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The report analyzes the security implications of rapid warming in the Arctic, focusing on the destabilizing effects of sea ice loss and permafrost thaw. It argues that these environmental changes, combined with an influx of commercial shipping and resource extraction, exacerbate tensions between major powers like Russia, the US, and China. The document highlights specific risks, including the degradation of military infrastructure in Alaska, the potential release of ancient pathogens, and the increased likelihood of military accidents in a region with limited security-focused diplomatic forums.

The World Climate and Security Report 2021 assesses how climate change acts as a threat multiplier for global security, emphasizing the urgent need to move from strategic planning to concrete implementation. It introduces a new Climate Security Risk Matrix to evaluate comparative risks among countries and presents a risk perception survey where experts predict severe-to-catastrophic risks by 2031. The report details regional vulnerabilities, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union, and analyzes the role of militaries as first responders and contributors to emissions. It concludes with recommendations for updating international law regarding the law of the sea and geoengineering governance, and calls for deeper integration of climate security into UN and EU institutional frameworks.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) outlines priorities for the FY2022 U.S. budget, urging investments in early biological threat detection, climate resilience within the Defense and Homeland Security departments, and the elimination of low-yield nuclear weapons. The team emphasizes the intersection of climate change, ecological disruption, and national security, advocating for increased scientific capacity in intelligence agencies and expanded funding for international climate adaptation and conservation.

The Council on Strategic Risks suggests a series of questions for U.S. Senate confirmation hearings for Jill Hruby (nominated as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA) and Heidi Shyu (nominated as Under Secretary for Research and Engineering at the DoD). The proposed questions focus on enhancing biotechnology leadership, improving interagency cooperation for biological threats, ensuring civilian oversight of nuclear weapons, and implementing safety recommendations at National Labs.

The Council on Strategic Risks recommends that the United States end its pursuit of nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) to mitigate the risk of nuclear war. The document argues that SLCM-N are destabilizing because they are virtually indistinguishable from conventional cruise missiles, which could lead to catastrophic miscalculations during a crisis. It suggests a phased approach: first, a unilateral U.S. decision to forgo the weapons, followed by a political commitment from the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) to cap and eliminate them. The brief notes that such an agreement is feasible because few nuclear states possess them—Russia is the only state with a confirmed stockpile—and the U.S. has successfully eliminated them in the past. The authors propose a verification regime involving data exchanges, portal monitors, and random inspections to ensure compliance.

The document highlights the elevation of climate security at the Leaders Summit on Climate, noting the US target to reduce greenhouse gas pollution by 50 to 52 percent by 2030. It emphasizes a 'whole-of-government' US approach involving military, intelligence, and diplomatic strategies, while noting the concrete security strategies of the UK and NATO. The text also observes varying levels of climate security expertise among participating nations, such as Kenya and Japan compared to the Philippines, suggesting an opportunity for the US to provide capacity-building tools.

The author contends that the U.S. national security focus on CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) weapons as the sole definition of WMD fails to account for modern technological convergence and the trend of using these agents for targeted strategic impacts rather than mass casualties. To address this, the briefing introduces the concept of 'weapons of mass agility'—technologies that can cause mass effects but also operate at the lower end of the destruction spectrum for strategic gain. The proposed framework evaluates threats based on six criteria: potential for mass effects, malicious intent, significant second and third order effects, minimal target dependency, high density of effects, and a 'fear factor'. This approach aims to integrate cyber weapons, drone swarms, and the 'digitization of biology' into a cohesive threat assessment model to avoid a 'failure of imagination' in national security strategy.

The report argues that climate change acts as a risk multiplier in the India-China rivalry, increasing the likelihood of conflict through material threats and perceptual risks. Key vulnerabilities include increased flooding in the Brahmaputra River Basin, which may be misconstrued as Chinese water manipulation, and warming in the western border region that could facilitate more frequent military patrols and clashes. The study also highlights the security implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) dam projects on the Indus and Brahmaputra rivers. To mitigate these risks, the authors recommend establishing granular data-sharing agreements, joint early warning systems for natural disasters, and long-term river basin treaties involving all riparian states.

The report finds that climate change will act as a risk multiplier in the India-China rivalry, increasing the likelihood of conflict through material environmental changes and perceptual misinterpretations. Key risks include increased flooding in the Brahmaputra River Basin, which may be misconstrued as Chinese water manipulation, and warming in the western border region that could facilitate more frequent military patrols and clashes. The study also highlights the role of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) dam projects on the Indus and Brahmaputra rivers as sources of regional instability and distrust. To mitigate these risks, the authors recommend institutionalizing data-sharing, establishing joint early warning systems for natural disasters, and pursuing long-term river basin treaties.

The Council on Strategic Risks identifies critical gaps in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) priorities, specifically noting a decline in biodefense spending and the need to operationalize climate resilience tools. The authors provide a set of targeted questions for nominees to key positions—including the Secretary of the Army and various Under Secretaries—to ensure that climate change, biological threats, and nuclear modernization are integrated into national security strategy and budget planning.

Former OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü details the challenges of investigating chemical weapons use in Syria, the failure of the UN-led Joint Investigative Mechanism due to a Russian veto, and the subsequent creation of the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to attribute responsibility for attacks.

The Council on Strategic Risks outlines critical priorities for the nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense (ASD(NCB)), focusing on biological threats highlighted by COVID-19, the erosion of chemical weapons norms, and the maintenance of civilian oversight of the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

The Council on Strategic Risks outlines key policy challenges and proposed Senate questioning for Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins' nomination as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. The authors emphasize the need for the U.S. to address the erosion of norms against chemical weapons, vulnerabilities exposed by COVID-19 regarding biological threats, and the rising risks of nuclear proliferation and treaty dissolution. They suggest that the nominee should be questioned on strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, managing the final destruction of U.S. chemical stockpiles by 2023, and reinvigorating 21st-century nuclear arms control.

The briefing argues that current nuclear risk reduction efforts lack an overall strategy to achieve the NPT's disarmament end state. It identifies a deteriorating risk landscape, highlighted by the UK's 2021 Integrated Review, and proposes a two-tiered strategy consisting of 'Preparative Steps' (such as adopting a Code of Responsible Nuclear Weapon Ownership and declaring a 'sole purpose' policy) and 'Formative Steps' (including bans on nuclear cruise missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons). The authors emphasize that risk reduction is symbiotic with the 'conditions to enable nuclear disarmament' (CEND) project and advocate for a flexible approach to overcome hurdles like the NPT's 'principle of irreversibility'.

The briefing assesses the critical role of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) in U.S. national security, highlighting its success in developing medical countermeasures for threats like Ebola and swine flu. Despite these capabilities, the authors report a decade-long decline in CBDP funding, which continued during the COVID-19 pandemic. The document recommends doubling the budget to $2 billion in the short term and increasing it to $6.5–$7 billion annually in subsequent years. It advocates for a shift toward 'rapid response platforms,' including nucleic-acid based therapeutics and metagenomic sequencing, while calling for clarified mission authorities to allow CBDP to respond to natural pandemics.

The document analyzes the historical development of the 'WMD paradigm' in the United States, which primarily equates WMD with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The author argues that while this framework provided bureaucratic stability during the Cold War and post-9/11 era, it now creates a 'failure of imagination' by excluding other technologies—such as cyber weapons, drones, and synthetic biology—that can produce similar mass-casualty or mass-destruction effects. The text highlights a disconnect between the WMD paradigm and the actual historical record since 1990, noting that violent non-state actors often rely on conventional means and state actors frequently use CBRN for targeted assassinations or psychological impact rather than mass destruction.

The document argues that the U.S. must address unstable biodefense funding and the tendency to cut budgets during crises. Drawing on the success of Operation Warp Speed, the authors propose a 10-year commitment of $10 billion annually to both the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to counter rising biological threats, including lab accidents and advances in synthetic biology.

The authors contend that environmental degradation and climate change are fundamental drivers of food insecurity and conflict. They highlight how resource competition in regions like the Sahel and Yemen fuels violence and extremism, while pointing to natural farming successes in India as a model for resilience. The document recommends that international security institutions acknowledge climate security risks to effectively address stability and displacement.

The briefing suggests that the United States can leverage its March 2021 UN Security Council (UNSC) Presidency to advance climate security through immediate activities—such as formal briefings, dialogues with Pacific Island Forum states, and a Presidential Statement—and long-term institutional reforms. Proposed long-term measures include integrating climate security into UN mission reports, establishing Climate Security Crisis Watch Centers, creating a formal climate and security mandate, and establishing dedicated offices within the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Peace Operations, and the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The report argues that the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated a false dichotomy between natural and man-made biological threats, necessitating a unified national security approach. It recommends expanding the U.S. bio industrial base, improving early pathogen detection through persistent sequencing and diagnostics, and fostering deep public-private collaboration. The authors suggest that effective coordination and capacity building are more critical than major government reorganization, emphasizing the need to leverage existing assets and the successes of initiatives like Operation Warp Speed to prevent future outbreaks from reaching pandemic scale.