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The report examines the risks associated with the renewed interest in tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) among global powers. It details three plausible use scenarios—targeting facilities, military forces in the field, or demonstration shots—and models the direct physical effects of a 20-kiloton blast. The authors argue that TNW use would trigger unpredictable international crises, erode the long-standing norm of nuclear non-use, and potentially lead to uncontrolled escalation. The paper recommends reinforcing the non-use norm and implementing risk-reduction measures to prevent the normalization of nuclear warfighting.

A group of military and defence experts argues that including clean energy investments in NATO's 1.5% non-core spending target is essential for European security. They highlight that the EU continues to fund the Russian war effort through fossil fuel imports, noting that in 2024, the EU paid nearly €22 billion for Russian fossil fuels, exceeding the €19 billion in financial support provided to Kyiv. The authors contend that decentralized energy sources like wind and solar are more resilient to military attack than large power stations and that transitioning away from fossil fuels reduces vulnerability to price spikes and supply manipulation by malign actors.

The author calls for a concerted global effort to update biosafety and biosecurity standards in response to the democratization of synthetic biology and the integration of AI and machine learning in biological research. Drawing on a review of COVID-19 origins, the text suggests that governments or nongovernmental actors must lead the creation of international roadmaps, universalized standards for high-risk research, and transparency mechanisms for BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories to prevent future pandemic-scale events.

The briefing emphasizes that the US nuclear posture relies on a foundation of science, technology, and engineering (S&T) managed by the NNSA National Laboratories and the Department of Energy. It advocates for increased long-term investment in early-stage R&D, the modernization of aging manufacturing infrastructure through robotics and CNC, and the rebuilding of a specialized workforce. The authors suggest that the S&T base should be viewed as a tool of deterrence in itself, requiring stable funding cycles that transcend short-term political terms and expanded public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation.

The analysis of the FY26 Presidential Budget Request indicates a general decline in biodefense and biosecurity funding across the US government, despite an overall increase in the Department of Defense budget. Significant cuts are observed in the CDC, NIH, and Department of State, while the Department of Homeland Security has undergone a major reorganization of its biodefense functions. The report argues that these reductions in vaccine R&D and global threat reduction efforts undermine US leadership and its ability to deter biological weapons.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a faster shift to renewables—potentially reaching 70% of electricity generation by 2035—would mitigate risks associated with fragile fossil fuel supply chains and geopolitical instability. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the authors contend these are manageable compared to the vulnerabilities of continued fossil fuel dependence. The document recommends greater inter-ministerial coordination between energy, defense, and diplomatic agencies to prioritize renewables as a national security imperative.

The report examines how climate hazards—including sea-level rise, extreme heat, and flooding—threaten Indonesia's military infrastructure, food security, and territorial sovereignty. It highlights the strategic risks of continued coal dependence, such as public health crises and corruption, while positioning the renewable energy transition as a critical national security priority to enhance economic competitiveness and geopolitical stability.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a rapid shift toward renewable energy—potentially reaching a 70% electricity share by 2035—would mitigate risks from volatile fossil fuel supply chains and enhance diplomatic and military autonomy. It identifies critical vulnerabilities in current maritime fuel routes and suggests that the resulting cost savings from reduced imports could fund defense procurement. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the document asserts these are manageable through diversification and technical innovation. It recommends stronger coordination between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense to integrate climate security into national strategy.

The report examines how AI accelerates biological research, creating a 'dual-use dilemma' where tools for medical advancement can be repurposed for bioweapons. It analyzes the 'risk chain' of biological weapon development, the capabilities of foundation models and biological design tools (BDTs), and the geopolitical landscape involving the US, China, and Russia. The document proposes a 'preferred' 2030 scenario characterized by geopolitical stability and responsible AI development, offering specific US policy recommendations across biosecurity foundations, technical governance, and international diplomacy.

The European Union has shifted from reactive crisis management to a proactive strategic framework for biological risks through the March 2025 EU Preparedness Union Strategy and subsequent July 2025 implementation strategies. These initiatives aim to secure essential medical supplies "under all circumstances," moving away from just-in-time delivery models. Key actions include the expansion of rescEU stockpiles, the creation of the Medical Countermeasure Accelerator (2025), a European Diagnostics Hub (2026), and a European Therapeutics Hub (2027). The strategy emphasizes civil-military integration, aligning with NATO's resilience targets, and expanding health intelligence via a Global Sentinel Hub. However, the document identifies critical gaps in long-term funding, the need for threat-agnostic detection capabilities like metagenomic sequencing, and the requirement for clear distribution protocols during crises.

Susanne Riegraf, Deputy of the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, delivered a keynote speech at the Berlin Biosecurity Dialogue on June 19, 2025. She highlighted the increasing risk of biological weapons due to the convergence of biotechnology, AI, and quantum computing, noting that AI-modified proteins can evade conventional detection methods. Riegraf discussed the limitations of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which lacks a verification regime, and the need for NATO allies to enhance collective biodefense and early-warning systems. She also detailed Germany's interagency coordination challenges and its international support efforts through the German Biosecurity Programme and the Global Health Protection Programme.

The document proposes a 'deterrence by denial' framework to dissuade the use of biological weapons by reducing the likelihood that such attacks would achieve their intended goals. This strategy is built upon four pillars: detection (early warning systems), response (preparedness and rapid action), mitigation (long-term resilience and medical countermeasures), and attribution (identifying the source of an attack). The authors assert that the necessary tools—including metagenomic sequencing, AI-driven surveillance, and advanced biomanufacturing—already exist and can be implemented through a whole-of-government approach. The paper also addresses challenges such as the 'dual-use dilemma,' where defensive biosecurity efforts may be misinterpreted as offensive programs, and the impact of disinformation on public health responses.

The document outlines an entreaty endorsed by over 100 experts at 'The Spirit of Asilomar' conference, condemning the development and use of biological weapons. It argues that the most effective way to deter biological weapons is to accelerate the equitable global deployment of tools for attribution, early detection, and rapid countermeasure manufacturing. The text highlights ongoing threats from state actors, specifically Russia and North Korea, as well as non-state actors, and emphasizes that increasing global access to vaccines and countermeasures in developing countries reduces the attractiveness of biological weapons.

The document examines the ecological insecurity caused by military occupations, noting that hostile authorities often engage in the deliberate destruction of ecosystems and exploitation of natural resources. It analyzes the limitations of the 1907 Hague Regulations in the context of the modern 'triple planetary crisis' and provides examples of environmental damage in Georgia, Kuwait, Palestine, and Timor-Leste. The author proposes legal remedies through the International Criminal Court and the ICJ, as well as policy interventions such as environmental risk assessments and citizen science monitoring to enhance ecosystem resilience.

The document outlines how the shift to renewable energy creates socio-ecological risks through expanded critical mineral mining and the rise of oil and gas decommissioning. It highlights environmental degradation, such as water pollution in China and orphan wells in the US, and explains how these issues can escalate into regional conflicts or local violence, as seen in Papua New Guinea. The author argues that current approaches often separate human rights from environmental impacts and recommends integrating these perspectives, increasing data transparency on site locations and health impacts, and sharing decommissioning best practices between experienced and novice nations.

The Council on Strategic Risks warns that the reported firing of staff and potential closure of climate.gov would erode the health and security of Americans. The site serves as a vital bridge between scientists and the public, providing STEM resources, extreme weather outlooks, and the US Climate Resilience Toolkit for farmers and policymakers. The author asserts that losing this 'national security asset' would lead to higher disaster recovery costs, increased vulnerability to misinformation, and a 'brain drain' of US scientists to regions like the European Union.

The Center for Climate and Security (CCS) urges US lawmakers to challenge Secretary of Commerce Lutnick on proposed FY 2026 budget cuts to NOAA. The briefing highlights risks to weather forecasting, climate monitoring, and public safety, noting that funding lapses have already disabled four regional climate centers and that 27,000 years of staff experience have been lost. CCS specifically questions the decommissioning of 14 data services, the status of the Atlas 15 precipitation project, and the lack of funding for extreme heat monitoring, arguing that these cuts undermine the $7 billion private weather services market and US national security.

The document details South Carolina's high susceptibility to sea level rise, hurricanes, and droughts, noting that 101 weather disasters with losses over $1 billion occurred between 1980 and April 2025. It highlights the critical role of federal support from NOAA, FEMA, and USDA in maintaining coastal resilience, providing disaster aid, and supporting military installations. The briefing warns that proposed FY 2026 budget cuts—including the elimination of the Sea Grant program and significant reductions in coastal research and FEMA funding—would severely hinder the state's ability to manage climate risks and protect its economy and national security infrastructure.

The report highlights a critical gap in US trade data that obscures the extent of firm-level dependence on Chinese suppliers for battery minerals and components. While China dominates global production—controlling 70% of battery pack assembly and 91% of anode production—current US tracking relies on outdated Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes and allows firms to hide import partners. The authors recommend updating trade codes, enhancing intergovernmental data sharing, expanding reporting requirements for electric vehicle tax credits, and leading international efforts for trade code standardization to enable more nuanced policymaking and supply chain diversification.

The paper examines the link between Japan's energy dependence and its national security, arguing that a shift to renewables is essential for strategic autonomy. It highlights Japan's vulnerability due to importing 97% of its energy and suggests that leading the Asia-Pacific transition could fill a leadership vacuum left by the US. While acknowledging China's dominance in renewable supply chains, the authors contend that diversifying these networks is more feasible than managing continuous fossil fuel imports.