Common Misconceptions About Biological Weapons

The briefing argues that biological weapons remain a viable and rational strategic option for some states due to their low cost, potential for deniability, and asymmetric impact. It challenges the notion that these weapons are tactically useless or too risky to develop, noting that historical precedents and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate that leaders may prioritize state status or regime survival over the risks of blowback. The authors further contend that bioweapons programs are not always top-down initiatives and that current international norms, specifically the Biological Weapons Convention, lack the enforcement and verification mechanisms necessary to effectively stop such programs.

• Biological weapons are strategically rational for some actors because they offer a relatively inexpensive path to weapons of mass destruction and provide potential for deniability, as attacks can initially appear to be natural outbreaks.
• The belief that biological weapons are tactically flawed is contradicted by their potential to weaken opposing forces, destabilize nations by overwhelming health systems, or be used as a last-resort leverage tool during regime collapse.
• The risk of 'blowback' or accidental release does not necessarily deter governments; historical evidence shows the US and USSR operated large-scale programs despite these dangers, and some leaders may accept such risks to achieve strategic ends.
• Bioweapons development is not always a centralized, top-down process; it can be driven by 'product champions' within a government or by bureaucratic inertia and scientific curiosity that edges into offensive work.
• The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is insufficient for deterring or discovering bioweapons programs because it lacks enforcement and verification mechanisms, as evidenced by the secret Soviet program that expanded after the USSR signed the treaty.
• The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates that a single biological event can reshape global power dynamics and demonstrates that nations with strong preparedness and response capacities may gain asymmetric advantages from such events.

APA

Bakerlee, C., Guerra, S., Parthemore, C., Soghoian, D., & Swett, J. (2020). Common Misconceptions About Biological Weapons. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Common-Misconceptions-About-Biological-Weapons_BRIEFER-12_2020_12_7.pdf

Chicago

Bakerlee, Chris, Steph Guerra, Christine Parthemore, Damien Soghoian, and Jacob Swett. Common Misconceptions About Biological Weapons. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2020. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Common-Misconceptions-About-Biological-Weapons_BRIEFER-12_2020_12_7.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bakerlee |first1=Chris |last2=Guerra |first2=Steph |last3=Parthemore |first3=Christine |last4=Soghoian |first4=Damien |last5=Swett |first5=Jacob |title=Common Misconceptions About Biological Weapons |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=7 December 2020 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Common-Misconceptions-About-Biological-Weapons_BRIEFER-12_2020_12_7.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bakerlee2020common, author = {Bakerlee, Chris and Guerra, Steph and Parthemore, Christine and Soghoian, Damien and Swett, Jacob}, title = {{Common Misconceptions About Biological Weapons}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2020}, month = dec, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Common-Misconceptions-About-Biological-Weapons_BRIEFER-12_2020_12_7.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }