The Next Great Idea in Nuclear Arms Control: Putting the 2N2 Back in INF

The Council on Strategic Risks proposes a tailored, nuclear-only successor to the INF Treaty to address the destabilizing trend of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The authors argue for an initial bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia to ban nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missiles (500 to 5,500 km), which could later expand to include other nations and ballistic missiles. This approach aims to reduce the risk of unintentional escalation and miscalculation, particularly in Europe and East Asia, while avoiding the complexities of banning conventional systems. The proposal emphasizes the feasibility of modern verification technologies and suggests a phased approach, starting with a moratorium on conventional ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe and potential unilateral political declarations if a formal treaty is not immediately feasible.

• The authors propose a nuclear-only successor to the INF Treaty that begins with a ban on nuclear intermediate-range cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 km, starting as a bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia.
• The proposal suggests focusing exclusively on nuclear weapons rather than conventional systems to simplify verification and make the agreement more attractive to other countries, such as China.
• The authors recommend prioritizing ground-launched systems initially, but suggest the United States should consider a parallel unilateral act to pause or halt plans to bring back nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) to signal leadership in arms control.
• The proposed framework is designed to be a "bilateral-plus" model, starting with the U.S. and Russia but including provisions for other nations to join later, potentially including China, NATO countries, and non-nuclear nations like Kazakhstan.
• As an immediate first step, the authors suggest the United States and Russia revisit a moratorium on the deployment of conventional ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe, potentially expanding this to Asia later.
• Verification of a nuclear-only INF agreement is considered feasible due to "institutional muscle memory" from the original treaty and advancements in technology that can confirm if missiles are not carrying nuclear warheads.

APA

Bajema, N. E., & Parthemore, C. (2021). The Next Great Idea in Nuclear Arms Control: Putting the 2N2 Back in INF. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Next-Great-Idea-in-Nuclear-Arms-Control_Putting-the-N-Back-In-INF_BRIEFER-14_2021_02_02.pdf

Chicago

Bajema, Natasha E., and Christine Parthemore. The Next Great Idea in Nuclear Arms Control: Putting the 2N2 Back in INF. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Next-Great-Idea-in-Nuclear-Arms-Control_Putting-the-N-Back-In-INF_BRIEFER-14_2021_02_02.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bajema |first1=Natasha E. |last2=Parthemore |first2=Christine |title=The Next Great Idea in Nuclear Arms Control: Putting the 2N2 Back in INF |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=2 February 2021 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Next-Great-Idea-in-Nuclear-Arms-Control_Putting-the-N-Back-In-INF_BRIEFER-14_2021_02_02.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bajema2021next, author = {Bajema, Natasha E. and Parthemore, Christine}, title = {{The Next Great Idea in Nuclear Arms Control: Putting the 2N2 Back in INF}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = feb, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Next-Great-Idea-in-Nuclear-Arms-Control_Putting-the-N-Back-In-INF_BRIEFER-14_2021_02_02.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }