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The We Mean Business Coalition calls for urgent global action at COP27 to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach, advocating for a partnership between business and government to halve global emissions by 2030. The Coalition emphasizes the need for a sectoral Mitigation Work Programme, scaled-up adaptation finance for vulnerable nations, and the fulfillment of the US$100 billion annual climate finance commitment.

The report finds that 15 major meat and dairy companies produce combined methane emissions of 12.8 million tonnes, representing 11.1% of global livestock-related methane. These emissions exceed the total methane footprints of countries like Russia, Canada, and Australia. The authors highlight a severe lack of corporate transparency, noting that 60% of the analyzed companies fail to report total supply chain (scope 3) emissions. The report criticizes governments for relying on 'techno fixes' like anaerobic digesters rather than reducing livestock numbers, and calls for binding targets and a just transition toward agroecology.

The report finds that 15 major meat and dairy companies emit approximately 12.8 million tonnes of methane, representing 3.4% of global anthropogenic methane emissions and 11.1% of livestock-related methane. These combined emissions exceed the methane footprints of several countries, including Russia, Canada, Australia, and Germany. The authors highlight a pervasive lack of corporate transparency, noting that 60% of the companies fail to report total GHGs or scope 3 emissions, and none report supply chain methane. The report calls for mandatory reporting, binding reduction targets, and a systemic shift away from industrial animal agriculture.

The report estimates that five of the largest meat companies and ten of the largest dairy corporations emit approximately 12.8 million tonnes of methane, representing 3.4% of global anthropogenic methane emissions and 11.1% of global livestock methane. Total greenhouse gas emissions for these companies reach 734 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, exceeding Germany's national emissions. The authors highlight a lack of corporate transparency, noting that 60% of the analyzed companies do not report total emissions or Scope 3 emissions, and none reported supply chain methane. The report calls for binding reduction targets, mandatory reporting, and a systemic shift toward agroecology to meet the 1.5°C global warming limit.

The toolkit argues that rights-based approaches lead to more effective and legitimate climate outcomes. It outlines a three-step process for integrating rights into NDCs: inclusive planning, transparent communication of how rights informed that planning, and reflecting human rights obligations in implementation and monitoring. The document provides specific recommendations across seven thematic areas: ambition, participatory planning, general human rights integration, gender mainstreaming, Indigenous Peoples' rights, land tenure, and just transition. It emphasizes that states must align their climate ambition with the 1.5°C target to fulfill human rights obligations and should account for all emissions under their jurisdiction, including extraterritorial ones. The toolkit includes guiding questions and illustrative examples from the NDCs of Canada, Mexico, Vanuatu, Nepal, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Chile to demonstrate best practices in human rights-based climate action.

The document argues that climate action must be aligned with human rights to be effective and legitimate. It provides a framework for integrating these rights into NDCs, focusing on scientific ambition, inclusive public participation, gender equality, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, land tenure, and a just transition for workers.

The document argues that climate action is most effective and legitimate when based on a human rights approach. It outlines a framework for integrating these rights into NDCs, focusing on scientific ambition, inclusive public participation, gender equality, the rights of indigenous peoples, land tenure, and a just transition for workers.

The document establishes a framework for Coal Transition Mechanisms (CTMs) to ensure they deliver real emissions savings, align with 1.5°C goals, and support a just transition. It outlines eight specific guidelines across four 'stage gates': plant eligibility, transition pathways, social protection, and accountability. The framework is illustrated through a real-world case of ratepayer-backed bond securitization in the United States and hypothetical scenarios involving a sovereign sustainability-linked bond in Indonesia and a managed transition vehicle for an Independent Power Producer (IPP).

The policy brief argues that the USD 8.5 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) in South Africa relies on a 'de-risking' model that prioritises private finance and Independent Power Producers (IPPs), shifting commercial risks to the state and consumers. This approach is criticised for potentially worsening South Africa's debt profile, increasing energy poverty through higher tariffs, and undermining local renewable energy manufacturing. The authors suggest alternatives including the regulation of PPPs, debt cancellation of 'odious debt' (such as World Bank loans for the Medupi plant), climate reparations, and the implementation of allocative green credit policies to direct investment toward productive, labour-intensive green industries.

The document critiques the South African JETP for prioritising blended finance and public-private partnerships (PPPs), which the authors argue shifts commercial risk to the state while privatising gains. It highlights how this model can increase energy poverty through higher tariffs and hinder local renewable energy manufacturing. The brief suggests alternatives such as regulating private finance, pursuing debt cancellation and climate reparations, and implementing allocative green credit policies.

The document advocates for a Universal Basic Income Guarantee (UBIG) in South Africa, defining it as a regular cash transfer provided as a right to all adults to cover basic necessities. It argues that a UBIG is superior to targeted grants, which often suffer from high exclusion errors and administrative complexity. The series presents evidence that basic income support improves health, education, and mental well-being, particularly for children, and empowers women by reducing their economic dependence on men and vulnerability to intimate partner violence. Economically, it contends that UBIGs do not create dependency or discourage work; instead, they can stimulate local economies through a multiplier effect and provide workers with an 'exit option' from exploitative labor. The document proposes financing the UBIG through progressive taxation, including a social security tax, wealth taxes, and the removal of subsidies for the wealthy, estimating a gross annual cost of R255 billion if set at the Food Poverty Line, which would be significantly offset by VAT recoupment and economic growth.

The Institute for Economic Justice advocates for a Universal Basic Income Guarantee (UBIG) in South Africa, defining it as a government commitment to ensure all adults have a regular cash benefit to meet basic needs as a right. The document highlights that while social grants have been effective, gaps remain for able-bodied adults aged 18-59, and the current Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant is temporary and limited. It asserts that a UBIG, supported by complementary policies like a just energy transition and industrial policy, could eliminate poverty for the 18.3 million people unable to meet basic food needs, improve health and education, and reduce gender inequality.

The document examines how anti-fossil fuel norms—specifically the phase-out of coal, oil, and gas, the end of public financing for fossil fuels, and subsidy reform—can overlook the needs of marginalized communities and the Global South. It argues that while these norms create political momentum, they risk causing unintended inequitable consequences, such as asset stranding in developing nations, unless paired with financial support and a focus on energy access.

The report argues that transitioning away from industrial meat production is essential for climate and health goals but requires a 'just transition' framework to protect vulnerable stakeholders. It identifies five key stakeholder groups—consumers, farmers, workers, communities, and companies—and outlines five guiding principles for policy-makers: phasing down industrial meat support, increasing support for sustainable alternatives, ensuring inclusive planning, providing offset support for adverse impacts, and addressing root causes of injustice.

The document examines the intersection of global trade flows and climate change, highlighting how trade can both exacerbate emissions through 'embodied' carbon and facilitate the diffusion of green technologies. It details a variety of policy levers—including border carbon adjustments, the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and the liberalization of environmental goods—that can align trade with climate goals. The brief analyzes the role of the WTO, noting that while existing rules generally allow for good-faith environmental policies, tensions arise over local content requirements and discriminatory measures. It highlights member-led initiatives like the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) and the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform group as critical paths for future cooperation, emphasizing the need for a 'just transition' for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs).

The document examines the intersection of trade, climate change, and development in Africa, advocating for a shift from a narrow 'just energy transition' to a broader 'climate-resilient development' (CRD) approach. It highlights Africa's vulnerability to climate crises and proposes strategies for green industrialization, climate-smart agriculture, and the strengthening of development finance institutions. The author critiques the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as 'green trade protectionism' and calls for a 'Global Green New Deal' based on multilateral cooperation, technology transfer, and the fulfillment of climate finance promises by developed nations.

The document evaluates the IMF's updated surveillance practices by analyzing recent reports for Indonesia and South Africa. While it notes a 'sea change' in the IMF's willingness to integrate climate issues—such as endorsing carbon taxes and green financing—it argues that the organization continues to prioritize steep fiscal consolidation and austerity. This focus on budget deficit ceilings is seen as a threat to the funding required for climate adaptation and mitigation. The authors highlight significant 'blind spots,' including the failure to fully account for the long-term fiscal risks of stranded fossil fuel assets and the potential for carbon-intensive exports to decline as trade partners decarbonize. The report concludes that while there is 'cautious optimism' due to more sophisticated analytical work, the IMF's advice remains insufficient for achieving a socially-just green transition.

The document provides an overview of COP27, the 27th United Nations conference on climate change, which brings together approximately 200 countries to discuss plans for reducing carbon emissions to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C. It identifies three overarching themes for the conference: emissions reductions, climate finance, and prioritising people through the lens of 'loss and damage'.

The paper argues that public development banks lack a published approach to ensure that unearmarked loans provided for policy and institutional reforms—known as policy-based operations (PBOs)—are aligned with the Paris Agreement. It proposes that PBOs are Paris-aligned if they do not undermine a just transition to climate neutrality by increasing exposure to climate risks and, where possible, promote long-term macro-fiscal resilience.

The report finds that none of the 40 indicators of systems change are on track to reach their 2030 targets, with current national commitments leading to projected warming of 2.4°C to 2.8°C. To align with the 1.5°C goal, the report argues for an enormous acceleration in effort, specifically noting that unabated coal phase-out must be six times faster and cement production carbon intensity improvements must increase by more than 10 times.