Search Climate Insights Directory

The briefing note argues that trade policy should avoid creating a "two-speed global economy" by balancing regulatory requirements ("sticks") with support measures ("carrots"). It suggests that WTO members adopt principles from international environmental law—such as Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)—and employ a data-driven diagnostic process to identify specific barriers to green transitions across different commodities and levels of development.

The authors argue that any climate compatibility checkpoint for UK oil and gas licensing must be based on a rapid wind-down of production consistent with 1.5°C pathways. They highlight that while different IPCC scenarios vary in their assumptions regarding carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and methane reductions, all require production to peak by 2020 for oil and 2025 for gas. The authors suggest that as a high-income country with low revenue dependence on fossil fuels, the UK should adopt a precautionary approach and potentially decrease production faster than the global average to ensure an equitable transition. They further refute the claim that reducing UK production would not impact global emissions, citing empirical evidence that supply reductions increase prices and lower global consumption.

The polluter-pays principle (PPP) requires those who produce pollution to bear the costs of managing it to prevent damage to human health and the environment. While established in the European Union and OECD, it is not yet a customary international norm due to ambiguities in defining 'the polluter' and varying national implementations. In climate change law, the PPP informs debates on loss and damage and is indirectly present in the Paris Agreement through nationally determined contributions and climate finance. The document suggests that combining the PPP with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) could help the Global North absorb costs for environmental harms caused in the Global South.

The polluter-pays principle (PPP) requires that the costs of pollution be borne by those responsible for causing it. While established in the EU and OECD, it is not a customary international norm due to varying state definitions and implementation complexities. In climate law, the PPP is relevant to loss and damage and carbon pricing, though it is not explicitly mentioned in the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, or Paris Agreement. The document suggests that combining the PPP with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) could ensure that Global North entities absorb the costs of environmental harms caused in the Global South.

The document argues that progress on loss and damage (L&D) finance has been stalled by disagreements over liability and compensation. It proposes a near-term 'solidarity-based' approach to unlock funding without requiring strict legal liability, while advocating for the eventual creation of a formal L&D mechanism within the UNFCCC. The authors emphasize that L&D finance must be additional to mitigation and adaptation funding and should be distributed based on a needs-based approach prioritizing the most vulnerable populations.

The document traces the history of international climate governance, highlighting the shift from the 'top-down' Kyoto Protocol to the 'bottom-up' Paris Agreement. It analyzes the central tension between ensuring universal participation and maintaining the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). While the Paris Agreement achieved universality by allowing self-differentiation through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the brief notes that current collective pledges are insufficient to limit warming to 1.5°C or 2°C, and that the regime's success depends on the ambition of major emitters.

The report traces the shift in international climate policy from the 'top-down' prescriptive approach of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which targeted developed nations, to the 'bottom-up' participatory model of the 2015 Paris Agreement. It highlights the central role of the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (CBDR) principle and argues that while the Paris Agreement achieved universal participation, current national commitments remain insufficient to limit global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C.

The document argues that the World Heritage Committee should not defer climate mitigation issues to the UNFCCC, as state parties have independent obligations under the World Heritage Convention to protect properties from climate change. It asserts that site-level mitigation and adaptation are insufficient for highly vulnerable sites like coral reefs and glaciers, which require warming to be limited to well below 1.5°C. The briefing recommends using the List of World Heritage in Danger to enforce corrective measures based on a state's alignment with global emissions pathways.

Carbon Market Watch calls for the EU to adopt more ambitious climate targets, specifically a 65% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2040, to remain consistent with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal and the 'do no harm' principle.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU should replace the free allocation of emission allowances in the EU ETS with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to ensure polluters pay for their emissions. The organization asserts there is no evidence of carbon leakage and proposes that a CBAM should be used as a tool for international climate diplomacy, exempt Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, and be based on carbon performance benchmarks for sectors including steel, cement, chemicals, and power.

The 2019 Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference, the longest in UNFCCC history, failed to reach a consensus on the operationalization of Article 6 regarding market and non-market mechanisms. While the conference achieved progress on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the Lima Work Programme on Gender, it was marked by significant disconnects between scientific demands for ambition and the limitations of multilateral negotiations. Key unresolved issues, including long-term climate finance and common time frames for NDCs, were deferred to future sessions under Rule 16.

The Bangkok Climate Change Conference focused on operationalizing the Paris Agreement through the PAWP, covering mitigation, adaptation, finance, and transparency. While some technical progress was made in streamlining negotiating texts, overall progress was characterized as "uneven," with significant deadlocks remaining over climate finance (Article 9.5) and the principle of differentiation in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

The document outlines India's approach to climate change, emphasizing the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) and its commitment to the Paris Agreement despite the US withdrawal. It highlights India's challenges with erratic weather, forest fires, and water shortages, while noting its continued reliance on coal alongside growing renewable energy. The report identifies five key areas for potential India-Norway cooperation: CO2 sequestration in Enhanced Oil Recovery, mini-hydro power and turbine retrofitting, REDD+ pilots for ecosystem restoration, smart grid solutions for renewables, and R&D in biogas from waste.

India has transitioned from a 'custodian' role for the global South, strictly adhering to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), toward a more proactive and pragmatic leadership style. While professional negotiators have historically maintained rigid positions based on equity and historical emissions, political leadership—notably during the Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban COPs—has shown a greater willingness to shift toward binding commitments and transparency. India now emphasizes solar power collaboration and the implementation of the Paris Agreement while continuing to demand green technology transfer from developed nations.

The report assesses the legal responsibilities of states to protect World Heritage-listed coral reefs, using the Great Barrier Reef as a case study. It argues that Australia, as a high per-capita emitter with significant resources, is failing its obligations by not sufficiently reducing greenhouse gas emissions, permitting new fossil fuel infrastructure in the Galilee Basin, and failing to mitigate non-climate stressors such as the expansion of the Abbot Point coal port. The document recommends that the World Heritage Committee inscribe the Great Barrier Reef on the List of World Heritage in Danger.

A coalition of European NGOs calls on the EU to intervene in ICAO negotiations to prevent the weakening of the Global Market Based Measure (GMBM). The authors demand the resolution of exemptions through fair differentiation, a strict 2020 deadline for any pilot phases, the protection of the EU's right to implement more ambitious regional measures, and the alignment of accounting methods between ICAO and the UNFCCC to avoid double counting.

Friends of the Earth International concludes that the Paris Agreement fails to provide climate justice, citing a lack of binding emissions targets for developed nations, insufficient financial commitments for developing countries, and the absence of concrete mechanisms for loss and damage reparations. The organization criticizes the agreement for not mentioning renewable energy or energy efficiency and for leaving the door open to 'false solutions' like carbon markets and geoengineering.

Friends of the Earth International concludes that the Paris Agreement fails the 'People’s Test on Climate' due to a lack of binding emissions targets, insufficient financial commitments for developing nations, and the absence of protections for vulnerable communities. The assessment highlights that the agreement does not mandate a phase-out of fossil fuels, lacks mentions of renewable energy or energy efficiency, and relies on unproven technologies like BECCS. Furthermore, it argues that the agreement weakens the principle of 'Common But Differentiated Responsibilities' and excludes compensation and liability for loss and damage.

The SAIIA Youth Policy Committee (YPC) advocates for a legally binding agreement at COP21 that emphasizes high ambition, the integration of adaptation and mitigation, and predictable finance for developing countries. The YPC calls for the inclusion of an adaptation goal in the Paris agreement, the use of indigenous knowledge in local strategies, and the implementation of 'no regret' and flexible adaptation strategies. It further argues that developed countries must fund these efforts and that climate change should be integrated into school curricula to maintain youth commitment.

The document outlines the transition from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which ended in September 2015, to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as part of the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda ending in 2030. It details the role of the 30-member Open Working Group (OWG) in creating 17 goals and 169 targets through a consultative process involving civil society. The text defines sustainable development based on the 1987 Brundtland report and discusses the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), which acknowledges that developed countries bear greater responsibility for environmental degradation. It also highlights South Africa's role in negotiating the SDGs via the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and its leadership of the G77+ China group.