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The report examines produced capital—human-made assets used in production—across Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago from 1995 to 2020. It finds that while produced capital has grown, levels remain low compared to developed nations and are heavily concentrated in a few sectors, such as petroleum in Trinidad and Tobago and manufacturing and real estate in Ethiopia and Indonesia. This concentration creates economic risks and hinders the transition to renewable energy and sustainable agriculture. The authors argue that the lack of regular measurement of produced capital by national statistical offices leaves policy-makers blind to these structural challenges, underscoring the need to move beyond GDP toward comprehensive wealth metrics.

The report analyzes Indonesia's Comprehensive Wealth Index (CWI), which grew by an average of 4.3% annually between 1995 and 2020, driven primarily by human and produced capital. However, real per capita GDP grew more slowly at 2.8%, indicating a declining rate of return on wealth from 6.8% in 1995 to 4.8% in 2020. The study highlights inefficiencies in natural resource management and a lack of investment in renewable energy, suggesting that better asset management could have pushed Indonesia into the World Bank's upper-middle-income category by 2020.

The report finds that while Trinidad and Tobago's GDP grew between 1995 and 2020, its real comprehensive wealth per capita has declined by 36% since the 2008 global recession. This divergence is attributed to an over-reliance on fossil fuel assets, which have seen a nearly 98% loss in value over the study period. The analysis highlights a 'Dutch Disease' effect, where investment in the petroleum sector has crowded out agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Human capital, the largest component of wealth, also declined by 29% from its 2008 peak. The report recommends that the government integrate comprehensive wealth measures into official policy-making to diversify the economy and ensure long-term sustainability.

The document argues that the global transition to renewable energy, specifically wind and solar, frequently results in 'green colonialism' where Indigenous rights to self-determination and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) are ignored. It documents human rights violations and land-grabbing in countries such as Kenya, Norway, Colombia, and Mexico, noting that Indigenous communities often respond through litigation, protest, and efforts to secure project ownership. The authors recommend the formal recognition of Indigenous rights, the strict application of FPIC, the implementation of Indigenous-led environmental impact assessments, and the promotion of Indigenous ownership to ensure a just transition.

The report finds that BP's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over climate solutions, with 2023 investments in oil and gas being 11.6 times higher than those in low-carbon energy. BP has revised its 2030 oil and gas production targets upward and reduced its scope 3 decarbonization targets, leading to a projected 2030 production level 26% above NZE alignment. While BP aims for 10 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, it will still produce 23 times more energy from fossil fuels than from renewables. The report also highlights BP's continued development of gas power and reliance on bioenergy and hydrogen, which may not be sustainable.

The report finds that Eni's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over renewable energy, leading to projected 2030 production levels that significantly exceed NZE requirements. While Eni is diversifying into renewables and bioenergy, these remain marginal compared to its fossil fuel core, and its decarbonization plan relies heavily on unproven carbon capture and offset technologies.

The report finds that Equinor's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over renewable energy, with 2023 investments in oil and gas being 6.2 times higher than those in renewables. The analysis indicates that Equinor's 2030 production targets will be 61% higher than levels required for NZE alignment, and the company continues to develop 'climate bombs' in the Barents Sea and Vaca Muerta. Furthermore, Equinor is expanding its gas power capacity by 80% by 2030 and lacks a specific target for scope 3 emissions, which constitute 96% of its total emissions.

The report finds that Repsol's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas and shareholder returns over renewable energy, with 2030 production targets projected to be 65% higher than those required for NZE alignment. While the company is diversifying into renewables and hydrogen, these remain marginal, with oil and gas expected to constitute over 70% of its energy mix by 2030. Additionally, the report notes that Repsol's scope 3 emission targets are less ambitious than its scope 1 and 2 targets, and its carbon intensity target for 2030 is 21.9% higher than the NZE.

Reclaim Finance finds that Shell's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over renewable energy, leading to production levels and LNG capacities that significantly exceed NZE requirements by 2030. The report notes that Shell has reduced its carbon intensity targets and relies heavily on unproven carbon capture and offsets, while its renewable energy growth remains marginal compared to its fossil fuel output.

The report concludes that TotalEnergies' strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over the energy transition. It finds that the company's 2030 production targets and LNG capacity expansions significantly overshoot NZE limits, while its renewable energy growth relies primarily on acquisitions rather than organic development. Furthermore, the report argues that TotalEnergies' diversification into gas power, blue hydrogen, and bioenergy is unsustainable and that its emissions targets rely heavily on unproven carbon capture and offset technologies.

The methodology focuses on indicators with a 2030 horizon to align with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal. It evaluates companies across five main dimensions: current energy production (using a fossil fuel equivalence method to compare renewables and fossil fuels), cash-flow allocation (analyzing CAPEX for exploration versus low-carbon solutions), fossil fuel strategy (assessing upstream expansion and production overshoot relative to the IEA Net Zero Emissions scenario), diversification strategy (projecting 2030 energy mixes), and emission targets (calculating carbon intensity excess and reliance on CCUS and offsets). The analysis covers 6 European companies (BP, Eni, Equinor, Repsol, Shell, TotalEnergies), 2 US companies (Chevron, ExxonMobil), and 4 National Oil Companies (ADNOC, Petrobras, QatarEnergy, Saudi Aramco).

The report argues that while ENGIE has ambitious renewable energy targets, its overall climate plan is not aligned with a 1.5°C trajectory due to continued investments in fossil gas infrastructure, long-term LNG contracts for fracked US gas, and a reliance on immature technologies like CCUS and large-scale renewable gas. It highlights a lack of precise intermediate absolute emission targets and insufficient methane reporting as key governance failures.

The research examines the drivers, barriers, and 'seeds' of circular economy (CE) practices within the SADC region, arguing for a contextually sensitive approach that moves beyond Global North narratives. It identifies critical drivers such as rapid urbanisation, e-waste challenges, and climate change, while highlighting systemic barriers including lack of uniform regulatory frameworks and knowledge disparities. The authors propose a multi-level resource use system that integrates indigenous solutions with disruptive technologies and recommends regional collaboration through the SADC Secretariat and AU to harmonise CE strategic frameworks, fiscal policies, and educational curricula.

The document maps the governance landscape of the WTO regarding trade and the environment. It details the roles of various committees, the dispute settlement mechanism, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in monitoring and negotiating environmental measures. It also highlights three major member-led initiatives—TESSD, DPP, and FFSR—and the role of the WTO Secretariat in facilitating information exchange and technical assistance to support sustainable development and climate goals.

The document analyzes the global landscape of fossil fuel subsidies (FFS), noting that they typically total around $600 billion annually and double during price crises. It argues that FFS drive greenhouse gas emissions and market distortions, and that the WTO is uniquely positioned to facilitate reform through transparency, capacity building, and the development of international disciplines. The author prioritizes the reform of subsidies for transport consumers, residential consumers, and oil and gas producers, while emphasizing the need for just transition principles to protect vulnerable populations, particularly in developing countries.

The report alleges that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided a $600 million loan to Indonesia's state-run utility, Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), which lacks a 'no-coal' clause and may be used to fund coal expansion, including the Java 9 & 10 project. This contradicts ADB's public climate pledges and its October 2021 Energy Policy. The report highlights the severe health and environmental impacts of coal in Banten Province, where the Suralaya Power Station operates, and criticizes the lack of financial transparency as loan proceeds are mixed into PLN's general account.

The briefing critiques the G20's "Better, Bolder and Bigger" MDB reform framework, arguing that its focus on leveraging private capital and streamlining processes undermines accountability, ignores debt vulnerabilities in developing nations, and fails to ensure a genuine fossil fuel phaseout. It highlights risks associated with large-scale renewable energy projects and the lack of gender-sensitive policies, urging a shift toward grants-based financing, stronger safeguards, and democratized decision-making.

The report finds that global coal capacity reached a historic high in 2023, increasing by 48.4 GW to a total of 2,130 GW. While new construction starts reached a nine-year low outside of China, China saw an eight-year high in new starts. Only 15% of global operating coal capacity has commitments to close in line with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal. In Indonesia, the report highlights a surge in 'captive' coal plants supporting nickel smelting, noting that 27.5% of Indonesia's operating coal capacity is captive. Despite the US$20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), Indonesia's early retirement targets for coal plants shrank from 5.5 GW to 1.7 GW in late 2023.

The report finds that while most countries are reducing coal proposals, global operating capacity grew by 48.4 GW in 2023, primarily driven by China. It highlights a stark divergence between China's construction surge and a record low in new starts elsewhere, while noting that only 15% of global operating coal capacity has a Paris-aligned retirement commitment.

The document examines the intersection of South Africa's energy transition and the interdependencies of water, energy, and food security. It identifies significant barriers to policy coherence, including institutional silos, budget cuts to environmental departments, and the political influence of the coal lobby and agricultural sector. The brief concludes that without an integrated framework, the transition risks perpetuating unsustainable coal practices and exacerbating social inequalities, particularly in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga.