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Attribution studies in Brazil indicate that fossil fuel combustion increased the likelihood and intensity of recent floods in Rio Grande do Sul and droughts in the Amazon. Despite these impacts, the Brazilian government continues to support oil and gas expansion, with plans to increase oil production by 63% and gas by 124% by 2032. Petrobras, which controls over 90% of domestic production, is estimated to be responsible for USD 500 billion in climate damages between 2018 and 2023. While Brazil has pledged to reduce emissions by up to 67% by 2035 and has successfully increased wind and solar power to reduce reliance on hydropower, its overall climate policies are rated as 'Insufficient' by Climate Action Tracker.

The report evaluates several major global climate pledges, finding that most are currently off-track. While there are isolated successes—such as the UK closing its last coal plant and growth in electric car sales—critical goals like tripling renewable energy by 2030 and halting deforestation are not being met. The document highlights a significant gap between high-level commitments and implementation, particularly in the financial sector where net-zero plans are deemed insufficient and fossil fuel subsidies have reached record highs. It calls for a shift from loose networks to platforms of accountability as countries develop their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025.

The document argues that while there is growing political and private sector momentum to expand nuclear energy, a massive financing gap persists. It highlights that only 2.5% of annual clean energy investment currently goes to new nuclear capacity, driven by a 'nuclear risk premium' and long development timelines. The authors call for innovative financing mechanisms and government-led risk reduction to unlock the trillions of dollars required to meet the Net-Zero Nuclear Initiative goals.

Kenya faces significant cooling gaps, with millions of people in hot regions at risk due to poverty and lack of electricity. While the country has a high share of renewable energy, the growth of refrigeration and air-conditioning (RAC) threatens to increase emissions, necessitating a transition to sustainable cooling to align with Net Zero 2050 goals.

The IISD welcomes Canada's draft regulations for an oil and gas pollution cap, noting that the sector accounts for 31% of Canada's total emissions. While supporting the cap-and-trade system to drive decarbonization and net-zero goals by 2050, the IISD warns that a proposed 'decarbonization program' could lead to double-counting of emissions reductions. The organization advocates for the continued exclusion of international carbon offsets and the use of only real, additional, and verifiable domestic offsets.

The document defines carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as the physical extraction and permanent storage of atmospheric CO2. It argues that CDR must supplement, not substitute, deep emission reductions of over 90%. The handbook evaluates six negative emissions technologies and practices (NETPs)—biochar, BioCCS, DACCS, enhanced weathering, afforestation/reforestation, and soil carbon sequestration—detailing their technical readiness, permanence, and environmental trade-offs. It emphasizes the need for robust 'cradle-to-grave' carbon accounting, separate targets for reductions and removals to avoid mitigation deterrence, and the integration of the Planetary Boundaries framework to ensure Earth system stability. The text also critiques current EU legislation, such as the Carbon Removal Certification Framework (CRCF) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), for lacking ambition and failing to distinguish between permanent and temporary storage.

The document defines carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as the physical extraction of CO2 from the atmosphere and its permanent storage. It argues that CDR must be a complement to, not a substitute for, aggressive emission reductions (over 90%). The guide evaluates six negative emissions technologies and practices (NETPs)—including Bio-CCS, DACCS, and biochar—while critiquing current EU policies for failing to distinguish between permanent removals and temporary biological sequestration. It advocates for a diversified portfolio of CDR methods, rigorous life-cycle accounting, and a governance framework based on the 'planetary boundaries' to avoid ecological trade-offs.

The SEI strategy 2025–29 focuses on accelerating the implementation of climate and environmental goals through three primary impact areas: climate transitions, nature and resources, and health and wellbeing. The institute aims to move beyond goal-setting to action by boosting research on implementation, exploring emerging topics like critical raw materials and AI, and strengthening research-to-policy networks. Operationally, SEI seeks to enhance its 'One SEI' approach to integrate its distributed regional centres and diversify its funding to ensure financial resilience.

The guide argues that US states are uniquely positioned to scale the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) industry by leveraging their specific geographies and regulatory authority. It outlines a framework for state leadership based on four core pillars: adopting approach-neutral and performance-based definitions of CDR, setting explicit removal targets aligned with carbon budgets, creating clear regulatory and permitting environments, and ensuring community-supported deployment through transparency and equity. The document emphasizes that CDR should complement, not replace, aggressive emissions reductions to avoid moral hazard.

The report argues that ecological disruption is an underappreciated security threat and advocates for the integration of strategic foresight tools—such as horizon scanning, futures wheels, and scenario planning—into national security architecture. It identifies land/sea-use change and global atmospheric/oceanic warming as the primary drivers of ecological instability. Through four plausible mid-century scenarios, the document illustrates how these drivers can lead to systemic collapses, such as Amazon dieback or the failure of the Lake Victoria Basin, resulting in famine, pandemics, and geopolitical conflict. The author recommends that security stakeholders shift their risk calculus to include ecological decline and prioritize locally-led, indigenous stewardship in resource management.

