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A coalition of European civil society organisations urges the EU to align its Industrial Strategy with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target, advocating for climate neutrality by 2040 and a 65% emissions reduction by 2030. The recommendations emphasize a transition to a circular economy, the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies, and the prioritisation of renewable electrification over hydrogen and CCS. The authors call for a 'just transition' that protects vulnerable communities and workers through retraining and the exclusion of fossil fuel investments from the Just Transition Mechanism.

The analysis concludes that climate neutrality in Estonia by 2050 is potentially profitable in the long term, requiring an estimated investment of 17.3 billion euros between 2021 and 2050. The majority of these costs (approximately 13.1 billion euros) would be borne by the private sector. The report emphasizes that delaying strategic decisions will increase costs and complexity. Key priorities for 2021-2030 include accelerating energy efficiency in buildings, transport, and industry, transitioning electricity and heat production to renewables, and establishing national carbon sequestration goals for the LULUCF sector. While the initial investment phase (2021-2030) will see costs exceed revenues, the long-term weighted average marginal cost is negative, meaning revenues will eventually exceed costs. The report warns that new oil shale production plants would significantly increase the risk of failing to reach climate neutrality due to added emissions and high regulatory risks.

The Clean Air Task Force supports the Enhancing Fossil Fuel Energy Carbon Technology Act, which proposes four new programs for the research, development, and demonstration of transformational CCUS technologies for industrial sources and coal- and gas-fueled power. The organization argues that such investments are essential for cost reduction and complement the 45Q tax credit.

The document assesses the failure of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to reduce emissions in heavy industry due to free pollution permits and inadequate sectoral plans. It proposes a transition based on electrification, circular economy models, and breakthrough technologies like hydrogen-based steelmaking, while calling for the phase-out of free allowances and the introduction of green public procurement.

The report analyzes the HYBRIT process, which replaces coal with hydrogen for the direct reduction of iron ore combined with an electric arc furnace to create fossil-free steel. While technically feasible and potentially cost-competitive depending on electricity and carbon prices, the transition faces systemic barriers including high investment risks, the need for large-scale electrolysis infrastructure, and the risk of carbon leakage in a globally competitive market.

The FUTURE Act provides tax credits for CO2 captured from power plants, industrial sources, and direct air capture, with rates ramping up to $50/ton for saline storage and $35/ton for enhanced oil recovery by 2026. The credits are available for 12 years to projects that commence construction within a six-year window. Assessments by the IEA and DOE suggest the act could increase capture capacity or reduce emissions by 10 to 30 million tons by 2030, with significant interest from industrial sources and companies like Occidental Petroleum.

The report analyzes two pathways for China's coal transition: a PEAK-2030 scenario aligned with its INDC and a more ambitious PEAK-2025 scenario. It argues that an early peak is possible through stringent policies in the power, industry, and building sectors, while emphasizing the need to manage socio-economic risks such as stranded assets in the electricity sector and job losses in coal-producing regions. The analysis highlights significant co-benefits for air quality and public health, as well as the potential for reducing methane emissions from coal mining.

The report proposes 'Inclusion of Consumption' (IoC) as a way to ensure carbon prices are reflected in the cost of materials like steel and cement, which are currently shielded by free allowance allocations in emissions trading schemes. By adding a charge to the consumption of these materials based on benchmarks, the IoC aims to incentivize material efficiency and innovation without harming competitiveness. The authors argue that IoC is administratively feasible, compliant with WTO law, and qualifies as an environmental regulation under EU law.

The briefing reports a significant increase in Google Ads by oil companies globally and specifically in Brazil leading up to COP30 in November 2025. It highlights that while global oil ads spiked by 218% in October 2025, ads targeting Brazil increased by 2,900%, with Petrobras accounting for nearly 70% of these. The document argues that these campaigns are part of a broader disinformation strategy to secure a 'social licence' for continued fossil fuel investment, contrasting public 'green' narratives with actual investment patterns and environmental records. It recommends increased regulatory intervention, including a potential ban on fossil fuel advertising similar to tobacco regulations.

The Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act (IIJA) allocates $12.1 billion toward carbon management, representing the largest single investment in the sector since 1997. The funding is distributed across four primary areas: carbon capture, utilization & storage (CCUS) research, development, and demonstration (RD&D); carbon transport and storage infrastructure and permitting; carbon utilization market development; and carbon removal priorities. Key allocations include $3.5 billion for four regional direct air capture (DAC) hubs and $2.5 billion for the CO2 Storage Commercialization Program. The document notes that IIJA provides the necessary RD&D and infrastructure, while the proposed Build Back Better Act (BBBA) was intended to provide the market incentives via 45Q tax credit enhancements.

The document identifies cement manufacturing as responsible for 1.1% of total U.S. emissions, with 60% of those emissions stemming from the chemical process of calcination. It highlights three primary decarbonization pathways: feedstock substitutions and alternative production processes (including non-kiln pathways), clinker substitution using materials like slag or calcined clays, and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS). To accelerate adoption, the document recommends low-interest loans, public procurement standards requiring Environmental Product Declarations (EPDs), state-funded pilot programs, and Contracts for Difference (CfDs).

The U.S. iron and steel sector accounts for 1.0% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, totaling 63 MMT CO2e. While 70% of U.S. steel is already produced via electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which emit 75–90% less CO2 than blast furnaces when using clean energy, the remaining 30% of production relies on coal-fired blast furnaces. Key decarbonization pathways include expanding EAF capacity, deploying carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) for existing blast furnaces, and scaling hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (H2-DRI). Recommended state-level policies include providing low-interest loans or grants for capital financing, setting low-carbon procurement standards for public projects, and supporting clean hydrogen hub development.

The document outlines Poland's position as the EU's third-largest greenhouse gas emitter and advocates for the deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) to decarbonize energy-intensive industries. It highlights Poland's significant geological storage potential, exceeding 15 Gt of CO2, and discusses specific projects like GO4ECOPLANET and ECO2CEE. The text emphasizes that developing domestic storage and transport infrastructure is critical to reducing costs and avoiding high EU ETS emission fees.

The position paper calls for a comprehensive German carbon management strategy that integrates CO2 capture, transport, and storage (CCS) and utilization (CCU). It emphasizes the need for quantifiable targets for technical CO2 sinks, a modernized legal framework—specifically updating the Carbon Storage Act (KSpG)—and financial incentives like Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) to make these technologies economically viable. The authors advocate for enabling offshore CO2 storage in the German North Sea and facilitating international transport through the ratification of the London Protocol amendment.

The document argues for the urgent development of domestic geological CO2 storage in France to avoid long transport routes and high costs. It recommends implementing Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) to incentivize industrial adoption, accelerating the timeline for projects like Pycasso, and adopting a regulated infrastructure model similar to the UK's to ensure open access for diverse industrial emitters. While acknowledging CO2 utilization (CCU), it prioritizes permanent geological storage for maximum climate impact.

Alberta faces significant economic risks due to its high concentration of workers and GDP tied to transition-vulnerable sectors, particularly oil and gas. While the province has established a foothold in low-carbon electricity, hydrogen, and CCUS, growth is hindered by mixed policy signals and a geographic mismatch between new opportunity companies in cities and vulnerable workers in rural areas.

British Columbia is positioning itself for the low-carbon transition by leveraging a low-emissions electricity grid and a growing clean technology sector, though it faces risks from its reliance on metallurgical coal and natural gas exports. While the province has 175 transition-opportunity companies, primarily concentrated in Metro Vancouver, challenges remain regarding the domestic adoption of these technologies and the alignment of provincial policy to support small and medium-sized domestic firms. Vulnerable workers are concentrated in rural communities and among Indigenous populations, necessitating a shift in support toward new growth areas to ensure economic resilience.

Ontario is well-positioned for the low-carbon transition due to its financial center and manufacturing expertise, but faces significant risks in its automotive and primary metals sectors. While the province leads Canada in the number of transition-opportunity companies, particularly in low-carbon electricity and batteries, progress is hindered by policy inconsistency and a lack of long-term sector-specific strategies. Workforce vulnerability is high in traditional manufacturing hubs, and high public debt may constrain the investment needed for a smooth transition.

The document evaluates seven electricity generation scenarios for Estonia, concluding that 'All technologies' and 'Renewable + Storage' pathways offer the best balance of feasibility and benefit. It identifies a gap of 2.7 GWh to 7 GWh in renewable electricity for 2030 objectives and recommends streamlining planning processes, deploying batteries, and developing offshore wind to meet climate goals.