Including clean energy in the NATO 1.5% non-core defence spending target
Summary
A group of military and defence experts argues that including clean energy investments in NATO's 1.5% non-core spending target is essential for European security. They highlight that the EU continues to fund the Russian war effort through fossil fuel imports, noting that in 2024, the EU paid nearly €22 billion for Russian fossil fuels, exceeding the €19 billion in financial support provided to Kyiv. The authors contend that decentralized energy sources like wind and solar are more resilient to military attack than large power stations and that transitioning away from fossil fuels reduces vulnerability to price spikes and supply manipulation by malign actors.
Key insights
- EU financial support to Ukraine in 2024 was outweighed by its payments for Russian fossil fuel imports, with the EU paying nearly €22 billion for the latter compared to approximately €19 billion in support for Kyiv.
- Since February 2022, EU spending on Russian gas imports has exceeded $105 billion, a sum representing 75% of the Russian military budget for 2024.
- Decentralized energy infrastructure, such as solar panels and wind turbines, provides greater wartime resilience and security than large power stations, which are primary targets for military aggressors.
- The authors propose that investments in renewable and low-carbon energy be integrated into the 1.5% NATO spending target designated for critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, and resilience to achieve energy sovereignty.
Cite the original document
- APA
- The Council on Strategic Risks (2025). Including clean energy in the NATO 1.5% non-core defence spending target. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Energy-Security-Open-Letter-October-2025.pdf
- Chicago
- The Council on Strategic Risks. Including clean energy in the NATO 1.5% non-core defence spending target. 2025. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Energy-Security-Open-Letter-October-2025.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite press release |author=The Council on Strategic Risks |title=Including clean energy in the NATO 1.5% non-core defence spending target |date=23 October 2025 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Energy-Security-Open-Letter-October-2025.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @misc{thecouncilonstrategicrisks2025including, author = {{The Council on Strategic Risks}}, title = {{Including clean energy in the NATO 1.5\% non-core defence spending target}}, publisher = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2025}, month = oct, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Energy-Security-Open-Letter-October-2025.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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