The report examines four decarbonization pathways for the Houston region—electrification, energy efficiency, hydrogen utilization, and carbon capture and storage (CCS)—across three scenarios: business-as-usual, selective investment, and net-zero. In the net-zero scenario, the region could achieve net zero carbon emissions from industry while creating over 21,000 jobs annually through 2050.

The document highlights a 73% decline in average wildlife populations since 1970 as a critical warning for the global economy. It asserts that nature loss threatens global GDP, with specific risks identified in the EU and Asia Pacific, and predicts a potential $2.7 trillion loss by 2030 due to the collapse of ecosystem services. The author calls on the business and finance sectors to transition toward net-zero, nature-positive markets using tools like the Biodiversity Risk Filter and Science-Based Targets for Nature.

The document explores transition finance as a tool for emerging and developing economies, particularly in Asia, to decarbonise high-emitting sectors that struggle to meet strict green finance criteria. It analyses the taxonomies of Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and ASEAN, while highlighting risks of 'transition-washing' and the need for science-based targets and independent verification to ensure alignment with 1.5°C pathways.

The Thailand Country Programme (TCP) 2024 outlines a framework to align national climate strategies with GCF funding for the 2024-2027 programming cycle. Thailand aims for carbon neutrality by 2050 and net-zero emissions by 2065, with the energy sector identified as the largest GHG contributor. The programme identifies five priority areas: mitigation strategies and technologies, knowledge enhancement in agriculture and waste, advanced adaptive technologies, strengthening climate financing mechanisms, and awareness raising. To meet its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), Thailand estimates a need for THB 5,000 billion for unconditional targets and THB 7,000 billion for conditional targets. The TCP also details a readiness plan to strengthen National Designated Authority (NDA) capacity and accredit Direct Access Entities (DAEs) such as Kasikorn Bank and the Environment Fund.

The briefing highlights that ecosystem services are worth over USD 150 trillion annually, while biodiversity loss costs the global economy more than USD 5 trillion per year. It asserts that the economic costs of nature destruction often exceed the benefits of exploitation, citing examples like EU nitrogen pollution and the Gulf of Mexico's dead zone. The text emphasizes that nature-related risks are transboundary, where deforestation in the Amazon or Southeast Asia impacts regional rainfall and coral reefs. It concludes that investing in biodiversity is significantly more affordable than the energy transition to net-zero, though a funding gap of approximately USD 830 billion per year remains.

The report argues that China's agri-food system requires significant investment to achieve net-zero emissions and climate resilience, but currently faces a massive funding gap and a mismatch between existing green finance policies and the sector's needs. It advocates for the use of transition finance—including sustainability-linked loans, bonds, and blended finance—to mobilize private capital. The authors emphasize that a 'just transition' is essential to protect vulnerable smallholder farmers. Key barriers identified include poor climate information disclosure by companies and a lack of credible transition plans. The report recommends that regulators standardize GHG accounting for agriculture, mandate climate disclosures for large firms, and align agricultural subsidies with climate goals.

The report details a systematic approach to quantifying 'bottom-up' climate finance needs—the capital countries state they require to meet national targets—as opposed to 'top-down' predictive models. CPI reviewed 168 NDCs, standardizing diverse data on currency, timeframes, and sector classifications using its Global Landscape of Climate Finance (GLCF) taxonomy. The methodology distinguishes between unconditional (domestic) and conditional (international) needs, while acknowledging significant data gaps, as less than half of the reviewed NDCs provided fully costed finance needs.

The report proposes a two-step assessment approach to link financial institutions' net zero strategies to real-world impacts. It emphasizes tracking investments in new assets rather than existing portfolios to avoid the 'divestment' loophole where assets are transferred without reducing emissions. The methodology uses a multi-level ownership tree (up to Level 2) to attribute finance to indirect investors based on equity and debt weightings, utilizing data from sources like Bloomberg Terminal and CPI's Global Landscape of Climate Finance.

The report finds a positive trend in European pension funds' commitment to sustainable investing, with significant growth in the adoption of mitigation targets and climate risk management. However, a persistent gap remains between these commitments and actual real-economy impact, as pension funds rarely invest directly in projects and often hold fragmented indirect ownership. The analysis highlights that larger funds, those in net-zero coalitions, and funds in countries with strong regulatory frameworks—such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and France—are leading the transition. Key challenges include the gap between asset ownership and management, the difficulty of transitioning passive investments, and limited capital flow to emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs).

The report finds that Australia, Canada, and the UK (the "Big Three") have historically and currently dominated fossil fuel extraction emissions within the Commonwealth. While these wealthy nations have the highest emissions, they are the least economically dependent on fossil fuel rents. In contrast, lower- and middle-income countries like Nigeria and Papua New Guinea are more exposed to financial risks from carbon liabilities. The report concludes that Commonwealth production plans are inconsistent with the 1.5°C goal, with the Big Three's share of the gap between Business as Usual and Net Zero scenarios exceeding 50%.