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This synthesis report discusses the role of South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency in advancing the 'just transition' agenda, building upon a Ministerial Statement from October 2024 that emphasizes structural actions in national economies and the international financial system to scale up climate action.

This research paper outlines the priorities of South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency regarding climate finance, emphasizing the mobilization of resources for just energy transitions and the elevation of African concerns within the G20 framework, building upon the foundations laid during Brazil's 2024 presidency.

The document outlines a strategy for South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency to address the deepening financial crisis in Africa, where debt servicing often exceeds spending on health or education. It critiques the current global governance architecture, noting the IMF's diminished bargaining power and the complexity of modern bondholder-led debt. The author proposes three priorities: establishing general principles for holistic debt restructuring based on norms like 'optimality' and 'responsibility'; utilizing the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR) to study the failures of the Common Framework and Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI); and addressing the debate between whether African debt is primarily a liquidity or solvency issue to restore access to finance.

African countries face a deepening financial crisis where debt servicing obligations constrain the policy space needed for climate and development goals. The document highlights that total public debt in Africa reached $1.8 trillion in 2022, with 23 countries spending more on debt service than on health or education. To address this, the author suggests that South Africa's G20 presidency should advocate for negotiations that integrate a debtor's financial obligations with its environmental and social commitments, noting that Africa requires $1.3 trillion annually for SDGs and $1.3–1.6 trillion annually until 2030 for climate change impacts.

The document argues that loss and damage (L&D) finance is a matter of climate justice and that the Global South must maintain a unified negotiating position to secure grants-based funding. It reviews the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund and the Santiago Network, while warning against the use of loans that increase external debt. The brief highlights the strategic role of Brazil's G20 presidency and COP30 in advancing a holistic development and environment agenda, and calls for the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance to include separate sub-goals for adaptation and L&D to prevent double counting.

The report highlights a divide between emerging middle powers (IBSA) and Germany regarding the war in Ukraine, the dominance of the US dollar, and the role of BRICS+. While IBSA respondents prefer mediation in conflicts and view the US dollar's dominance unfavourably, German respondents support Ukraine and view the dollar's role as favourable. Despite these differences, there is shared optimism for the G20 and a common interest in the 2030 Agenda, specifically regarding technology transfer and global public investment.

The document outlines the methodology for a briefing on public money for fossil fuels, detailing how the authors tracked subsidies, state-owned enterprise (SOE) investments, and international public finance. It specifies the use of IMF and IEA data for 2022 subsidies and explains the 50% government ownership rule for SOE analysis. The note also highlights significant data gaps, particularly regarding subnational support and transparency in Chinese SOE reporting, suggesting that total government support for fossil fuels is likely underestimated.

The 2021 Production Gap Report finds that governments plan to produce significantly more fossil fuels by 2030 than is consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C, with the gap remaining largely unchanged from previous assessments. While some G20 countries and multilateral development banks have reduced finance for fossil fuel production, over USD 300 billion in new funds have been directed toward fossil fuel activities since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, exceeding investments in clean energy.

The authors argue that while the T20 has grown in diversity and productivity, it suffers from limited policy impact, a lack of continuity across presidencies, and an over-reliance on the production of policy briefs over substantive dialogue. To address these, they propose establishing a permanent steering committee based on a troika system, decoupling the T20 timeline from the G20 calendar to allow for earlier agenda-setting, and reducing the volume of policy briefs in favor of higher-quality, joint recommendations. The goal is to transform the T20 into a more continuous process that engages both current and incoming G20 presidencies and mid-level government officials.

Japan is ranked second among G20 OECD member countries for its low level of support for fossil fuel use and overall progress, yet it remains the second-highest supplier of public finance for domestic and overseas fossil fuel projects within that group.

In 2019, Canada's federal fossil fuel subsidies totaled at least CAD 600 million, though the actual figure may be higher due to data gaps regarding tax measures and the Trans Mountain pipeline. The report notes a shift in subsidy focus from exploration to production and export infrastructure, including liquefied natural gas. It argues that these subsidies undermine Canada's net-zero 2050 goal and 2030 emissions targets. The document recommends that Canada complete its G20 peer review with Argentina in 2020, commit to no new subsidies, and integrate subsidy reform into its next Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement.

The document is a formal petition by sixteen children from various countries against five states, alleging that their failure to mitigate climate change violates the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It details specific harms faced by the petitioners—including extreme heat, wildfires, and sea-level rise—and argues that the respondents' current emission pathways are inconsistent with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement. The petitioners request that the Committee recognize climate change as a children's rights crisis and recommend that the respondent states accelerate mitigation efforts and prioritize the best interests of children.

The IISD argues that Canada's current draft framework for assessing non-tax fossil fuel subsidies is too restrictive and lacks transparency. It recommends adopting the World Trade Organization (WTO) definition of subsidies, removing qualifiers like 'specificity' and 'normality', and aligning the 'inefficiency' criteria with Canada's Paris Agreement commitments. The document emphasizes the need for full public disclosure of subsidy data, coordination with Finance Canada on tax-related measures, and the inclusion of provincial and territorial jurisdictions to meet the G7's 2025 phase-out deadline.

This executive summary from the 2018 'Brown to Green' report analyzes the progress of G20 countries toward a low-carbon economy. It highlights a significant gap between current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the goals of the Paris Agreement, noting that G20 energy-related CO2 emissions began increasing again in 2017 and that 82% of the G20 energy supply remains dependent on fossil fuels.

The Climate Change Performance Index 2017: G20 Edition assesses the 20 largest economies, which collectively account for 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Using a revised methodology that incorporates Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from the Paris Agreement, the index measures performance against benchmarks for 2030 and 2050, including nearly zero GHG emissions and 100% renewable energy. The report concludes that current efforts, even from top-performing countries, remain insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change.

The paper argues that while BRICS nations share complementary economic relationships, their individual state-led strategies to promote manufacturing and disputes over currency valuation create friction. It suggests that the group could find common ground by collaborating to resuscitate the WTO Doha round, engaging with China's shift toward a consumption-led economic model, and coordinating a common position on currency reform within the G20 to reduce global protectionism.

The document analyzes the intersection of global financial regulatory reforms (Basel III, G20) and regional trade negotiations in the SADC region. It argues that while the 2008 crisis did not directly collapse South African banks, the resulting 'second-round' effects—liquidity freezes and increased risk premiums—severely impacted trade and project finance. The author concludes that G20-driven reforms, adopted by South Africa, will likely act as new, non-negotiable barriers to trade in financial services across the SADC region, potentially reducing cross-border lending to non-investment grade African countries.

The document examines how the 2008 financial crisis caused a collapse in global trade and a freeze in trade finance due to a reassessment of counterparty risk. It analyzes the G20's regulatory response, primarily the transition from Basel II to Basel III, which aims to increase capital adequacy and liquidity to reduce systemic risk. The author highlights a tension between regulators, who argue these reforms ensure stability, and banks, who contend that stricter capital requirements will increase lending costs and constrain long-term infrastructure and trade finance, particularly in emerging markets. In South Africa, the impact is noted through increased credit impairments for corporate customers and a lack of regulatory dispensation for trade finance compared to the UK.

The South African Tax Justice Working Group and allied organisations call for progressive tax reforms to combat extreme inequality and tax evasion. They urge the South African government to use its 2025 G20 presidency to champion international corporate tax reform and a wealth tax on the ultra-rich, while calling on the National Treasury to shift away from regressive domestic taxes like VAT.

The 2021 Production Gap report by the Stockholm Environment Institute finds that global government plans for fossil fuel production in 2030 are more than double what is required to limit warming to 1.5°C. Despite net-zero pledges, most major producers plan to increase or maintain production, and G20 nations have provided more new funding to fossil fuels than clean energy since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.