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The document argues that urban climate adaptation is severely underfunded compared to mitigation, with only 9% of global urban climate investments flowing to adaptation projects as of 2017-2018. It highlights the extreme vulnerability of cities to flooding, heat, and water stress, noting that coastal cities could face annual costs of USD 1 trillion by 2050. To address this, the brief recommends that national governments declare climate emergencies, integrate local governments into national planning (NAPs and NDCs), boost technical project preparation, collaborate with development banks, mobilize private capital through PPPs and insurance, invest in early warning systems, and develop standardized adaptation metrics.

In 2019/20, Ethiopia's tracked climate finance averaged USD 1.7 billion, representing only 7% of its estimated annual needs of USD 25.3 billion. The landscape is heavily dominated by international public finance (92%), with a strong preference for adaptation projects (56%) over mitigation (38%). While the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector received the most sectoral finance (29%), it remains significantly underfunded relative to its 83% contribution to national GHG emissions. Key barriers to scaling finance include a highly regulated financial sector, lack of a stock market, unfavorable collateral policies for SMEs, and a heavy reliance on grants over private capital. The report recommends establishing a comprehensive climate budget tagging system, conducting bottom-up needs assessments, and developing capital markets to mobilize private investment.

The document critiques the reliance on 'net zero' frameworks, carbon offsets, and technological fixes, asserting that these mechanisms allow polluters to continue emissions while risking land grabbing and violating indigenous rights. It specifically analyzes the implications of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and the promotion of Nature-based Solutions (NbS) and geoengineering, calling instead for a systemic shift toward energy sovereignty and the phased elimination of fossil fuels.

The report establishes a monitoring tool for forest legality and governance in the Congo Basin, based on Chatham House methodology. It defines 50 indicators categorized into forest goals, sustainable production and development, forest financing, and forest governance. Additionally, it provides a comparative matrix of the legal frameworks, dedicated agencies, and development policies of Cameroon, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo, specifically addressing drivers of deforestation such as commercial agriculture, extractive industries, and small-scale farming.

The 2022 Regional Assessment of the Congo Basin reveals that while the region is a critical global carbon sink, deforestation increased in 2021 by 4.9% compared to the 2018-20 period. Only Gabon and the Republic of the Congo are currently aligned with the trajectory to end deforestation by 2030. The report identifies subsistence agriculture and infrastructure development as primary drivers, while noting that industrial mining and logging cause the most severe damage to intact core forests. Despite the existence of legal frameworks and international funding commitments, such as the USD 1.5 billion Joint Declaration for the Congo Basin, the report highlights significant gaps in policy enforcement, land tenure security for Indigenous peoples and local communities, and the alignment of economic development plans with forest conservation goals.

The policy brief argues that the USD 8.5 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) in South Africa relies on a 'de-risking' model that prioritises private finance and Independent Power Producers (IPPs), shifting commercial risks to the state and consumers. This approach is criticised for potentially worsening South Africa's debt profile, increasing energy poverty through higher tariffs, and undermining local renewable energy manufacturing. The authors suggest alternatives including the regulation of PPPs, debt cancellation of 'odious debt' (such as World Bank loans for the Medupi plant), climate reparations, and the implementation of allocative green credit policies to direct investment toward productive, labour-intensive green industries.

The document critiques the South African JETP for prioritising blended finance and public-private partnerships (PPPs), which the authors argue shifts commercial risk to the state while privatising gains. It highlights how this model can increase energy poverty through higher tariffs and hinder local renewable energy manufacturing. The brief suggests alternatives such as regulating private finance, pursuing debt cancellation and climate reparations, and implementing allocative green credit policies.

The report argues that PLN's plan to use biomass co-firing to reduce emissions is contradictory and potentially destructive. To achieve a 10% co-firing rate across 107 coal power plants, Trend Asia estimates a need for 10.23 million tons of wood pellets annually, requiring energy plantation forests (HTE) of at least 2.33 million hectares. Based on historical data showing 38% of industrial plantation forests originated from deforestation, the report projects that HTE development could lead to the loss of 630,000 to 2.1 million hectares of natural forest, depending on the tree species used.

The report argues that Indonesia's biomass co-firing policy, led by PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), threatens natural forests. To achieve 10% co-firing across 107 coal power plants, Trend Asia estimates a need for at least 2.33 million hectares of energy wood plantations. Based on historical data showing 38% of industrial timber plantations were established via deforestation, the report warns that this policy could increase annual deforestation rates from 630 thousand to 2.1 million hectares. It further highlights contradictions between the government's Enhanced NDC emission targets and its increasing deforestation quotas, while noting that biomass burning creates a 'carbon debt' rather than being carbon neutral.

The document evaluates the IMF's updated surveillance practices by analyzing recent reports for Indonesia and South Africa. While it notes a 'sea change' in the IMF's willingness to integrate climate issues—such as endorsing carbon taxes and green financing—it argues that the organization continues to prioritize steep fiscal consolidation and austerity. This focus on budget deficit ceilings is seen as a threat to the funding required for climate adaptation and mitigation. The authors highlight significant 'blind spots,' including the failure to fully account for the long-term fiscal risks of stranded fossil fuel assets and the potential for carbon-intensive exports to decline as trade partners decarbonize. The report concludes that while there is 'cautious optimism' due to more sophisticated analytical work, the IMF's advice remains insufficient for achieving a socially-just green transition.

The report argues that current climate finance is woefully inadequate to meet Paris Agreement goals, with developing countries alone requiring $4.3 trillion for 2030 commitments. It outlines a three-stage framework—planning, implementation, and monitoring—and details a variety of fiscal and policy instruments to align public spending, increase public funding, and mobilize private capital.

The study examines renewable energy financing through public-private partnerships (PPP) in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. It notes that while hydropower has historically dominated PPPs in both regions, there is a rapid shift toward solar and wind projects. In Southeast Asia, the transition is driven by national commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions via Nationally Determined Contributions, while Central Asian energy profiles vary between fossil fuel reliance in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and hydroelectric power in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.

The CER's submission on the draft NWRS-3 argues that the strategy must move beyond treating climate change as a future threat and instead implement binding regulations to protect water security. The CER advocates for the formal legal protection of Strategic Water Source Areas (SWSAs), strengthened compliance monitoring and enforcement (CME) through the 'Blue Scorpions', and a moratorium on unconventional oil and gas exploration due to risks of water contamination and methane emissions. It further emphasizes the need for transparency in water licensing and the alignment of the NWRS-3 with South Africa's international commitments under the Paris Agreement and the domestic Climate Change Bill.

The Clean Air Task Force calls for COP27 leadership to move beyond prescribed solution sets toward 'region-centric flexibility' and 'technology optionality'. It emphasizes that climate strategies must align with national interests and energy security, particularly for emerging economies, while advocating for the deployment of a broad range of carbon-free technologies including nuclear, hydrogen, and carbon capture and storage to address hard-to-abate sectors.

The health community has developed policy recommendations for COP27 to address the insufficient integration of health issues into UNFCCC policy and monitoring. The document argues that climate-sensitive health threats cause millions of avoidable deaths and productivity losses, while mitigation efforts in energy, transport, and agriculture provide significant health co-benefits. It highlights that the health sector contributes 4-5% of global emissions and is a priority for adaptation in many Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The text calls for urgent international financing to address health-related loss and damage and to build 'health resilience' as a foundation for economic productivity and overall climate resilience.

The author contends that reducing food loss and waste is a non-contentious solution to climate change and biodiversity loss, yet it remains under-adopted by governments. While some countries have set targets aligned with SDG 12.3, only 38 nations have included food loss and waste in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). The text highlights that agriculture drives 70% of terrestrial biodiversity loss and 30% of greenhouse gas emissions, with rotting food in landfills serving as the third largest cause of methane emissions.

Saint Lucia is highly vulnerable to climate change due to its small size, location in a high-risk cyclone and volcanic belt, and economic reliance on agriculture and tourism. To address these risks, the country established a Climate Change Adaptation Policy and a Nationally Determined Contribution in 2015, followed by the initiation of its National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process in 2017 and the subsequent publication of the 2018–2028 NAP.

The IAI is conducting a Regional Assessment to better understand how global environmental change (GEC) affects the decisions of its member Parties. Through surveys and subregional listening sessions held in 2022, the IAI identified 'climate action' as the most important current national priority for 14 Parties. Key barriers to using scientific information include a lack of intersectoral collaboration and a lack of science available for non-technical audiences. The assessment has grouped member countries by shared priorities and identified specific regional focuses, such as water security in the Southern Cone and biodiversity in the Andean subregion. Next steps include a deep analysis of collected data and a review of national policy documents, with results to be communicated at CoP-31.

One year after COP26, progress on climate pledges is described as "mixed at best," with some advancements in renewable energy and net-zero targets countered by a resurgence in fossil fuel reliance due to the Russia-Ukraine war. While 24 countries updated their emissions targets and renewable capacity reached new heights, global fossil fuel subsidies nearly doubled in 2021. Financial commitments remain unmet, with developed nations still $17 billion short of the $100 billion annual goal for 2020. Efforts to curb methane and deforestation have seen expanded participation, but accountability for city-level net-zero pledges remains low due to a lack of reported emissions data.

Nigeria is highly vulnerable to climate change, facing risks from drought, flooding, and sea level rise that threaten food security and economic stability. While the government has established frameworks like the National Adaptation Plan, implementation at the local level is limited by poor funding, lack of skilled personnel, and a reliance on international finance. The paper advocates for Locally Led Adaptation (LLA) to ensure climate actions are inclusive and aligned with community needs.