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The report analyzes the shift in power dynamics in Mali after the 2013 French military intervention. It notes that while the intervention strengthened the authority of the interim presidency and marginalized the 2012 coup leaders, deep-seated governance issues and tensions between the state and armed groups in the north remain. The author argues that military success must be followed by inclusive national reconciliation and a credible electoral process to avoid a return to previous systemic failures.

The report analyzes the shift in power relations in Mali after the 2013 French military intervention, noting a 're-presidentialised' political system and a temporary decline in the influence of the 2012 military junta. It argues that while military gains in the north have been achieved, lasting stability requires inclusive reconciliation that addresses the grievances of northern communities and a credible electoral process that avoids returning to previous patterns of corruption. The author cautions against a traditional UN peacekeeping mission, suggesting a peace support operation instead, and emphasizes the need for comprehensive security sector reform and regional cooperation to counter terrorist and criminal networks.

The research examines how the physical and economic characteristics of natural resources predispose them to be exploited by warring factions in Africa. It posits that resources requiring low specialized skills, high portability, and high liquidity (like alluvial diamonds) are more likely to fuel conflict. Conversely, capital-intensive resources (like deep-level gold or oil) are less attractive to rebels but can still be linked to conflict through state weakness and elite rent-seeking. The author emphasizes that while resource characteristics create vulnerabilities, the state's capacity to manage grievances and maintain territorial control determines whether these vulnerabilities lead to actual conflict.

The document evaluates the National Development Plan 2030, arguing that its core economic growth target of 5.4 per cent average GDP is very ambitious and requires significant structural changes and leadership to achieve. It notes that while some sectoral targets in education and infrastructure are attainable with lower growth, the current capital-intensive economic model is insufficient for job creation and addressing structural inequality.

The report details a workshop in Addis Ababa focused on the nexus of climate change adaptation and peacebuilding in Africa. It emphasizes that climate change exacerbates resource scarcity and conflict, necessitating 'conflict-sensitive' adaptation planning. The proceedings cover the application of the 'Do No Harm' (DNH) framework, the USAID Climate Change and Conflict Annex, and the role of population dynamics—particularly youth bulges and rapid urbanisation—in increasing vulnerability. Through a site visit to Sululta, Ethiopia, the report highlights the gap between conceptual tools and practical implementation. It concludes with recommendations to integrate conflict assessments into National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and to sustain a multidisciplinary community of practice to influence policymakers and donors.

The document examines the evolution of suicide attacks in Africa, distinguishing between ad hoc incidents and those part of broader campaigns by groups like AQLIM, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. It details tactical advantages, target selection, and delivery methods, while providing a historical analysis of attacks in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, and Nigeria. The guide also offers recommendations for preventing recruitment and improving intelligence gathering, while warning against repressive counter-terrorism measures that may fuel further radicalization.

The report identifies a 'syndrome of fragility' in Africa driven by the interaction of poor governance, conflict, inequality, and poverty. Using the International Futures (IFs) system, it forecasts that while 16 of the 26 identified 'more fragile' states could transition toward resilience by 2050, ten countries—including the DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan—are at risk of remaining in a fragility trap. The analysis warns that climate change and democratic deficits could exacerbate these risks, and recommends long-term national development plans, extractive sector reform, and direct cash transfers to the poor to pivot toward a more optimistic future.

The document assesses the potential for human development in the Western Cape through 2040 using the Human Development Index (HDI). The 'Base Case' forecast predicts significant improvements in life expectancy, income, and education, potentially reaching levels comparable to the UK and Austria by 2040. The brief explores three alternative policy-driven scenarios: an 'Education Push' to accelerate schooling attainment, a 'Broadband Initiative' to boost GDP through ICT infrastructure, and 'The End of AIDS' to reduce HIV prevalence and mortality. It concludes that a combined 'Accelerated Development' approach would yield the highest HDI gains through synergistic effects between health, education, and economic growth.

The document analyzes the 'troubling confusion' in Nigeria's strategy against Boko Haram, contrasting a military-oriented approach supported by the EU with reports of secret peace talks in Senegal. It suggests that the government's responses are incoherent and may be driven by political motives related to President Jonathan's 2015 re-election bid. The briefing recommends moving toward a bottom-up dialogue strategy and improving the delivery of public goods to address the underlying socio-economic grievances that fuel the violence.

The briefing argues that the ANC's lack of rules for open leadership campaigning and the use of 'slates' by President Jacob Zuma's supporters have created deep internal divisions. These processes, characterized by allegations of rigging and intimidation, risk alienating members and voters, potentially reducing the ANC's parliamentary majority in the 2014 elections and encouraging the formation of a breakaway left-wing party.

The document argues that eradicating malaria in Africa by 2025 would prevent 12 million deaths and increase the continent's economic output by nearly US$ 430 billion by 2050. Using the International Futures (IFs) tool, the authors compare a 'Base Case' of continued current efforts against a 'Malaria Eradication' scenario. They find that while eradication would lead to a slight population increase, this would be tempered by declining fertility rates resulting from lower infant mortality. The brief highlights that the economic gains, driven by increased productivity and reduced disability, would far outweigh the high costs of eradication campaigns and vaccine development.

The document examines the challenges facing Tanzania's long-dominant CCM party, including systemic corruption, internal power struggles over the 2015 succession, and increasing pressure for constitutional reform. While the party remains the dominant political force, it has seen a decline in President Jakaya Kikwete's approval ratings and a statistical rise in opposition strength, particularly from the Chadema party. The analysis highlights the party's efforts to rebrand and restructure to maintain legitimacy, while noting ongoing tensions between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar.

The document analyzes a November 2012 incident where 42 Kenyan police officers were killed by Turkana cattle raiders, framing this as part of a broader pattern of insecurity. It argues that climate change acts as a trigger for resource-based conflicts over land and water, particularly in Kenya's driest regions, leading to increased ethnic clashes and social insecurity. The briefing suggests that traditional nomadic lifestyles are no longer sustainable and proposes climate change adaptation through the settlement of pastoralist communities, economic shifts, and the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms rather than military responses.

On 8 November 2012, a coalition of South African opposition parties led by the Democratic Alliance (DA) tabled a vote of no confidence in President Jacob Zuma, citing constitutional failures, corruption, economic decline, and the Marikana tragedy. The motion is considered unlikely to succeed due to the requirement for a two-thirds majority and the lack of support from the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The document outlines three potential scenarios for creating a stronger opposition: the DA expanding its voter base, the formation of a united opposition coalition, or the emergence of a new political party. Additionally, it highlights reports from the Public Service Commission (PSC) and National Planning Commission (NPC) regarding public sector graft, which cost the government nearly R1 billion, and the need for stricter regulations to end a 'culture of no consequence'.

The report assesses how the Somali diaspora, comprising 14 per cent of the population, can contribute to the reconstruction of Somalia through financial, political, and socio-cultural engagement. It highlights the significant economic impact of remittances and the role of the diaspora in Kenya as a logistical and business hub. However, it also identifies critical challenges, including the persistence of clan-based interests, insecurity, and the involvement of some diaspora elements in supporting al-Shabaab or engaging in people smuggling.

The paper assesses the implementation of financial disclosure regulations for municipal councillors in South Africa, finding that while laws are progressive, practical application is inconsistent across municipalities. Key failures include poor record quality, low compliance in some areas, restricted public access to information, and a lack of proactive monitoring and oversight. The authors argue that the current system focuses on formal compliance rather than the substantive detection of irregularities, which allows corruption in public procurement to persist. The document provides case studies of municipal corruption and recommends standardising disclosure templates, digitising submissions, and strengthening internal investigative capacities.

The report argues that traditional anti-money laundering (AML) efforts, which focus on the banking sector, are insufficient in cash-based economies where over 50% of transactions occur in cash. In these environments, the conventional phases of money laundering—placement, layering, and integration—are often bypassed because proceeds of crime can be integrated into the economy without ever entering the formal financial system. The author identifies several drivers of this vulnerability, including low bank penetration, onerous documentation requirements, and systemic corruption. Key laundering typologies highlighted include the use of unregulated bureaus de change, real estate acquisition (notably in Tanzania), and alternative remittance systems like hawala. The report concludes that FATF recommendations are often poorly adapted to these realities and calls for a pragmatic approach to increasing bankability, regulating mobile money, and empowering Financial Intelligence Units to engage with the informal sector.

The document provides updates on the political instability and foreign policy of Eritrea, including its relations with Ethiopia and Sudan, and reports on Kofi Annan's visit to Kenya to assess preparations for the March 2013 elections.

The report highlights the systemic neglect of 200,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northern Kenya, who face severe vulnerability due to a combination of colonial legacies, violent conflict, human rights abuses, and climatic factors. It argues that while IDPs in other regions of Kenya received significant support following the 2007/08 post-election violence, pastoralist IDPs are largely unaccounted for and receive only inadequate, short-term humanitarian aid. The document calls for the adoption of a national IDP policy, ratification of the Kampala Convention, and a shift toward long-term security and development solutions.

Malawi and Tanzania are unable to agree on a mediation process for their dispute over Lake Malawi, with Tanzania proposing a former SADC head of state and Malawi preferring the International Court of Justice. The dispute is driven by potential oil and gas deposits in the lake. The situation highlights SADC's lack of a standing regional mediation architecture and the 2010 suspension of its regional tribunal, suggesting a need for formal mechanisms to handle trans-boundary resource conflicts.