Climate Change and Terrorism: Three Risk Pathways to Consider

The briefing argues that while climate change is unlikely to be the primary ideological driver for terrorist groups, it acts as a risk multiplier. It identifies three channels of impact: the creation of recruitment opportunities due to food and livelihood insecurity; the erosion of state legitimacy when governments fail to respond effectively to climate-induced disasters; and the security instabilities caused by the global energy transition, which may strand assets in hydrocarbon-exporting states and increase the value of critical minerals in fragile regions.

• Climate change is generally not the primary motivation for terrorist organizations, and groups that use environmental discourse often do so for marketing purposes to gain favorable Western press.
• Climate change increases recruitment opportunities for violent extremism by undermining agricultural livelihoods and food security, particularly for young males in developing and middle-income countries.
• Sea level rise is expected to displace several hundred million people across Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa in the coming decades, potentially straining institutions and fueling conflict between migrants and host communities.
• State legitimacy is eroded not by the natural disasters themselves, but by the perceived failure of governments to prepare for or respond to them, which can create a recipe for violent extremism.
• The Syrian Civil War was influenced by a severe drought from 2006-2011 that caused 75% of crops to fail in regions like Hasakeh and displaced over 1.5 million people to urban centers, exposing the regime's inability to meet basic needs.
• The transition to sustainable energy may destabilize legacy hydrocarbon producers, with the International Energy Agency estimating that oil and gas-producing economies could lose up to $7 trillion by 2040.
• The increased demand for critical minerals (such as cobalt, lithium, and rare earths) may empower terrorist organizations in fragile, agriculturally-dependent states with weak institutions, specifically in the Sahel, South Asia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

APA

Hendrix, C. S. (2021). Climate Change and Terrorism: Three Risk Pathways to Consider. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Climate-Change-and-Terrorism_Three-Risk-Pathways-to-Consider_BRIEFER-28_2022_01_10.pdf

Chicago

Hendrix, Cullen S. Climate Change and Terrorism: Three Risk Pathways to Consider. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Climate-Change-and-Terrorism_Three-Risk-Pathways-to-Consider_BRIEFER-28_2022_01_10.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Hendrix |first1=Cullen S. |title=Climate Change and Terrorism: Three Risk Pathways to Consider |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=10 January 2021 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Climate-Change-and-Terrorism_Three-Risk-Pathways-to-Consider_BRIEFER-28_2022_01_10.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{hendrix2021climate, author = {Hendrix, Cullen S.}, title = {{Climate Change and Terrorism: Three Risk Pathways to Consider}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = jan, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Climate-Change-and-Terrorism_Three-Risk-Pathways-to-Consider_BRIEFER-28_2022_01_10.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }