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The report argues that the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated a false dichotomy between natural and man-made biological threats, necessitating a unified national security approach. It recommends expanding the U.S. bio industrial base, improving early pathogen detection through persistent sequencing and diagnostics, and fostering deep public-private collaboration. The authors suggest that effective coordination and capacity building are more critical than major government reorganization, emphasizing the need to leverage existing assets and the successes of initiatives like Operation Warp Speed to prevent future outbreaks from reaching pandemic scale.

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  • The COVID-19 pandemic revealed that natural and man-made biological threats are not distinct categories, as SARS-CoV-2 possesses attributes that would be desirable in a man-made pathogen, such as being highly contagious and hard to detect.
  • Early warning systems for pathogens require a state of persistent detection, utilizing next-generation sequencing (NGS) and metagenomic NGS to monitor humans, animals, insects, and plants to identify new outbreaks faster.
  • The U.S. must develop and maintain a sustainable bio industrial base capable of surging to address threats, leveraging synthetic biology and the ability of private companies to pivot assets for producing reagents and equipment.
  • Rapid vaccine development was a success of the COVID-19 response, but the time required for approvals and distribution delayed their effectiveness, indicating a need to reduce bureaucratic burdens for medical countermeasures.
  • Effective response to biological threats depends more on coordination, training, and resources across agencies like HHS, Defense, and Energy than on major bureaucratic restructuring or the creation of new agencies.
  • The U.S. response to COVID-19 was hindered by slow test development, supply chain failures for critical equipment like ventilators and masks, and conflicting public health messaging.

Cite the original document

APA
Parthemore, C., Singh, A., & Weber, A. (2021). CRITICAL STEPS IN PREVENTING FUTURE PANDEMICS. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Critical-Steps-in-Preventing-Future-Pandemics_2021_2_22.pdf
Chicago
Parthemore, Christine, Anup Singh, and Andrew Weber. CRITICAL STEPS IN PREVENTING FUTURE PANDEMICS. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Critical-Steps-in-Preventing-Future-Pandemics_2021_2_22.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Parthemore |first1=Christine |last2=Singh |first2=Anup |last3=Weber |first3=Andrew |title=CRITICAL STEPS IN PREVENTING FUTURE PANDEMICS |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=22 February 2021 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Critical-Steps-in-Preventing-Future-Pandemics_2021_2_22.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{parthemore2021critical, author = {Parthemore, Christine and Singh, Anup and Weber, Andrew}, title = {{CRITICAL STEPS IN PREVENTING FUTURE PANDEMICS}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = feb, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Critical-Steps-in-Preventing-Future-Pandemics_2021_2_22.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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