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The document examines various European initiatives to reduce public transport costs, ranging from temporary low-cost summer passes to permanent free transit. While these measures can alleviate financial pressure on citizens and reduce pollution, the author argues that price reductions alone are insufficient; sustainable mobility requires improved accessibility, simplified tariff systems, and strategic public investment funded by mechanisms like congestion charges or corporate taxes.

The analysis argues that the UK's economic insecurity is rooted in neoliberalism, which prioritizes individual resilience over collective security. This is evidenced by underinvestment in public infrastructure, the sale of 2.5 million social houses between 1979 and 2022, and a lack of energy storage (four days compared to France's fourteen). In contrast, Finland's approach to housing, energy, and social policy—including a 'housing first' strategy and a basic income pilot—is presented as a model for restoring public confidence and wellbeing. The authors suggest that a cost-neutral universal basic income of approximately £60 per week for single adults could more than halve child and pensioner poverty in the UK.

The Visegrad Group (V4) is experiencing significant fragmentation due to diverging responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and differing relationships with the European Union. While Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia generally support Ukraine and NATO expansion, Hungary has obstructed sanctions against Russia and the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. The once-strong alliance between Poland's PiS and Hungary's Fidesz was severely shaken by Orbán's ties to Putin, though a tactical reconciliation has emerged based on mutual dependence regarding EU rule-of-law procedures and shared populist narratives. Ultimately, the author argues that Orbán's veto power in the EU has reached its limits, leading him to seek alliances with American Republicans, European far-right fundamentalists, and China to maintain domestic legitimacy and enrich his clientelist network.

The report finds that low-cost, repeated behaviors like reducing food waste are significantly more common than high-cost, one-time installations like heat pumps or solar panels. While many who adopted these behaviors faced minimal difficulty, non-adopters cited lack of awareness and lack of interest for low-cost actions, and high cost and home ownership issues for high-cost technologies.

The briefing highlights the risks associated with treating critical minerals as undifferentiated commodities, noting that a lack of transparency hides environmental and social costs. It advocates for a paradigm shift toward commodity differentiation through product-level standards, tracking technology, and regulatory tightening to ensure the energy transition is just and sustainable.

The Climate Change Performance Index 2023 finds that none of the 60 largest emitters are on a 1.5°C pathway, leaving the top three ranks unoccupied. Denmark is the current frontrunner, leading in almost all categories, while China and the US are categorized as 'very low' performers. The report highlights a wide disparity in performance among EU countries and identifies Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan as the worst overall performers due to heavy oil reliance and weak renewable energy adoption.

The document examines the 'fair and equitable treatment' (FET) standard, a controversial provision found in nearly 95% of international investment agreements. It argues that the vagueness of FET leads to inconsistent interpretations by arbitral tribunals, which can result in 'regulatory chill' for states. The brief analyzes five common treaty formulations of FET and concludes that even 'new-generation' agreements often produce the same unpredictable outcomes as older ones. To mitigate these risks, the authors propose three policy options: excluding FET standards entirely, using alternative terminology like 'fair administrative treatment,' or implementing a strictly defined, closed list of breach conditions that explicitly excludes investor expectations.

The document examines the 'fair and equitable treatment' (FET) standard in international investment agreements, noting its prevalence in nearly 95% of such treaties and its role in 83% of treaty-based arbitrations. It argues that the vagueness of FET leads to inconsistent interpretations by tribunals, which can result in 'regulatory chill' for states. The brief outlines five common formulations of FET and suggests three primary policy alternatives: excluding the FET standard entirely, using alternative terminology like 'fair administrative treatment', or implementing a strictly defined, limited FET standard with a closed list of violations.

The document analyzes the 'fair and equitable treatment' (FET) standard, which appears in nearly 95% of international investment agreements and is the basis for approximately 83% of investor-state arbitrations. It argues that the lack of a precise definition allows tribunals to expand the standard's scope, creating legal unpredictability and 'regulatory chill' for states. The brief details five common drafting approaches—ranging from unqualified FET clauses to those linked to customary international law—and concludes that even 'new generation' treaties often produce the same results as older ones. To protect their right to regulate, the authors suggest three policy options: excluding the FET standard entirely, using alternative terminology like 'fair administrative treatment', or implementing a strictly defined, closed list of violations that explicitly excludes investor expectations.

The document outlines legal and non-legal interventions available to energy communities to ensure EU Member States comply with the Renewable Energy Directive (REDII) and the Internal Electricity Market Directive (IEMD). It highlights that many Member States have failed to fully transpose these directives, which are intended to empower citizens, municipalities, and SMEs to engage in renewable energy production, sharing, and efficiency services. The guide specifically details actions that can be taken before EU institutions and national courts, providing examples of legal avenues in Hungary, France, and Belgium.

The document argues that while the costs of climate action are high, the costs of inaction are higher, noting that physical climate risk has already increased the cost of capital for V20 countries by USD62bn over 10 years. It proposes a three-pillar policy framework: providing clarity on green investments via taxonomies, tilting investment toward green opportunities through de-risking and carbon pricing, and building green investment pipelines. Key mechanisms suggested include the use of junior capital by development finance institutions to mobilize private investment, the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and the implementation of carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs). The summary concludes with a list of 101 specific policy ideas across sectors including energy, transport, and agriculture to be detailed in a full report.

The document outlines legal and administrative pathways for Renewable Energy Communities (RECs) and Citizen Energy Communities (CECs) to challenge Member State failures in implementing EU directives. It details EU-level options, such as infringement complaints to the European Commission and petitions to the European Parliament, alongside national remedies including ombudspersons, regulatory authority complaints, and court actions based on principles like direct effect and state liability. The guide also provides a preliminary analysis of which specific provisions of RED II and IEMD may have direct effect and examines transposition challenges in Hungary, France, and Belgium.

Between May and August 2022, the EU generated a record 12.2% of its electricity from solar power, totaling 99.4 TWh. This generation helped the EU avoid the purchase of an additional 20 bcm of fossil gas, resulting in potential cost savings of €29 billion based on average daily gas prices for that period. Solar share records were broken in 18 of 27 EU countries, with the Netherlands achieving the highest share at 23%. The report argues that while solar deployment is accelerating, permitting bottlenecks must be addressed to meet 1.5C and REPowerEU targets, which include a proposed 45% renewable energy target for 2030.

The report highlights the high energy and feedstock intensity of the EU's plastic production industry, noting its significant reliance on Russian fossil fuels. It argues that reducing plastic production, particularly packaging, is a critical but overlooked lever for enhancing EU energy security and meeting climate goals.

The authors contend that Norway's public debate regarding the war in Ukraine has become overly emotional and ideologized, hindering the ability to discuss complex strategic dilemmas. They call for a more open discourse on NATO's role, the implications of NATO expansion into Finland and Sweden, the potential for EU membership, and the risks associated with food and energy price hikes.

The report demonstrates that Europe can achieve a 94-96% clean power system by 2035 at no extra cost compared to stated policies, provided wind and solar deployment quadruples. This transition would enable wider electrification, potentially halving fossil fuel consumption by 2030 and saving between €530 billion and €1 trillion by 2035. Key requirements include expanding interconnection, deploying electrolysers for green hydrogen, and phasing out coal by 2030 and unabated baseload gas after 2025.

The report outlines how Ember updated its 2020 NECP assessment by incorporating policy changes announced between 2020 and 2022, including coal phase-outs and clean power commitments. It details the transformation of capacity targets into generation figures, the assumption that renewables replace fossil fuels (with specific exceptions for nuclear in Hungary), and the treatment of overproduction in countries like Denmark and France. The analysis identifies 19 governments that updated their renewables expansion or fossil fuel phase-out ambitions beyond their original National Energy and Climate Plans.

Based on a representative survey of 811 Ukrainians in April 2022, the study finds that the vast majority of the population remained in their home provinces despite the invasion. Among those who did migrate, three quarters stayed within Ukraine, often moving toward safer western regions like Lviv. The analysis indicates that personal exposure to direct attacks significantly increases the likelihood of a person planning to leave their current location, while the targeting of friends or family does not have a significant effect.

The report contends that fossil gas cannot be considered a transition fuel due to significant methane leakage and the need for rapid decarbonisation by 2030. It argues that the EU's Complementary Delegated Act threatens the credibility of the EU Taxonomy by allowing fossil gas as a transitional activity. The document advocates for a rapid shift to low-carbon hydrogen, prioritised for hard-to-abate sectors, and warns against 'gas blending' as an inefficient decarbonisation strategy. It recommends the use of additionality requirements for electrolysers to prevent them from cannibalising renewable energy growth and suggests various financial mechanisms, including Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfDs) and green public procurement, to mobilise investment. The report also emphasizes the need for a Just Transition to protect workers and low-income households from the regressive effects of carbon pricing.

The report concludes that the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is incompatible with EU law because it allows international tribunals to interpret EU law and undermines the regulatory autonomy of EU institutions. While the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has already ruled that intra-EU arbitration under the ECT is illegal (Komstroy), the report argues that extra-EU arbitration also poses significant risks. It highlights that the ECT lacks the procedural and substantive safeguards found in modern agreements like CETA. The authors suggest that the most effective remedy is a combination of withdrawal from the ECT, inter-se modification to eliminate the sunset clause between withdrawing parties, and interpretative declarations to prevent investors from circumventing these measures by relocating their seats outside the EU.