Making Deterrence by Denial a Reality: Key Biological Defense Tools and Technologies

The document proposes a 'deterrence by denial' framework to dissuade the use of biological weapons by reducing the likelihood that such attacks would achieve their intended goals. This strategy is built upon four pillars: detection (early warning systems), response (preparedness and rapid action), mitigation (long-term resilience and medical countermeasures), and attribution (identifying the source of an attack). The authors assert that the necessary tools—including metagenomic sequencing, AI-driven surveillance, and advanced biomanufacturing—already exist and can be implemented through a whole-of-government approach. The paper also addresses challenges such as the 'dual-use dilemma,' where defensive biosecurity efforts may be misinterpreted as offensive programs, and the impact of disinformation on public health responses.

• Deterrence by denial for biological threats is defined as a strategy that disincentivizes attacks by denying the intended effects on human health, thereby hampering an adversary's ability to achieve tactical, operational, or strategic goals.
• A credible deterrence posture relies on four mutually reinforcing pillars: detection, response, mitigation, and attribution.
• Effective detection requires a multi-layered early warning system combining indicator-based, event-based, genomic, sentinel, syndromic, and vector surveillance to provide a comprehensive risk landscape.
• Genetic sequencing, particularly third-generation techniques like shotgun metagenomic sequencing, is essential for pathogen-agnostic detection of unknown or novel biological threats.
• Mitigation focuses on building societal resilience and long-term recovery, utilizing advanced biomanufacturing, automated laboratories, and biofoundries to surge production of medical countermeasures.
• Attribution serves as a deterrent by increasing the potential costs for an aggressor through the provision of rapid, transparent scientific evidence that enables condemnation, sanctions, and retaliation.
• The 'dual-use dilemma' creates a risk where biodefense activities, such as vaccine development or PPE stockpiling, may be misinterpreted by other states as offensive bioweapon development.
• Disinformation and misinformation can undermine deterrence by denial by lowering compliance with health guidelines, reducing vaccine uptake, and creating vulnerabilities that adversaries may exploit.

APA

The Council on Strategic Risks (2025). Making Deterrence by Denial a Reality: Key Biological Defense Tools and Technologies. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2025/06/30/making-deterrence-by-denial-a-reality-key-biological-defense-tools-and-technologies/

Chicago

The Council on Strategic Risks. Making Deterrence by Denial a Reality: Key Biological Defense Tools and Technologies. 2025. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2025/06/30/making-deterrence-by-denial-a-reality-key-biological-defense-tools-and-technologies/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=The Council on Strategic Risks |title=Making Deterrence by Denial a Reality: Key Biological Defense Tools and Technologies |date=30 June 2025 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2025/06/30/making-deterrence-by-denial-a-reality-key-biological-defense-tools-and-technologies/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{thecouncilonstrategicrisks2025making, author = {{The Council on Strategic Risks}}, title = {{Making Deterrence by Denial a Reality: Key Biological Defense Tools and Technologies}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2025}, month = jun, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2025/06/30/making-deterrence-by-denial-a-reality-key-biological-defense-tools-and-technologies/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }