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Global climate finance plateaued at USD 359 billion in 2012, falling short of investment needs for a 2°C pathway. While private actors provided 62% of the total, a strong domestic preference exists, with 76% of finance spent within the country of origin. Public finance, particularly through Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), remains critical for addressing risk and funding adaptation, though significant knowledge gaps persist in tracking private adaptation and energy efficiency flows.

The report examines the challenges and mechanisms for attracting private capital to climate finance, noting that private funding is nearly three times larger than public funding but remains difficult to channel toward adaptation in developing countries. It identifies political, project-related, and financing barriers—particularly in Africa—and suggests a combination of policy reforms and financial instruments like loan guarantees and pledge funds to mitigate risk. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is highlighted as a central vehicle for achieving the $100 billion annual target by 2020, though it must address the funding gap between mitigation and adaptation.

The document argues that while public and private funding for climate-resilient development is increasing, it remains insufficient to limit global temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius. It highlights the need for a more equitable international climate finance architecture, specifically calling for the inclusion of least developed countries and small island developing states in the design of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The brief emphasizes that climate change should be treated as an economic concern managed by national ministries of finance and planning, and that public finance must be used strategically to unlock the private sector, which is expected to provide over 85% of the necessary funding.

The document analyzes Zambia's energy sector and the incentives provided by the government to attract private investment in renewable energy. It details a framework of fiscal incentives (tax exemptions on dividends, import duties, and corporate tax), financial incentives (grants from the Rural Electrification Fund and government-backed loan guarantees for ZESCO), and other support services provided by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) and the Office for Promoting Private Power Investment (OPPPI). While stakeholders report a generally positive trend and increased interest in projects, the report notes a lack of transparency regarding the actual costs of these incentives and a need for greater legal clarity regarding which renewable energy technologies qualify for support.

The paper examines the fragmented landscape of climate change adaptation finance, analyzing the roles of the UNFCCC, the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). It argues that the current system is a 'non-system' characterized by inefficiencies, double counting of funds, and a lack of standardized metrics for success. The author explores the potential for regional banks, such as the African Development Bank, to provide more effective, decentralized management of funds. The document concludes by offering lessons for the Green Climate Fund (GCF), emphasizing the need for direct access modalities, clear ring-fencing of assets, and a transparent trustee selection process to avoid conflicts of interest, particularly regarding the World Bank.

This report provides a guide for policy-makers, particularly in developing countries, on how to use public spending to catalyze private investment for climate-friendly infrastructure and clean energy.

The briefing argues that the G20 and Rio+20 summits lack concrete deliverables and proposes a 'green growth guarantee' to provide developing countries with indicators, planning support, financial engagement, and peer review. The author highlights the growth of catalyst funds leveraging private investment and the need for a unified approach to sustainable development planning to avoid duplicating efforts across different international frameworks.

The policy brief argues that current systems for tracking climate finance are fragmented and insufficient, calling for a robust MRV framework within the UNFCCC to build trust between donors and recipients. It highlights the political nature of defining 'climate finance' and 'new and additional' funds, while warning against double-counting and the risk of narrow definitions hindering broader development goals.

The document examines how different financial instruments and institutions define and calculate 'leverage'—the ability of public funds to catalyze additional investment. It finds that leverage is often conflated with co-financing and varies wildly by instrument, making cross-comparison nearly impossible. The authors propose a new framework based on counterfactuals, risk mitigation, and the avoidance of double counting to improve the rigor of climate finance reporting.

The report identifies a significant gap in the ability to measure the effectiveness of climate finance, noting that current tools are often project-based, incompatible, and lack real-time evaluation capabilities. It argues that effectiveness is enhanced when funding is aligned with national priorities, promotes transformative effects, and utilizes results-based approaches. The authors recommend the development of standardized 'climate effectiveness' metrics, robust ex ante and ex post abatement estimates, and increased transparency to avoid the risks of fragmentation and 'crowding-out' of private investment. The analysis draws on lessons from development aid (Paris-Accra principles), international financial institutions (IFIs), and market-based instruments like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

The report estimates that at least USD 97 billion per annum in climate finance was provided in 2009/2010, with private finance (USD 55 billion) significantly outweighing public finance (at least USD 21 billion). The vast majority of these funds (USD 93 billion) are directed toward mitigation, while adaptation receives only USD 4.4 billion. The analysis highlights a critical lack of standardized definitions and a significant gap in data regarding the effectiveness of these financial flows.

The document examines the governance of climate finance across three developing regions, arguing that funding is heavily skewed toward mitigation over adaptation and private over public sources. It highlights that this imbalance often ignores the urgent needs of the most vulnerable populations and the preference of developing nations for public finance to address historical climate debt. Additionally, it critiques the role of regional development banks, noting conflicts of interest where banks fund both fossil-fuel and renewable energy projects while prioritizing loans over grants.

The report analyzes how the Somali diaspora, estimated at 1-1.5 million people, supports its country of origin through private remittances, collective fundraising, and private investment. It highlights the critical role of the 'hawala' money transfer system and the significant impact of diaspora-funded social services in education and health. The document argues that while the diaspora is a vital lifeline, its effectiveness is hindered by security concerns, counter-terrorism regulations in host countries, and a lack of coordination. It recommends that the UN act as a facilitator by providing matching funds, improving the regulatory environment for transfers, and expanding professional return programs like QUESTS/MIDA.

The document outlines how the AGF's recommendations for climate finance apply to Asia, noting that while China and India have successfully used carbon markets to attract private finance, other Asian nations will rely more on public revenue. It highlights the potential for 'transformational investments' combining public and private flows, the need for grants and concessional loans for highly vulnerable countries like Bangladesh, and concerns regarding international transport revenue and trade costs. Finally, it suggests that the US$100 billion annual target may be insufficient to meet Asia's adaptation needs.

The document highlights the LAC region's specific climate finance needs, noting a high proportion of emissions from land-use change and adaptation requirements per person that exceed those of Africa and Asia. It emphasizes the need for public sector catalysis of private investment, particularly in forestry and agribusiness, and cautions that existing official development assistance patterns may leave the region with insufficient adaptation resources.

The workshop identified four primary challenges in climate finance: a limited understanding of effectiveness, the need to track domestic and South-South flows alongside North-South flows, the difficulty of measuring and linking policy to the dominant private finance sources, and a general lack of comprehensive information. Participants emphasized the need for common methodologies to calculate disbursement data, the development of risk-sharing mechanisms to unlock private capital, and the creation of an integrated system for storing financial data. These findings served as the basis for the Climate Policy Initiative's (CPI) Climate Finance Project, which aims to provide analysis and a productivity evaluation framework for policymakers.

The document explores how the private sector can partner with governments to address climate adaptation, noting that corporate expertise in managing economic uncertainty and risk can inform public sector decision-making. It highlights that while private sector integration of climate risks into planning can protect global markets and create new economic opportunities, government facilitation is necessary to ensure corporate actions promote the public good rather than running counter to it.

The executive summary proposes a four-component approach to climate cooperation: low-carbon development strategies, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), international support mechanisms (financial, technical, and capacity-building), and quantitative reporting. It emphasizes that domestic ownership is essential for success and that international support should be demand-driven and tailored to specific sectoral needs to attract private investment and facilitate technology leapfrogging.

The report highlights that global water demand exceeds renewable supplies, with agriculture accounting for over 70% of withdrawals. It argues that increasing crop water productivity through mature technologies and improving policy incentives creates a significant opportunity for private capital investment, despite potential disruptions from the 2008 financial crisis.

The document explains the roles of the IFC and MIGA in providing loans and guarantees to private corporations in developing countries and details the functions of the CAO, which was created in 1998 to address complaints from affected communities. It outlines the specific requirements for filing an Ombudsman complaint, the assessment and prioritization process used by the CAO, and the potential outcomes, such as settlement agreements or compliance audits. The guide also notes the limitations of the CAO, including its inability to award compensation or cancel projects, and provides a comparison with other accountability mechanisms like the World Bank Inspection Panel.