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The document examines the impacts of coal, oil, gas, and megadams across Africa, highlighting how these 'dirty energy' sources drive climate change and cause severe social and health crises. It details specific cases, such as South Africa's coal reliance, Uganda's oil expansion, and Mozambique's megadams, while warning against the 'extreme energy' frontier of fracking and tar sands. The briefing concludes that African governments must reject these outdated pathways in favor of decentralized, sustainable energy systems supported by climate finance from developed nations.

The document examines the impacts of 'dirty energy' (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, industrial biomass, mega-dams, and waste incineration) across Africa. It highlights how these technologies drive climate change, cause severe health and environmental damage, and often benefit elites and multinational corporations over local populations. The report provides case studies on coal in South Africa, oil in Nigeria and Uganda, mega-dams in Mozambique, and the risks of 'extreme energy' like fracking and bitumen extraction in the Maghreb and Nigeria. It concludes by calling for 'energy sovereignty' and a just transition to decentralized, renewable energy systems.

The document examines the impacts of 'polluting energy'—including fossil fuels, industrial biomass, and large dams—across Africa. It highlights how these systems often benefit elites and corporations while leaving local populations to face health crises, land grabbing, and climate vulnerability. Specific case studies focus on South Africa's coal dependency, oil extraction in Nigeria and Uganda, the influence of European energy policies in the Maghreb, and the social and environmental costs of large dams in Mozambique. The report concludes that African nations must avoid 'locking in' obsolete polluting technologies and instead pursue energy sovereignty through decentralized renewables.

The report analyzes diverse resource management models—ranging from sovereign wealth funds in Norway to ecosystem service payments in Costa Rica—to derive a framework for benefit sharing. It emphasizes that successful long-term outcomes require clear leadership, strong legislative frameworks, institutional mechanisms for implementation, and the active inclusion of Indigenous populations in decision-making. The document contrasts successful models, such as Norway's GPFG, with cautionary examples like Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund and Nigeria's oil sector, highlighting the risks of overreliance on non-renewable resources without strategic diversification and robust legal safeguards.

Africa is experiencing unprecedented urban growth, with its urban population expected to reach 1.4 billion by 2050. While this transition offers economic potential, it is occurring alongside slow structural transformation and pervasive poverty. The paper highlights the rise of megacities—such as Lagos, Cairo, and Kinshasa—and warns that without integrated urban planning and inclusive economic growth, cities will face increasing slum proliferation and urban violence.

The paper argues that effective governance is a primary determinant of poverty reduction in Africa. Using the International Futures (IFs) forecasting system, it demonstrates that improving governance effectiveness (aligned with SDG 16.6) would lift more than 60 million people out of poverty by 2050, outperforming other targeted health and sanitation interventions.

The document examines how ECOWAS implements the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), focusing on 'sustaining peace' through conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding. It highlights ECOWAS's sophisticated early warning system (ECOWARN) and its recent institutionalization of mediation through a new directorate, while noting significant gaps in post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). The paper argues for clearer definitions of comparative advantage and subsidiarity between ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) to avoid duplication and improve regional stability.

The document analyzes the challenges African low-income countries (LICs) face in financing infrastructure, specifically focusing on the African Development Fund (ADF). It highlights a critical gap in concessional funding, which pushes LICs toward high-interest non-concessional loans and unsustainable debt. The paper evaluates the ADF's ability to mobilize private sector finance through blending, guarantees, and public-private partnerships (PPPs), while using Lesotho and Senegal as case studies to illustrate issues such as inadequate project preparation, limited institutional capacity, and the risks of poorly managed PPPs. It concludes with recommendations for the ADF to enhance its project preparation facilities, improve debt advisory services, and ensure more inclusive stakeholder consultations.

The document examines why traditional multilateral development banks struggle to meet the needs of middle-income countries, citing bureaucratic loan processes, rigid procurement rules, and stringent safeguards. Using the African Development Bank (AfDB) as a case study and analyzing experiences in Nigeria and Botswana, it argues that MICs are increasingly turning to private finance, bilateral donors like China, and domestic markets. It recommends that the NDB adopt a leaner operational model, utilize 'use of country systems' (UCS) for procurement, focus on 'green' sustainable infrastructure, and improve gender representation in governance to avoid the pitfalls of established MDBs.

The document analyzes Nigeria's struggle to maintain its status as a 'regional hegemon' since the return to democracy in 1999. It argues that while Nigeria has a history of assertive 'Africa-centred' foreign policy, this has been eroded by domestic instability, corruption, the Boko Haram insurgency, and a lack of strategic leadership. The author highlights a shift in continental pre-eminence from Nigeria to South Africa and notes that Nigeria's regional influence in West Africa is contested and often dependent on external actors like France. The paper concludes that only a fundamental restructuring of domestic governance and the economy can restore Nigeria's international standing.

The letter argues that the owners of the Dakota Access Pipeline are complicit in human rights abuses against Indigenous peoples in Standing Rock, North Dakota, and asserts that corporate and financial entities have an affirmative duty to prevent such impacts.

The Reiner Lemoine Institut (RLI) developed electrification plans for five Nigerian states to achieve 100% electrification using a combination of grid extension, solar hybrid mini-grids, and solar home systems. The project addressed challenges such as data scarcity, modelling complexity, and undefined institutional structures through the use of GIS and energy system simulation tools. In cooperation with the Nigerian Energy Support Programme (NESP), the initiative included capacity-building workshops for stakeholders on data management and energy demand modelling to provide local governments with evidence-based investment and capacity requirements.

The briefing advocates for a binding UN treaty to end the impunity of transnational corporations (TNCs) in Africa. It details systemic environmental degradation and human rights abuses by companies like Shell in Nigeria, Vale in Mozambique, and ArcelorMittal in South Africa, arguing that national legal systems are often insufficient to provide justice and reparations.

This report by Friends of the Earth International and Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria examines the failure of the Nigerian judicial system to hold transnational oil corporations, specifically Shell, accountable for environmental degradation and human rights violations in the Niger Delta. The authors argue that systemic barriers in national courts—including high costs, strict standing requirements, and corporate stalling tactics—necessitate the establishment of a World Environmental Court with international jurisdiction to ensure environmental justice.

The document defines the 'Decade Zero' as the critical window to prevent irreversible climate warming. It critiques the current global energy system and neoliberal economic models, labeling market-based mechanisms like carbon trading and REDD as 'false solutions' that protect corporate profits while violating human rights. The report advocates for a systemic transformation centered on climate justice, where developed nations pay their 'climate debt' to the Global South and energy production is shifted to decentralized, community-owned, and sustainable models.

Friends of the Earth International asserts that humanity has entered the 'Decade Zero', the final window to prevent dangerous climate change through drastic action. The document criticizes the neoliberal economic system and the power of transnational corporations, which it claims drive the climate crisis and promote 'false solutions' like carbon markets and REDD. It proposes a transition to 'energy sovereignty', agro-ecology, and community forest management, while demanding that wealthy industrialised nations pay their 'climate debt' to support developing countries.

The report examines the catastrophic environmental and human rights impacts of transnational oil companies, specifically Shell, in Nigeria's Niger Delta. It details the persistence of gas flaring and oil spills, the resulting destruction of rural livelihoods, and the systemic barriers—such as high legal costs, burden of proof, and judicial delays—that prevent victims from accessing justice in Nigerian courts. Through case studies, it demonstrates how corporations use legal stalling and jurisdictional challenges to evade accountability, concluding that a legally binding global treaty and an international environmental court are necessary to protect human rights and the environment.

The report estimates that ending world hunger by 2030 will require an average of USD 11 billion in additional annual public spending, with USD 4 billion provided by donors and USD 7 billion by poor countries. This investment is projected to trigger an additional USD 5 billion in annual private investment. The analysis focuses on three intervention categories: social safety nets, farm support, and rural development. Using a sample of seven African countries to extrapolate global costs, the report identifies that Africa, particularly Central and South East Africa, will require the highest level of support, with some countries depending on donors for over 90 per cent of their budgets.

The document analyzes Africa's epidemiological transition, noting that while communicable diseases currently cause a disproportionate share of deaths, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are rising. Using scenario modeling, it argues that achieving SDG 3.3 (eradicating communicable diseases) would significantly boost GDP and life expectancy but accelerate the shift toward NCDs, potentially stressing health systems. Conversely, achieving SDG 3.4 (reducing premature NCD deaths) improves productivity through reduced disability but offers smaller overall economic gains than the eradication of infectious diseases.

The document analyzes the state of democracy in Africa, arguing that while electoral democracy has increased since 1989, it is often constrained by neopatrimonialism and a lack of governance capacity. It explores the 'sequencing debate' regarding whether democracy precedes or follows economic development, noting that while authoritarian models have sometimes delivered rapid growth, long-term human development is robustly linked to high-quality electoral democracy. Using the International Futures (IFs) system, the author forecasts that a 'Fourth Wave' of democracy could significantly increase Africa's GDP and reduce extreme poverty by 2070 compared to an 'Authoritarian Regress' scenario.