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The fact sheet details the severe environmental and humanitarian impacts of the conflict in Gaza, including the destruction of water, energy, and agricultural infrastructure. It identifies specific global arms manufacturers, fossil fuel companies, and financial institutions that support the Israeli military and economy, linking these actors to both 'climate crimes' and the ongoing crisis in Palestine.

The document links the systems of imperialism, neoliberalism, and colonialism to both climate breakdown and the genocide in Palestine. It details the catastrophic environmental and humanitarian impacts in Gaza, including the destruction of water, energy, and agricultural infrastructure. Furthermore, it identifies a network of transnational corporations—including arms manufacturers, energy companies, and financial institutions—that profit from and facilitate the occupation and military actions in Palestine.

The report links the systems of imperialism, neoliberalism, and colonialism to both the global climate collapse and the destruction of life and land in Palestine. It provides detailed data on the collapse of water, energy, and agricultural infrastructure in Gaza, while identifying specific global arms, energy, and financial companies that support the Israeli state.

The report details the outcomes of the FSD Network Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 2025. It examines the impact of gender-responsive financial systems, the use of alternative credit scoring, the influence of societal gender norms on financial autonomy, and the role of digital public infrastructure and AI in bridging the gender gap in financial services across Africa.

The report compares 10 SADC cities, revealing stark disparities in economic wealth and infrastructure. While South African cities like Johannesburg and Cape Town are the wealthiest, they face high inequality and unemployment. Most other cities are characterized by high proportions of informal housing (60-86%) and a heavy reliance on national parastatals for engineered services. Sanitation remains the most critical service gap, with sewered sanitation being rare outside of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Local government finance varies wildly, with some cities relying heavily on national transfers while others, particularly in Zimbabwe, receive no transfers despite high service obligations.

The Maputo metropolitan area, with a population of 2.9 million, serves as Mozambique's primary economic and political hub but faces significant challenges in service delivery and infrastructure. While the city shows economic growth and improving health indices, it is characterized by high levels of informal settlements, inadequate sanitation, and a fragmented local government system with limited functional autonomy. Key infrastructure projects like the Maputo-Katembe bridge have improved connectivity, but the region remains one of the poorest primary cities in the SADC region, with a heavy reliance on charcoal for cooking and a high prevalence of waterborne diseases among children.

The report examines the prevalence and impact of mining tax incentives in Africa, concluding that they are largely ineffective at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and instead facilitate revenue loss and illicit financial flows. It highlights that factors such as mineral quality and political stability are more critical to investors than tax breaks. The document argues for a shift toward performance-based incentives, the adoption of the OECD/G20 global minimum tax, and regional tax harmonization to prevent a 'race to the bottom' and support the goals of the Africa Mining Vision.

The report analyzes the prevalence and effects of tax incentives in Africa's mining sector, concluding that these measures frequently result in substantial public revenue losses and encourage aggressive tax avoidance. It argues that mining investments are driven more by resource quality and political stability than by tax breaks. The document recommends that African nations move away from generous, contract-based incentives and instead adopt regional tax harmonization and targeted, time-limited incentives linked to specific development goals, such as mineral processing and the energy transition.

The document defines ring-fencing as a limitation on the consolidation of income and deductions across different projects or activities for tax purposes. It argues that while ring-fencing can discourage investment in marginal ore bodies and increase compliance costs, it is essential for capturing economic rents, preventing permanent revenue loss from unsuccessful exploration, and mitigating BEPS practices. The guide recommends ring-fencing by mining licence area and suggests that profit-based taxes like Resource Rent Tax (RRT) and Additional Profit Tax (APT) must be ring-fenced to be effective. It also provides technical recommendations on apportioning indirect and general expenditures, suggesting that capital expenditure (CapEx) is a more effective allocation key than production volumes to avoid tax deferral.

The document examines the use of ring-fencing—the limitation of consolidating income and deductions across different mining projects or activities—as a tool for governments to ensure timely tax collection and protect the tax base. It analyzes the trade-offs between accelerating state revenue and potentially disincentivizing investment, particularly in marginal deposits. The guide provides detailed design options, such as ring-fencing by mining license area, activity type (upstream vs. downstream), or specific project, and offers recommendations on allocating indirect costs and managing transfer pricing risks. It also discusses exceptions for unsuccessful exploration costs to balance revenue goals with the need to attract exploration investment.

The document examines 'ring-fencing'—the practice of limiting the consolidation of revenues and deductions for different activities or projects undertaken by the same taxpayer—as a tool for governments to protect the mining tax base. It analyzes the trade-offs between accelerating public revenue and potentially discouraging investment, particularly in marginal deposits. The guide details various design options, such as ring-fencing by mining license area, activity (upstream vs. downstream), or separating mining from non-mining activities. It also provides practical recommendations on allocating indirect and general expenses, managing national transfer pricing risks, and handling permanent losses from unsuccessful exploration to balance revenue needs with investment incentives.

African cities face extreme climate vulnerability, with 83% rated at 'extreme risk', yet they are largely bypassed by the global climate financial architecture. The document highlights that while cities generate 80% of global GDP and are first responders in disasters, they are not parties to international conventions like the UNFCCC. It urges cities to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments—including non-economic loss and damage—and to leverage city networks and multi-level governance to access the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), the Warsaw International Mechanism, and the Santiago Network. The brief recommends that national governments integrate urban loss and damage into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) to improve funding access and implementation.

The policy brief assesses the failure of the Mozambican government's military-first strategy in Cabo Delgado, noting that despite interventions by Rwanda and SADC, the insurgency persists and has expanded in 2025. It identifies local grievances—including youth unemployment, religious discrimination, and economic displacement—as primary drivers of recruitment. The author advocates for a multi-level dialogue approach involving community leaders and civil society to address these root causes, while critiquing the government's tendency to frame the conflict as 'international terrorism' to avoid negotiation.

The policy brief argues that Africa's maritime security efforts are hindered by institutional fragmentation, chronic underfunding, and a gap between high-level policy and operational capacity. It highlights that while regional bodies like SADC and ECOWAS have made progress, the African Union (AU) lacks a permanent coordinating body and a tested naval component for the African Standby Force. To address this, the authors recommend establishing an African Maritime Security Expert Group, convening a permanent Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS), and conducting the AMANI Africa III maritime exercise to validate naval command-and-control.

The report analyzes the integration of human mobility into National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), finding that while 83% of submitted NAPs reference mobility, most lack detailed strategies for sub-national implementation. Through case studies in Costa Rica, Senegal, and Sri Lanka, it identifies gaps in financing, data, and coordination between national and local governments, while proposing a typology of approaches for localizing mobility actions.

The report examines whether Official Development Assistance (ODA) prevents or exacerbates violent conflict. A systematic review of 20 studies indicates that while assistance can foster stability by improving livelihoods and accountable governance, it can also fuel violence by creating 'prizes' for elite capture or provoking insurgent backlash. Case studies of South Sudan and Mozambique highlight a contrast between fragmented states and capable but exclusionary states, suggesting that prevention strategies must be tailored to the specific institutional context. The authors recommend shifting from externally imposed state-building models toward community-driven initiatives and inclusive governance reforms.

The report evaluates 52 community-managed areas (CMAs) across Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania using the Elinor tool. It finds that while 30% of CMAs have made substantial progress toward equitable governance, 40% are in early stages and 30% have made minimal progress. Key challenges include weak operational capacity, limited funding, and gaps in inclusive decision-making. The report argues that secure tenure and clearly defined rights are essential precursors to effective management and positive ecological and social outcomes.

South Africa's carbon-intensive export model is increasingly vulnerable as 78% of its exports are sold to countries with net zero targets. The report highlights acute risks in the basic metals, automotive, and agricultural sectors due to high embodied CO2 emissions compared to global competitors. While the EU's CBAM and shifting US trade policies pose immediate threats, South Africa's reserves of critical minerals and renewable energy potential offer a strategic path toward 'carbon competitiveness'. The report argues that success depends on decarbonising the national electricity grid, implementing the Climate Change Act 2024, and securing international support through the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP).

India is pursuing a "build now, decarbonize later" strategy in its steel industry, focusing on expanding capacity through emissions-intensive blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) routes. This approach risks creating stranded assets valued between US$124187 billion and locking in high emissions due to a young fleet of blast furnaces. While the government has introduced roadmaps for green steel and energy efficiency, the document argues that deep decarbonization requires a fundamental shift away from coal toward green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI) and increased scrap-based secondary production.

The document argues that financial institutions should cease support for the Mozambique LNG project due to severe human rights violations, political instability, and resettlement failures. It highlights reports of a 2021 massacre of civilians by security forces linked to the project and describes a climate of state repression and electoral violence in Mozambique. The authors call for an independent international investigation by bodies such as the OHCHR and demand that financiers withhold further funding until accountability is established.