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The report posits that Asia is leading a 'Great Convergence' with the West by leveraging its position as the world's manufacturing hub to drive an electric energy transition. It highlights that Asia has driven three quarters of global electricity growth since 2000 and now produces the majority of the world's solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. The document argues that while a lack of oil and gas was previously a weakness, it has become a strategic advantage in an era where energy is defined by technology rather than commodities. This transition is further accelerated by 'fossil shocks,' including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the 2022 energy crisis, which push the region toward energy security through electrotechnology.

The briefing examines the impact of energy supply disruptions stemming from the US-Iran war, noting that the current crisis is larger than the 1970s oil embargo. It argues that while governments are using short-term fixes like strategic reserves and subsidies, the long-term solution lies in electrification, demand-side efficiency, and the scaling of 'green molecules' like hydrogen and ammonia. The text highlights specific vulnerabilities in Southeast Asia and the US, and suggests that mitigating methane leakage and flaring could recover energy volumes equivalent to approximately half of worldwide LNG trade.

The document highlights the rapid global growth of solar energy, noting a 31% jump in generation in the first half of 2025 and its cost-effectiveness compared to fossil fuels. It advises journalists to move past 'alternative energy' framing, treat intermittency as a manageable issue rather than a fundamental obstacle, and be skeptical of 'weird solar' innovations that cannot compete with mass-produced panels. The guide also provides specific examples of solar applications, from agrivoltaics in Illinois to mini-grids in Nigeria and resilience hubs in Houston.

The document highlights the economic and legal imperatives for South Korea to strengthen its 2035 NDC, noting strong business support for a transition to renewables and a landmark Constitutional Court ruling requiring more robust climate targets to protect citizens' rights.

Ember's response to the EU Electrification Action Plan call for evidence emphasizes that while technology readiness is not a barrier—with two-thirds of EU energy demand potentially electrifiable today—cost remains the primary obstacle. The organization urges the Commission to rebalance energy taxation, as industrial electricity taxes are on average triple those of gas, and to incentivize smart consumption through dynamic tariffs. Furthermore, Ember advocates for strategic grid planning and increased investment in energy storage and demand-side response to lower total system costs and integrate renewables.

The document analyzes the surging demand for critical minerals driven by the energy transition, the environmental impacts of mining, and the strategic trade policies developing countries can employ to add value to their mineral resources while ensuring climate resilience.

Deep-sea mining targets critical minerals like cobalt and nickel from polymetallic nodules, sulfides, and crusts, primarily in international waters such as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. While proponents argue it can meet surging demand for the energy transition and avoid some terrestrial mining harms, the practice faces significant opposition due to risks of species extinction, disruption of the ocean's carbon sink, and threats to food security in small island states. Commercial exploitation remains stalled as the International Seabed Authority (ISA) has failed to reach a consensus on regulations as of July 2025, though some companies may attempt to bypass this via U.S. domestic law. Alternatives such as scaling up recycling and shifting to LFP or sodium-ion batteries could reduce the necessity of seabed extraction.

Electric vehicle adoption is accelerating globally, with many markets passing critical tipping points. In the United States, the total cost of ownership for light-duty EVs is now lower than for gas-powered cars, despite a projected reduction in savings after September 30, 2025, due to the removal of the federal tax credit. Electric medium- and heavy-duty (MHD) trucks are trending toward cost parity with diesel, with some segments expected to reach it by 2028. Furthermore, advancements in battery recycling could potentially eliminate the need for additional mining by 2040 as minerals enter a circular supply chain.

The Institute for Energy Economics Japan (IEEJ) produces energy forecasts with significantly higher gas demand and carbon emissions than those of the IEA, ExxonMobil, and BP. This is driven by higher projected costs for solar and wind, a preference for thermal power as a backup to renewables, and optimistic forecasts for carbon capture and storage (CCS) deployment. The IEEJ maintains close ties to the Japanese government and industry, while Japan remains a major global financier and trader of gas.

The report argues that Canada can capitalize on the global energy transition by increasing production of cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements. To achieve this, it recommends that the federal government implement financial risk-sharing agreements to mitigate price volatility, support Indigenous self-determination and equity ownership, strengthen provincial mining regulations to meet international environmental standards, and avoid shortening regulatory reviews by cutting environmental or consultation safeguards.

ASEAN electricity demand grew by approximately 50% between 2013 and 2023 and is projected to rise by up to 41% by 2030. While the IEA's Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) targets 100,000 km of transmission line expansion for Southeast Asia between 2021 and 2030, the combined plans of Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and the Philippines total 45,078 km, covering only about 45% of that target. The document argues that grid planning must shift from merely meeting peak demand to managing the intermittency of wind and solar power, which saw cost reductions of 55% and 85% respectively in the decade to 2020.

