of public financing, and the perceived inefficiency of 'clean coal' technologies like Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

Financing for sustainable cooling is complex because needs vary across populations and businesses, requiring a diverse array of financial instruments including public procurement, grants, subsidies, and commercial financing. A significant development in 2021 was the establishment of a USD 157 million Cooling Facility by the World Bank and Green Climate Fund to support nine developing countries. The appropriateness of these financial flows depends on local conditions such as poverty levels and energy access tiers.

The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021 reports that annual climate finance reached USD 632 billion in 2019/2020, though growth has slowed. The report highlights a massive investment gap, noting that an increase of at least 590% is needed to meet 2030 climate objectives. Mitigation remains the dominant focus, particularly in renewable energy and low-carbon transport, while adaptation finance continues to lag, relying almost entirely on public sources. Geographically, investments are heavily concentrated in East Asia & Pacific, Western Europe, and North America, with China accounting for an estimated 81% of investments in its region.

The report finds that community-based organisations (CBOs) in South Africa provide violence prevention and youth development services at a low cost—under R7,000 per family per year—while generating significant tangible and intangible social benefits. Using case studies of Net vir Pret and Seven Passes Initiative, the analysis suggests a benefit-to-cost ratio of more than 2:1. The authors highlight the adaptability of CBOs compared to state institutions and call for the South African government to develop funding benchmarks to sustainably support these organisations.

Canadian governments provided over CAD 23 billion in support to oil and gas pipelines between 2018 and 2021, with CAD 10 billion allocated after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. This support, which includes loans and loan guarantees, is argued to undermine Canada's net-zero goals and international commitments to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.