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Reclaim Finance argues that the current SFDR framework is too vague, leading to confusion and greenwashing. It proposes three key reforms: excluding fossil fuel developers from funds making environmental or social claims, establishing minimum quality requirements for 'green', 'transition', and 'impact' funds, and aligning transparency obligations (PAIs) with advisory processes (MiFID II and IDD) to better reflect investor preferences.

Reclaim Finance analyzes 243 sectoral targets from 30 global banks, concluding that most are ineffective due to flawed methodologies, partial coverage, and a lack of transparency. The report specifically criticizes the use of PCAF attribution factors, which can make emissions appear to drop even if real-world emissions remain flat. It recommends shifting toward targets based on financing volumes for fossil fuels, absolute sectoral portfolio emissions, and physical intensity for industrial sectors to drive genuine decarbonization.

The document argues that Oregon should adopt consumption-based emission targets to account for its full carbon footprint and avoid displacing emissions to other regions. It contrasts sector-based emissions (territorial) with consumption-based emissions (life cycle of goods and services) and notes that while Oregon's sector emissions have decreased, consumption emissions continue to rise. The paper provides case studies from cities like San Francisco, London, and Paris, and countries like Sweden, to illustrate different target-setting approaches. It proposes four specific frameworks for Oregon: aligning with existing sector goals, targeting minimum well-being standards, using global carbon budget scenario analysis, or applying a 'fair share' equity-based approach.

The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) aims to eliminate deforestation-driven imports of commodities like palm oil, rubber, cocoa, coffee, soy, and cattle. However, the briefing highlights that stringent due diligence requirements—including geolocation and traceability—risk excluding smallholder farmers in Southeast Asia who lack the financial resources, technical capacity, and legal land tenure to comply. The document argues that without targeted support, such as knowledge hubs, financial mechanisms for compliance costs, and improved stakeholder coordination, smallholders may be pushed out of the global value chain. It emphasizes that local context is critical, as many smallholders operate through informal transactions and lack the certifications required by the EU market.

The document argues that Oregon cannot achieve climate-safe emission levels through individual behavioral changes or technological solutions alone. It highlights a significant 'emissions gap' where consumption-based emissions grew over 20% in 16 years, despite stabilizing in-state production emissions. The authors advocate for a shift from growth-centric neoclassical economics toward paradigms like the well-being economy, degrowth, and doughnut economics. Proposed structural interventions for Oregon include redesigning economic measurements beyond GDP, investing in the care economy, implementing carbon pricing, and adopting smart growth urban policies to ensure a just and equitable transition.

The report outlines ten considerations for the design of trade-related circular economy policies and measures (TrCEMs), emphasizing the need for international cooperation to avoid regulatory fragmentation. It highlights the role of the WTO, ISO, and multilateral environmental agreements in aligning definitions and standards. The document specifically addresses the challenges faced by developing countries, such as the need for technical assistance and the risk of a 'circular divide,' and suggests mechanisms like extended producer responsibility (EPR) fee transfers to manage end-of-life products in importing nations.

The document argues that while the WTO has historically neglected the environment, there is a current paradigm shift toward recognizing trade's role in addressing climate change and biodiversity loss. It assesses the outcomes of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference (MC13), highlighting failures in fisheries subsidies and the absence of explicit climate commitments in the Ministerial Declaration, while noting progress in plurilateral initiatives like the Dialogue on Plastic Pollution. Experts propose reforming subsidy rules for fossil fuels and agriculture, leveraging 'Aid for Trade' for just transitions, and adopting the legal principle of 'Common Concern of Humankind' to guide trade law. The report emphasizes the need for regulatory alignment on circular economy principles and the ability of the WTO to coordinate trade-related climate measures, such as Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms, to avoid global trade fragmentation.

The We Mean Business Coalition argues that for NDCs to be 'investible', they must move beyond ambitious targets to include concrete implementation policies. The document proposes a three-pillar approach: setting ambitious economy-wide and sector-specific targets, developing consistent national and international policy frameworks, and establishing transparent dialogue between governments and businesses. It highlights that while renewable energy and electric vehicle adoption are accelerating, sectors like heavy industry and aviation require more targeted government intervention to overcome investment barriers. The report provides illustrative examples of successful policy-driven investments in India, Brazil, Sweden, the EU, and the US.

Three companies—GE Vernova, Siemens Energy, and Mitsubishi Power—control two-thirds of the global market for gas turbines in power plants currently under construction. While these firms are expanding through regional partnerships and promoting 'hydrogen-ready' technology, the report argues they face significant geopolitical and financial risks due to the rapid growth of renewables and the potential for gas power overcapacity.

Brazil is positioned as a potential global leader in green steel due to high-quality iron ore and vast renewable energy resources, though its industry remains heavily reliant on coal-based blast furnaces. While the country leads in biochar use, a full transition requires shifting to electric arc furnaces (EAF) and green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI). The report emphasizes that strategic policy and the upcoming COP30 summit are critical to overcoming the longevity of existing coal-based infrastructure and the high capital costs of new technologies.

The report categorizes hydrogen applications into 'high-value' (primarily chemical feedstocks) and 'low-value' (primarily energy provision), arguing that the latter are often outcompeted by direct electrification. It warns that without strict guardrails on production, electrolytic hydrogen could increase net greenhouse gas emissions. The author recommends focusing infrastructure on tight industrial clusters and utilizing demand-side policies like advance market commitments and contracts for difference to scale high-value uses while minimizing risks in low-value sectors.

The research paper examines the intersection of G7 initiatives, such as the Energy for Growth in Africa Initiative and the Mattei Plan, with South Africa's role as a representative for African climate priorities. It highlights the tension between Western-led green transitions and African concerns over 'green protectionism' (specifically the EU's CBAM), the need for adaptation financing based on the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle, and the geopolitical competition for critical minerals. The author argues that the G7 must provide concrete deliverables and respect African agency to effectively bridge its goals with South Africa's upcoming G20 presidency.

The 'Big Five' agricultural commodity traders—ADM, Bunge, Cargill, COFCO, and LDC—dominate the global trade of staples like grains and oilseeds, controlling 70-90% of the commercial grain market. The author contends that these companies used the 2021-2022 food price spikes, driven partly by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to dramatically increase net profit margins, with profits in 2022 being 200-300% higher than the 2016-2020 average. This dominance is maintained through strategies of market consolidation (M&As), vertical integration across the value chain, and interconnectedness via joint ventures. The document criticizes EU competition regulators for a narrow focus on immediate consumer prices, which has led to the approval of nearly all M&A cases involving the Big Five, including the recent 34-billion-dollar Bunge-Viterra deal. The author concludes that while stronger anti-trust enforcement is necessary, a systemic shift toward degrowth and decolonization is required to dismantle the incentives for such concentration.

The Sahel region is experiencing a major geopolitical shift as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and severed ties with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This move reflects deep-seated anti-French and anti-EU sentiment, driven by perceptions of neo-colonialism and a focus on security and migration over socio-economic development. As the EU's influence wanes, Russia has expanded its presence through military cooperation and strategic economic interests, including potential control over Niger's uranium. The author argues that the EU and ECOWAS must move away from punitive sanctions and colonial-era approaches toward equal partnerships and dialogue to maintain stability and influence in the region.

The report assesses the avocado value chain in East Africa, emphasizing the transition toward sustainable practices to support economic growth and rural development. It identifies that sustainability can protect the environment, improve smallholder farmer livelihoods, and facilitate entry into global markets. To overcome barriers to this transition, the document suggests increasing access to affordable finance, providing training in climate-smart farming, and creating market-focused policies.

Sweden adopted a net-zero target in 2017 with a broad scope, limited offsets, and interim targets for 2020, 2030, and 2040. To ensure durability, the country passed the Climate Act, which mandates a climate action plan every four years, annual budget alignment, and oversight by an independent Climate Policy Council. While emissions have generally declined since the 1990s and the 2020 interim target was met, recent political changes—including the removal of a dedicated Ministry for Climate and Environment and a reduction in biofuels requirements—have led to concerns about the deprioritization of near-term action in the December 2023 Climate Action Plan.

The EU Digital Services Act (DSA), fully in force as of 17 February 2024, establishes a systemic online safety framework for digital intermediary services. It imposes tiered obligations based on societal impact, with the most stringent requirements applied to Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs)—those with 45 million or more monthly EU users. These entities must conduct annual risk assessments and implement mitigation measures against systemic risks, including illegal content and negative effects on civic discourse. The DSA introduces transparency mandates for advertising and recommender systems, and establishes a crisis response mechanism for threats to public security or health. Enforcement is shared between the European Commission and national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), with potential fines reaching 6 percent of annual turnover.

National wind targets from 70 countries and the EU aim for a collective capacity of 2,157 GW by 2030, which represents a 2.4x increase from 2022 but falls short of the 2,742 GW required for a tripling. While global forecasts suggest these targets are achievable in aggregate, this is primarily due to China's expected over-performance; most other countries are projected to fall short of their own targets. The report highlights significant implementation gaps in the US and India, while noting that Brazil and Türkiye are likely to exceed their targets due to low initial ambition.

The report finds that Türkiye's domestic coal power plants are incapable of providing baseload electricity, characterized by an average availability rate of 52% and significant annual production losses of 22 TWh due to malfunctions. Despite this poor performance, coal-fired generation reached a record 118 TWh in 2023, contributing 20% of the country's total carbon emissions. The analysis highlights that domestic lignite plants are particularly inefficient, with energy efficiency 15% below the EU average, and some wind farms now achieve higher capacity factors than these coal plants. The document argues that Türkiye lacks a coal phase-out strategy, with some licenses extending to 2069, and recommends transitioning to cheaper renewable energy to meet its 2053 net zero target and mitigate potential EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) costs.

The document outlines the climate, economic, and energy security benefits of reducing methane emissions in the UK, specifically targeting the oil and gas sector. It recommends that the UK advance the ban on venting and flaring, implement a comprehensive measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MMRV) framework, and introduce a methane fee and import standard to align with EU regulations and global best practices.