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The document concludes that Africa's current economic path is characterised by low productivity and 'premature deindustrialisation', where labour shifts from subsistence agriculture to low-end informal urban services rather than manufacturing. It highlights a reliance on 'capital-intensive commodity enclaves' that fail to build local value chains or improve broad welfare. To reverse this, the author argues for strategic investments in renewable energy, education, health infrastructure, and digital literacy, alongside the use of the AfCFTA to foster intra-African trade. The text emphasizes that achieving the African Union's Agenda 2063 requires strong governance, gender equity, and international partnerships for financing and technology transfer.

The report describes a shift in the global and internal perception of Africa, moving from negative stereotypes of poverty and conflict toward a narrative of innovation, cultural richness, and strategic agency. This transformation is driven by the rise of African storytelling, digital platforms, and cultural movements like Afrofuturism. The document argues that these changing narratives enhance Africa's geopolitical leverage in forums like the G20 and BRICS, attract foreign investment, and foster continental integration through initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The document analyzes Africa's economic trajectory, noting that while the absolute size of the economy is growing, its share of global GDP remains stagnant at around 3% despite a rapidly increasing population. It highlights a widening gap in GDP per capita between Africa and the rest of the world, attributing this to a reliance on raw material exports, the 'resource curse', and a slow recovery from COVID-19. By 2043, Nigeria is projected to become the world's third-largest country by population, and the five largest African economies are expected to be Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

The document outlines a forecasting scenario for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) using the International Futures (IFs) platform. It details the specific interventions used to simulate the agreement's impact—including import tax reductions and productivity increases—and specifies the tariff phase-out timelines for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), non-LDCs, and the G6 countries. The authors characterize the scenario as an optimistic forecast that depends on political commitment and stakeholder engagement.

The report analyzes global carbon emissions, noting that 2023 saw record levels of 36.1 billion tons of CO2 equivalent from fossil fuels. It highlights the dominance of a few producers and the significant impact of coal and methane. While China and the EU are pursuing decarbonization, the US experience fluctuates with political administrations. The report forecasts a peak in emissions by 2037/8, but warns that atmospheric CO2 concentrations could reach 551 ppm by 2063, potentially leading to a 3°C temperature rise. Africa is identified as particularly vulnerable, facing increasing emissions from population growth and significant forest loss, with 100 million hectares cleared over three decades.

The report argues that rising geopolitical instability and the military occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant have exposed gaps in nuclear safety norms. It suggests that the Pelindaba Treaty may be insufficient for contemporary armed conflicts and recommends strengthening international regulations, expanding the IAEA's mandate, and protecting nuclear personnel and infrastructure to safeguard nuclear energy in Africa and globally.

A coalition of business, civil society, and research stakeholders calls on WTO ministers at MC14 to ensure that multilateral trade reform prioritizes sustainable development, the climate crisis, and the needs of developing countries, particularly least developed countries (LDCs).

The World Resources Institute describes the UK's reduction of its international climate finance budget to £6 billion over three years as a setback for the world's poorest, while suggesting the remaining funds be used to leverage private finance and support systemic change in vulnerable states.

Between December 2025 and February 2026, climate change significantly boosted global temperatures, with over one in six people experiencing strong climate influence daily. Nearly 228 million people faced 30 or more risky heat days added by climate change, with 81% of these individuals residing in Africa. The analysis highlights that in 45 countries, all risky heat days during this period were driven by climate change, and 124 countries saw the average person experience at least 30 days of strong climate influence (CSI level 2 or higher).

In 2025, Nigeria transitioned from policy ambition to implementation through the introduction of the National Integrated Electricity Policy, the launch of the Nigerian Climate Investment Platform, and the submission of its NDC 3.0. Key energy initiatives include the National Public Sector Solarisation Initiative and the Nigeria Electrification Project, while the Nigerian Gas Flaring Commercialisation Programme targets emissions reductions within the hydrocarbons sector.

In 2025, Nigeria transitioned from policy ambition to concrete implementation of its climate agenda through the introduction of the National Integrated Electricity Policy, the launch of the Nigerian Climate Investment Platform, and the submission of its NDC 3.0. Key energy initiatives include the National Public Sector Solarisation Initiative and the expansion of mini-grids via the Nigeria Electrification Project. The country also established a National Carbon Market Framework and advanced the Nigerian Gas Flaring Commercialisation Programme to reduce emissions while boosting power generation.

In 2025, African nations faced a fragmented global order characterized by US strategic retrenchment and intensifying competition over critical minerals. The year was marked by the first G20 summit on African soil in South Africa, which pushed for reforms in sovereign credit rating practices and international financial support. While some states like Nigeria and Kenya increased domestic resource mobilization to counter US aid cuts, others in the Horn of Africa became focal points for geopolitical rivalry involving Israel and Gulf Arab states. Additionally, the Lobito Corridor emerged as a key site for US and EU efforts to counter Chinese dominance in critical mineral supply chains, though this development is accompanied by governance risks in the DRC and Zambia.

Following COP30 in Belém, the adoption of the Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), the extension of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC), and the development of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) create a critical window for African countries to reshape multilateral technology cooperation. The author argues that without scaled concessional finance and a shift away from loan-based instruments, these institutional changes risk reinforcing import dependence and debt distress. The document outlines a strategic roadmap for the African Group from 2026 to 2028, focusing on securing a suitable CTC host, influencing JTM operationalisation, and proposing specific technology-justice indicators to ensure that green innovation benefits African national innovation systems rather than remaining a donor-driven process.

In 2025, African states navigated a multipolar landscape marked by a transactional US approach under the second Trump administration, which led to aid cuts and a push for domestic resource mobilisation in countries like Nigeria and Kenya. The AU-EU partnership faced skepticism over the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), while South Africa's hosting of the G20 Summit resulted in the G20 Africa Engagement Framework and proposals to reform sovereign credit rating practices. Geopolitical competition intensified in the Horn of Africa, exacerbated by Israel's recognition of Somaliland, and along the Lobito Corridor, where the US and EU compete with China to secure critical mineral supply chains and midstream processing capacity.

The report assesses how the African Organization for Standardisation (ARSO) can align its regional agriculture and forestry standards with the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) to protect market access for African producers. While ARSO possesses a strong governance framework and chain-of-custody requirements, it lacks mandatory forest conversion cut-off dates, plot-level geolocation mapping, and public transparency regarding audit methods. The document argues that updating these standards to match EUDR's strict no-exemption rules and data requirements is essential for African exporters to meet compliance deadlines by late 2026 for large companies and mid-2027 for smaller enterprises.

The report examines Africa's green technology transition in 2025, highlighting how tightening global trade rules, such as the EU's CBAM and the uncertainty surrounding AGOA, alongside the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, have created economic pressures. It details multilateral outcomes from COP30, including the Belém Package's goal to triple adaptation finance by 2035, and continental efforts like the African Single Electricity Market and the goal to mobilise $50 billion annually for climate solutions. The text emphasizes the critical need for affordable decarbonisation finance and measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) capacity to prevent the marginalisation of African firms.

The report examines Africa's green tech transition in 2025, highlighting the challenges posed by the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and the expiration of AGOA. It details continental efforts to mobilize $50 billion annually for climate solutions and the progress toward an African Single Electricity Market, while noting the emerging role of AI in climate action and the need for a just transition to prevent the marginalization of smaller firms.

The GCF's 2025 administrative budget saw a total expenditure of USD 131.7 million, representing 98% of the approved USD 134.5 million budget. While the Board and Secretariat remained broadly within their budget envelopes, the Trustee's expenditure reached 130% of its budget due to higher-than-expected average annual cash balances. The independent units' execution was 88% overall, with the Independent Evaluation Unit spending 82% of its budget. Significant year-on-year increases in Secretariat spending were noted in travel (48%) and consultants (41%), driven by record programme delivery of USD 3.26 billion across 50 projects in 2025.

The evaluation concludes that the SAP has become operationally ineffective, failing to deliver on its promises of simplification and acceleration. While it has provided unintended value as a 'stepping-stone' for Direct Access Entities (DAEs) to build institutional capacity, it is now virtually indistinguishable from the standard Project Approval Process (PAP). The report recommends discontinuing the SAP in its current form and replacing it with a new, integrated access modality featuring delegated authority and a focus on replicating proven interventions rather than piloting new ideas.

The report examines the challenges and opportunities for African energy exporters facing the EU Methane Regulation, which imposes extraterritorial monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards on imports. While Africa accounts for nearly 13% of global methane emissions, the continent faces significant financing gaps and technical barriers to compliance. The authors argue that while the regulation threatens export revenues, it provides a strategic opportunity to adopt low-cost abatement technologies. Key recommendations include mobilising innovative financing like transition bonds, establishing local independent verification capacity, and harmonising MRV standards to maintain market access to the EU.