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The handbook traces G20 engagements with Africa from 2008 to 2025, noting a transition from ad hoc initiatives to structured partnerships, culminating in the African Union's permanent membership in 2023. While identifying successes in rural youth employment and financial inclusion, it highlights persistent implementation gaps in infrastructure and climate finance. The document maps G20 outcomes against AU Agenda 2063, finding strong alignment with economic integration but gaps in peace and institutional capacity. It also details South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency priorities, focusing on solidarity, equality, and sustainability through specific task forces on inclusive growth, food security, and AI.

The report finds that the world is off-track to meet all SDG7 targets by 2030. While electricity access has improved, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 85% of the remaining deficit. Clean cooking access is severely lagging, with 2.1 billion people lacking access. Renewable energy shares in total final energy consumption are stagnating, and energy intensity improvements are insufficient, requiring a 4% annual increase to meet goals.

The study assesses the vulnerability of the Boyacá-Santander region to climate change, projecting temperature increases between 1.3°C and 2.4°C by 2040-2070. It identifies significant risks to surface and groundwater availability, particularly in the northeast, and uses econometric modeling to project negative impacts on agricultural production, municipal value added, and social indicators such as multidimensional poverty and education. The authors recommend diversifying climate finance, improving intersectoral coordination, and implementing specific hydrogeological interventions like artificial aquifer recharge in the Middle Magdalena Valley.

The report examines the role of risk mitigation and transfer (RMT) instruments in supporting utility-scale wind and solar projects in East Africa. Through six case studies, it finds that while RMT tools—such as political risk insurance, guarantees, and blended finance—are essential for reaching financial close, risks remain high due to macroeconomic instability, currency volatility, and utility financial strain. The analysis highlights a 'start-stop cycle' in countries like Kenya, where rapid deployment led to overcapacity and subsequent government moratoriums on new contracts. Conversely, the GET FiT program in Uganda is presented as a successful model of systematic de-risking through transparent procurement and institutional support.

The document argues that there are no credible pathways to tackle the climate crisis without trade policies aligned with the Paris Agreement. It identifies key areas for cooperation, including the management of climate-trade tensions (such as the EU's CBAM), the acceleration of clean energy transitions, and the decarbonization of industrial sectors like shipping and steel. A central theme is the need for 'climate justice,' ensuring that developing nations are not marginalized by green industrial policies or unilateral trade measures. The report proposes several mechanisms for progress, including the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade (IFCCT) proposed for COP30, the 'greening' of Aid for Trade (AfT), and the development of regional green trade blocs like a potential arrangement within the RCEP. It emphasizes that a just transition requires bridging the gap between the WTO and UNFCCC, harmonizing carbon accounting standards, and increasing climate finance for adaptation in the Global South.

The Mancomunidad del Chocó Andino (MCA) in Ecuador manages a 124,000-hectare mosaic of conservation areas, including private reserves and biosphere components, to protect high biodiversity against extractive threats. While the MCA employs a participatory governance model involving local governments and community networks, it faces significant challenges from state-led mining concessions, land tenure insecurity, and fragmented financing. The document argues that the OECM framework could strengthen the MCA by providing legal recognition of local control and facilitating access to sustainable funding, provided it avoids top-down administrative burdens.

The report examines Bolivia's conservation landscape, highlighting a tension between formal state strategies and local practices. While Bolivia has a robust system of protected areas and land tenure, conservation outside these areas is often hindered by state priorities favoring extractivism and agribusiness. The document argues that indigenous territories and community-led initiatives offer significant potential for OECM recognition, provided that the state shifts toward a more inclusive, less bureaucratic, and better-funded support system that aligns with local livelihoods.

The report examines Ecuador's conservation landscape, highlighting the tension between a strong legal framework for biodiversity and a dominant extractivist economic model. It evaluates various conservation modalities, including the SNAP and OECMs, and argues that for OECMs to be truly inclusive, they must move beyond symbolic recognition to provide tangible benefits, secure land tenure, and respect the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

The document examines ACOMAD, an association of 15 members managing 16 forest concessions (approximately 171,424 hectares) in the Manu-Tambopata corridor of Madre de Dios, Peru. It highlights the contrast between the highly resourced Los Amigos conservation concession—the first recognized OECM in Peru—and other members who rely on limited self-funding or sporadic international aid. Key challenges include illegal mining, illicit crops, land trafficking, and a lack of consistent state supervision by OSINFOR. The report argues for stronger public institutional support, official recognition of Technical Forestry and Wildlife Administrations (ATFFS) as Regional Authorities (ARFFS), and the development of sustainable economic models such as ecotourism and non-timber forest products (e.g., Brazil nuts and aguaje) to ensure long-term conservation viability.

Reclaim Finance and 19 youth and student organizations have issued an open letter to Agirc-Arrco, ERAFP, and the Fonds de réserve pour les retraites, urging them to stop funding the development of coal, oil, and gas. The signatories argue that continued investment in fossil fuel companies, such as TotalEnergies and BP, and the use of asset managers like BlackRock, contradicts scientific goals to limit global warming to 1.5°C and threatens the future stability, health, and security of young people.

The joint statement argues that while the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) can transform Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) into clean industry hubs, it risks exacerbating regional disparities due to the CEE's narrower fiscal margins and higher energy costs compared to other EU states. To prevent industrial decline driven by 'subsidy races', the authors recommend combining EU content requirements with carbon and circularity criteria, establishing common EU labels for green steel, cement, and chemicals, and implementing Green Public Procurement (GPP) mandates. Specifically, the statement suggests that GPP mandates for low-carbon materials in infrastructure could increase public procurement budgets in CEE by between +0.11% in Austria and +1.35% in Romania. The authors also call for equitable access to EU-level funding and streamlined permitting for cross-border hydrogen and CO2 infrastructure to address the region's high energy costs.

The report identifies that the current EU public procurement framework is fragmented and voluntary, leading to missed opportunities for emissions reductions despite nearly EUR 2 trillion in annual public spending. It proposes a roadmap for the European Commission to revise the directives, specifically recommending a 'comply-or-explain' approach to make green public procurement the default, tying 'Buy European' preferences to environmental performance, and simplifying legal requirements to reduce uncertainty for buyers.

South Africa's green technology transfer ecosystem is characterized by a comprehensive but fragmented policy landscape that creates tensions between social equity goals and climate urgency. While the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) demonstrates successful public-private collaboration, other sectors struggle with institutional silos and a significant gap in funding for the commercialization of research. Key barriers include conflicting localisation requirements and data regulations that may act as non-tariff barriers to foreign investment.

Climate Strategies reflects on COP30, noting disappointments over fossil fuel phase-out language and adaptation funding, while highlighting the creation of the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade (IFCCT) and the proposal for a Just Transition Mechanism. The organization also notes Colombia's commitment to host a global diplomatic conference on fossil fuel transitions in April 2026.

South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency has partially succeeded in raising global awareness of Africa's difficulties in accessing affordable development finance, though it has failed to secure concrete agreements on IMF reform or the restructuring of the G20 Common Framework. The document highlights systemic barriers including credit rating agency practices and the slow, creditor-biased nature of debt restructuring for countries like Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia. To maintain momentum, South Africa has established an African Expert Panel to advise President Cyril Ramaphosa on technical recommendations for finance and IMF governance.

Nigeria holds 33 percent of Africa's gas reserves and is implementing the 'Decade of Gas' (2021-2030) to transition toward a gas-powered economy. While the country is a top global LNG exporter, it faces significant internal challenges, including high gas flaring (188 Bcf in 2022), inadequate pipeline infrastructure, and poor payment discipline in the power sector. The document argues that natural gas can serve as a bridge fuel toward Nigeria's net-zero 2060 goal and a catalyst for African industrialization in sectors like fertilizers and petrochemicals. However, the global energy transition is leading International Oil Companies (IOCs) to divest from onshore assets, and geopolitical instability—specifically Niger's 2023 coup—threatens major cross-border projects like the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline.

In 2025, Europe transitioned toward commercial-scale CCS deployment, marked by the first fully operational value chain at Norway's Brevik cement plant. While ten projects reached final investment decisions (FID) between December 2024 and October 2025—adding approximately 4 Mt CO2/year of capture and 14 Mt CO2/year of storage capacity—deployment remains far below the trajectories needed for 2040 and 2050 climate targets. Progress is heavily reliant on blended finance and corporate carbon dioxide removal (CDR) offtake agreements, particularly with Microsoft. Geographically, CCS is expanding from Northern European hubs into Southern and Central & Eastern Europe, with new projects in Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary. Policy advancements include the Net-Zero Industry Act's 2030 injection target and Germany's 2025 legislation classifying CO2 transport and storage as projects of overriding public interest.

The document examines the role of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) as a cost-effective tool for Canada to achieve its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). It highlights that internal decarbonization, particularly in heavy industry, is increasingly expensive, whereas ITMOs allow Canada to account for verified emissions reductions achieved abroad. The author suggests that by integrating ITMOs into its trade and financial strategies, Canada can open new markets for its clean technologies, such as methane reduction and advanced manufacturing. Using Japan's Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) as a model, the briefing recommends that Canada establish a national coordination mechanism involving multiple government departments to manage bilateral agreements and mobilize private investment.

The Canadian Climate Institute argues that Canada is currently off track to meet its 2026 and 2030 emissions targets. To make the upcoming federal progress report useful, the Institute recommends providing detailed policy implementation updates, using rigorous and recent emissions projections based on actual policy rather than backcasting, offering a substantive assessment of additional measures to close the emissions gap, and introducing new progress indicators beyond simple emissions reductions.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that the Clean Electricity Regulations (CER) are critical for providing the long-term predictability needed by risk-averse utilities and regulators to invest in clean energy. By setting emission limits for fossil fuel-burning generation that reach zero tonnes per gigawatt hour by 2050, the CER complements industrial carbon pricing and Investment Tax Credits to lower the cost of capital for decarbonization. The author emphasizes that while the CER allows for provincial flexibility and equivalency agreements, a stable federal standard is necessary to prevent provincial rollbacks—such as Saskatchewan's decision to extend coal plant life—from undermining Canada's overall emissions targets.