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The African Climate Foundation (ACF) advocates for COP28 to deliver measurable progress for Africa across the Global Stocktake, adaptation, and finance. The ACF emphasizes that emission reduction targets must be paired with climate finance reforms and the preservation of policy space for African development. Key priorities include a robust Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) with quantified targets, the operationalization of a fit-for-purpose Loss and Damage Fund, and the reform of the global financial system to provide affordable finance and debt restructuring. The ACF also warns against unilateral trade measures, such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which it argues threaten Africa's sustainable development goals.

The report argues that MDBs must shift from a project-by-project approach to national sectoral platforms and adopt an 'originate-to-distribute' business model to better mobilize private capital. It recommends expanding risk-sharing instruments, such as guarantees and local currency financing, and standardizing KPIs and investment labels to reduce transaction costs and improve transparency for climate investments in EMDEs.

Global Energy Monitor identifies nearly 2.7 million coal miners worldwide, with the majority in Asia. The report warns that 414,200 jobs could be lost by 2035 and 990,200 by 2050 due to the industry's own 'life of mine' closure schedules, regardless of climate policies. It highlights that current climate pledges cover only 6% of the thermal coal workforce, leaving millions vulnerable. The report emphasizes the need for just transition mechanisms, such as the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), and suggests bridging employment through mine reclamation and renewable energy repurposing.

The document critiques the implementation of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) in Indonesia, highlighting a lack of transparency in the Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP) and the persistence of 'false solutions' like coal co-firing and carbon capture. It argues that for a transition to be truly 'just,' it must incorporate four pillars of justice—recognition, distributive, procedural, and restorative—and specifically address the vulnerability of workers in the coal sector. The report recommends legally binding emission targets, the removal of 'take-or-pay' electricity contracts, and the decentralization of renewable energy development to empower local governments and communities.

The guide outlines strategies for engaging diverse stakeholders in just transition processes, emphasizing the need to tailor approaches to national contexts, build trust through personal relationships, and leverage existing networks. It draws on research from the South-to-South Just Transitions network in countries including Argentina, Vietnam, and Indonesia, highlighting both the effectiveness of virtual and in-person engagements and the challenges of securing high-level official participation.

RMI provides recommendations for Indonesia's coal transition based on a model applied to the Java-Bali grid, emphasizing the integration of coal retirement and clean energy deployment to ensure financial feasibility and emissions reductions.

The report highlights a significant increase in Indonesia's captive coal power capacity, which grew from 1.4 GW in 2013 to 10.8 GW in 2023. This expansion is primarily driven by the metal industry, particularly nickel and aluminium smelters, as part of a national strategy to increase the added value of natural resources. The authors argue that the government's current energy transition efforts focus too narrowly on the utility grid, ignoring the substantial emissions from captive plants. They recommend that the USD 20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) funding be used to establish a clear retirement pathway for these industrial coal plants to avoid significant health and economic burdens.

The document highlights a surge in 'captive' coal power—plants operated off-grid by industrial users—which grew from 1.4 GW in 2013 to 10.8 GW in 2023. A vast majority of this capacity is dedicated to metal smelting, particularly nickel and aluminium, often justified by policies to increase the 'value add' of natural resources. The report warns that while Indonesia is a key supplier of minerals for the global energy transition, the reliance of these smelters on coal contradicts national climate targets and the goals of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). It recommends integrating the phase-out of captive coal power into national plans to avoid significant health costs and carbon emissions.

The briefing evaluates 16 countries against 1.5°C-aligned power sector benchmarks, finding that no assessed country is fully on track. It argues for a global phase-out of coal and fossil gas by 2040, noting that while some countries are making progress on coal, there is a critical lack of explicit fossil gas phase-out plans and insufficient renewable energy acceleration globally.

The report estimates that annual climate finance needs will rise to USD 6.2 trillion by 2030 and USD 7.3 trillion by 2050 to achieve Net Zero, while tracked global finance only surpassed USD 1 trillion for the first time in 2022. Transport and energy systems represent the largest investment needs, requiring at least USD 3.2 trillion and USD 2.1 trillion annually, respectively. The study highlights a significant disparity in finance distribution, with 75% of global spend concentrated in East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and North America. It argues that public finance must act as a catalyst to mobilize private capital, particularly in developing economies where the cost of capital is significantly higher. While private sector commitments are growing—such as the 30 largest banks pledging USD 870 billion annually—the report notes that asset managers and owners have been slower to set quantifiable targets. Key recommendations include aligning stakeholder policies, supporting non-commercially viable technologies like CCUS and green hydrogen, and implementing just transition frameworks.

The report analyzes the I-JETP's goal of mobilizing $20 billion for Indonesia's energy transition, framing it as an initial 'downpayment' for a much larger requirement potentially exceeding $200 billion over 15 years. It identifies a '3+1' funding strategy involving international public, international private, domestic private, and domestic public capital. Key challenges include rising global interest rates increasing the absolute cost of renewables, the need for significant grid/transmission upgrades, and the necessity of policy reforms regarding power purchase agreements and the role of the state utility PLN. The author argues that success depends on the Government of Indonesia's commitment to policy predictability and the international community's willingness to provide concessional financing that ensures electricity affordability.

The report analyzes Indonesia's power sector finance from 2015 to 2021, revealing a significant gap between current renewable energy investment and the USD 16 billion annually required for the NZE 2060 scenario. It highlights a projected annual financing gap of USD 13 billion for renewable generation, particularly in solar and hydro, and recommends policy reforms to divest from fossil fuels and scale up renewable energy infrastructure.

The report identifies a gap between Indonesia's international climate pledges and its domestic energy policies, which continue to favor coal. It highlights a governance model characterized by sectoral silos, informal decision-making influenced by politically exposed persons (PEPs) from the coal sector, and significant financing shortfalls for renewable energy.

The report analyzes South Africa's Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) using a 'two-level game' framework to examine the interaction between international diplomacy and domestic politics. While the JETP provided a country-led platform to articulate financial needs and accelerated conversations on NDC implementation, it has faced significant hurdles. These include a lack of transparency from the International Partners Group (IPG), a contested domestic political landscape characterized by ministerial 'turf wars', and a financial package heavily weighted toward loans rather than grants. The study highlights that the JETP's success depends on South Africa's ability to build institutional capacity and deliver on implementation to maintain international credibility, while the IPG must provide more transparent and justice-oriented funding.

Between 2015 and 2021, Indonesia's power sector tracked USD 35.6 billion in finance, with 58% allocated to renewable energy. While RE finance trended upward after 2016, it faced a setback in 2020 due to COVID-19 and the Omnibus Law. To reach the 2060 NZE target, Indonesia requires USD 16.1 billion in annual financing, leaving a current annual gap of USD 13.1 billion, most notably in solar and wind power.

The document analyzes the organizational structure, funding, and implementation challenges of South Africa's JETP, highlighting the gap between policy targets and practical execution. It compares the energy landscapes of South Africa and Indonesia, emphasizing the critical need for transmission grid upgrades and the social protection of coal-dependent regions. Key recommendations for Indonesia include ensuring broad government consensus, translating commitments into legislation, and prioritizing social benefits to ensure a truly 'just' transition.

The paper analyzes the shift in German-African energy relations from a focus on development aid to a complex mix of energy diplomacy, foreign policy, and technical cooperation. It highlights a tension between Germany's goals for a green transition (including hydrogen partnerships) and its strategic interests in diversifying fossil fuel imports. The author critiques 'energy colonialism' and the financialization of projects, recommending that future cooperation be grounded in 'energy justice' and a value-chain approach to ensure local benefits and social standards.

The document argues that MDBs must shift from a project-by-project approach to a systemic, program-based model to address the climate crisis in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). It recommends scaling country sector platforms, deploying risk-sharing instruments like guarantees and local currency financing, and overhauling MDB business models through standardization and an 'originate-to-distribute' balance sheet strategy. The authors emphasize the need for better integration of domestic financial institutions and increased transparency in data sharing to mobilize private capital at scale.

Vietnam's PDP8 aims to peak coal capacity at 30 GW by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050, but the briefing argues that all coal projects not yet in construction must be cancelled to align with the JETP agreement. While Vietnam is leading global coal project cancellations in 2023, concerns remain regarding the use of experimental fuels for plant conversion and the government's crackdown on civil society leaders essential for a just transition.

The Southeast Asian Working Group on Fossil Gas and Energy Transition argues that Vietnam's PDP8 fails to provide a genuine energy transition by maintaining significant roles for coal and fossil gas. While the plan increases renewable capacity to over 70 GW by 2030, the group claims the resulting renewable share of 30.9% to 39% is lackluster. The group specifically warns against the 'meteoric rise' of LNG and the use of ammonia and hydrogen as transition fuels, calling on international financiers to stop promoting gas and instead support a 1.5°C-aligned transition through the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP).