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The author, a co-founder of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR), outlines five principles for managing systemic global threats. These include acknowledging that unprecedented ecological disruption has fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape, resisting the compartmentalization of converging threats such as climate change, nuclear weapons, and ethnonationalism, and utilizing modern foresight tools to fulfill a 'Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent'. The author emphasizes the need for systemic resilience to unforeseen shocks and the importance of interpersonal kindness in professional spheres.

The Council on Strategic Risks argues that the U.S. Department of Defense's Global Posture Review should prioritize biological threat readiness by enhancing ally cooperation, deploying rapid disease detection on naval assets, and establishing forward-deployed medical materiel stocks. It suggests utilizing OCONUS bases for pathogen surveillance and medical countermeasure manufacturing to improve resilience and deter adversaries from developing biological weapons.

The Council on Strategic Risks proposes a tailored, nuclear-only successor to the INF Treaty to address the destabilizing trend of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The authors argue for an initial bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia to ban nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missiles (500 to 5,500 km), which could later expand to include other nations and ballistic missiles. This approach aims to reduce the risk of unintentional escalation and miscalculation, particularly in Europe and East Asia, while avoiding the complexities of banning conventional systems. The proposal emphasizes the feasibility of modern verification technologies and suggests a phased approach, starting with a moratorium on conventional ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe and potential unilateral political declarations if a formal treaty is not immediately feasible.

The briefing examines the limitations of the current WMD paradigm, which focuses primarily on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. By comparing the treatment of fentanyls and novichoks, the author illustrates how narrow definitions of WMD can lead to a misalignment of policy priorities, where a highly lethal but non-WMD designated substance like fentanyl causes more domestic death and economic damage than designated WMDs used in targeted assassinations. The author advocates for a shift toward a 'mass effects' framing to encompass systemic risks like climate change and pandemics, as well as emerging technologies like drone swarms.

The document analyzes climate change as a 'threat multiplier' in South Asia, where it exacerbates socio-economic tensions, fuels violent extremism, and intensifies nuclear-armed rivalries over shared water resources. It highlights the vulnerability of the region to heatwaves, sea level rise, and flooding, which drive mass migration and compromise military readiness. The report specifically examines the hydro-rivalry between China and India over the Brahmaputra and between India and Pakistan over the Indus River Basin. To address these challenges, it recommends integrating climate projections into military planning, establishing comprehensive transboundary water treaties, and accelerating the transition from coal and natural gas to renewable energy through international financing.

The report examines the intersection of climate change, energy policy, and security in Southeast Asia. It identifies key vulnerabilities, including sea level rise threatening megacities and the Mekong Delta, and extreme heat reducing economic productivity. These stressors are analyzed as 'threat multipliers' that exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea, fuel violent extremism through livelihood degradation, and complicate transboundary water management of the Mekong River. The document also highlights the 'energy-climate security nexus,' arguing that the region's continued reliance on coal and the pursuit of civilian nuclear power—often involving long-term partnerships with China and Russia—create new strategic risks. It concludes with a call for 'Climate Security Watch Centers,' carbon drawdown plans for ASEAN states, and a systemic shift toward renewable energy to ensure regional stability.

The report argues that global ecological disruption is a critical, underappreciated security threat. It details how the collapse of ecosystem services, biodiversity loss, and environmental crime create systemic risks including pandemics, political instability, and economic harm. The authors advocate for a fundamental reboot of U.S. national security architecture to integrate scientific expertise and prioritize ecological security alongside climate change.

The document advocates for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to prioritize funding for platform technologies to combat biological threats. It highlights the success of mRNA technology during the COVID-19 pandemic, noting its ability to reduce vaccine development timelines from over ten years to a fraction of that time. The author argues that shifting away from a "one-bug, one-drug" approach toward flexible platforms enhances national security by making it harder for adversaries to circumvent defenses and by reducing the incentives for developing bioweapons. The text specifically recommends the Biden administration increase R&D funding for these technologies through the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP).

The briefing argues that while climate change is unlikely to be the primary ideological driver for terrorist groups, it acts as a risk multiplier. It identifies three channels of impact: the creation of recruitment opportunities due to food and livelihood insecurity; the erosion of state legitimacy when governments fail to respond effectively to climate-induced disasters; and the security instabilities caused by the global energy transition, which may strand assets in hydrocarbon-exporting states and increase the value of critical minerals in fragile regions.

The Council on Strategic Risks condemns the violent attempt to obstruct the 2020 U.S. presidential election certification on January 6th. The Council asserts that while the attack was fueled by political actors and falsehoods, it was also the result of broader systemic risks—such as environmental degradation, climate change, and economic devastation—that create conditions for democratic erosion and instability globally.

The author contends that the Biden administration's review of U.S. nuclear programs should focus on eliminating new capabilities—specifically the LRSO, low-yield warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles—rather than just extending the New START treaty. The text argues that these new weapons increase the risk of decapitation strikes, undermine the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and promote a dangerous 'usable' nuclear mindset. The author suggests that targeting these specific programs is more strategically sound and politically feasible for a president than attempting to cut land-based strategic deterrent programs, which face stronger congressional opposition.

The report argues that climate change is a national security issue for Canada, affecting its Arctic sovereignty, domestic disaster resilience, and international stability. It recommends establishing a Climate Security Task Force to coordinate a cross-agency response, adapting military infrastructure to sea-level rise and permafrost thaw, and leveraging multilateral institutions to manage global climate-driven fragility.

The Pacific Islands Climate Storybook 2021 outlines a methodology for 'Climate Services Dialogs'—three-day workshops designed to bridge the gap between scientific climate data and local experiential knowledge. The process involves sharing climate knowledge, diagnosing existing services using the 'READY-SET-GO' framework, and developing 'Climate Stories' to communicate best practices. The report includes several case studies from the region, such as the impact of the 1997–98 El Niño on water resources in American Sāmoa, coastal flooding in Papua New Guinea and the Marshall Islands, and the link between drought and disease outbreaks in the Marshall Islands. It emphasizes the need for co-production of knowledge, community engagement, and the integration of traditional knowledge with scientific forecasts to enhance regional resilience.

The author contends that the United States' limited genome sequencing efforts—sequencing only 0.3% of cases compared to 5-10% in the United Kingdom—have delayed the detection of the highly transmissible B.1.1.7 strain. The text advocates for integrating genome sequencing and metagenomic sequencing into a permanent disease early warning toolkit to protect against future mutations and bioweapons.

The briefing argues that biological weapons remain a viable and rational strategic option for some states due to their low cost, potential for deniability, and asymmetric impact. It challenges the notion that these weapons are tactically useless or too risky to develop, noting that historical precedents and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate that leaders may prioritize state status or regime survival over the risks of blowback. The authors further contend that bioweapons programs are not always top-down initiatives and that current international norms, specifically the Biological Weapons Convention, lack the enforcement and verification mechanisms necessary to effectively stop such programs.

The authors argue that appointing John Kerry to a climate envoy role with a seat on the National Security Council signals that the Biden administration views the climate crisis as an urgent national security threat and intends to elevate climate change within national security decision-making.

The Council on Strategic Risks advocates for a long-term U.S. strategy to make biological weapons obsolete by integrating pandemic preparedness with bioweapon deterrence. The authors propose a system of real-time early warning and rapid response capabilities, leveraging existing COVID-19 investments and Department of Defense leadership to create a disease-defense ecosystem that serves both public health and national security interests.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) examines how climate change and nuclear trends—including the expansion of civil nuclear energy and the modernization of nuclear arsenals—interact to reshape the international order. The briefing highlights specific regional vulnerabilities, such as water stress in South Asia and sea-level rise affecting nuclear sites in Egypt and Nigeria. It concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the U.S. government, including the creation of a National Security Council director for the climate-nuclear-security nexus and the elimination of low-yield nuclear weapons to restore international trust.

The Council on Strategic Risks recommends that the Biden administration prioritize reducing nuclear risks by eliminating low-yield capabilities and systems that blur the line between conventional and nuclear warfare. Key proposals include extending the New START treaty, issuing a national security directive establishing that U.S. nuclear forces exist solely for deterrence or responding to nuclear attacks, and exploring new treaties to eliminate nuclear-armed cruise missiles and prevent the proliferation of nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles and drones.

The Council on Strategic Risks argues that the U.S. President should make climate change a vital national security priority. It evaluates President-elect Biden's plan to commission a National Intelligence Estimate on climate security, require annual reports from the Secretary of Defense, and invest in military base resilience. The author advocates for further steps, including the creation of senior climate security positions in the White House and the development of Regional Climate Security Plans.