China has surpassed its 2030 wind and solar capacity targets six years early, with clean electricity meeting 84.2% of additional demand in 2024. However, the report argues that the 'more renewables, more coal' era is ending and the next phase requires a shift from adding capacity to engineering a 'megasystem' involving smart grids, long-duration storage, and industrial electrification. While the 'new three' sectors (solar, batteries, EVs) have driven GDP, they face saturation and competition, making the development of next-generation technologies essential for sustaining China's 'growing by greening' economic strategy.

The author contends that the U.S. administration's decision to exit the Paris Climate Agreement and end international climate finance creates significant risks for the United States. These include the loss of diplomatic soft power, the forfeiture of economic opportunities in a clean energy market projected to exceed $2 trillion by 2035, and the creation of a power vacuum likely to be filled by China or other actors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The text asserts that maintaining a leadership role is essential for U.S. companies to ensure market transparency and harmonization abroad, and warns that domestic policy rollbacks further undermine American innovation and long-term energy competitiveness.

The briefing discusses the impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on U.S. clean manufacturing, noting over $123 billion in announced investments and the potential for 67,000 rural jobs. It explores the role of domestic production of solar panels, batteries, computer chips, and wind turbines in supporting the clean energy transition and community reinvestment.

The re-election of Donald Trump may slow US clean technology deployment through the potential repeal of Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funds and EV tax credits, potentially shifting leadership to emerging economies. The global market for six key technologies—solar PV, wind turbines, EVs, batteries, electrolysers, and heat pumps—is projected to exceed USD 2 trillion by 2035, with global trade reaching USD 575 billion. China currently leads with 70% of the market for these technologies, though it faces risks from proposed US tariffs of 60% on all imports and 100% on EVs. Other nations may benefit: India could become a net exporter of clean technologies by 2035 with annual exports of USD 30 billion, and Brazil is well-positioned in wind turbine blade production, currently accounting for 5% of the global market. In the Global South, renewable energy potential is 400 times greater than fossil fuel production, and solar is expected to have lower upfront costs than coal in Vietnam from 2024 and in India from approximately 2027.

The report argues that 'clean flexibility' acts as the 'brain' of a clean power system, balancing supply and demand in real time to ensure electricity is clean every hour. It categorizes nine flexibility tools into four functional areas: Store (pumped hydro, batteries, long-duration energy storage, and green hydrogen), Shift (peak shaving and smart electrification), Share (grids and interconnectors), and Supply (improving fossil plant flexibility and smarter wind/solar operation). The document emphasizes that while some tools are basic and cheap, others are more complex and costly, and the optimal mix depends on the specific power system. It concludes by urging COP29 to expand its focus beyond storage, grids, and hydrogen to include the full portfolio of flexibility solutions.

Ember proposes four primary initiatives for the EU Energy Commissioner: the creation of a "Future Grids" Task Force to coordinate grid policy and finance, a transition to open energy data and open-source system models, a joint DG ENER and DG AGRI strategy for agri-PV, and a "Smart Electrification" Action Plan to promote energy storage and demand-side flexibility.

The briefing examines the role of deep sea mining in providing minerals like cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese for clean energy technologies. It concludes that deep sea mining is unlikely to solve immediate supply crunches because the necessary technology for commercial extraction and processing is not yet available, and the steepest growth in mineral demand is expected before 2035. The document highlights significant environmental risks, regulatory uncertainty surrounding the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and the potential for alternatives such as sustainable land mining, recycling, and material substitution to meet demand.

China is expanding its nuclear power capacity faster than any other country in the 21st century, with nearly half of the world's nuclear power under construction located there. While China's operational capacity of 58.1 GW currently ranks third globally, its prospective capacity of 118 GW positions it to potentially overtake France and the United States. The buildout is shifting toward Generation III and IV reactors, including the domestically developed Hualong One and the first commercial Generation IV unit, the HTR-PM. However, a moratorium on inland plants following the 2011 Fukushima disaster has led to the cancellation of 201 GW of capacity, though some sites have been repurposed for wind and solar energy.

The EU is attempting to increase domestic production of net-zero technologies through the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) and other strategies to reduce dependencies on China and the US. However, the author contends that the EU lacks the necessary funding to meet its 2030 targets, such as producing 40 per cent of its installation needs domestically. The document highlights a conflict between 'frugal' member states and those seeking a European Sovereignty Fund, leading to a reliance on the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF). This framework allows national 'matching aid', which the author argues creates unfair competition between wealthy nations like Germany and France and smaller states like Belgium. The text further critiques the use of non-price criteria in procurement and trade defense instruments, such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), noting they can increase costs for taxpayers and slow decarbonization. The author concludes that targeted, conditional European-level subsidies are the only viable way to ensure a just and cohesive green transition.