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The document details California's efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 under the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32). It outlines a cap-and-trade program scheduled for January 2012, alongside 'early action' measures such as the Low Carbon Fuel Standard and landfill methane capture. The briefing also highlights California's leadership in the Western Climate Initiative and the political support for these measures following the defeat of Proposition 23 in November 2010.

The report assesses how the EU can achieve a 30% greenhouse gas reduction by 2020, analyzing the interplay between the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), renewable energy targets, and energy efficiency goals. It finds that full implementation of energy efficiency and renewable targets, combined with post-recession baselines, could lead to a domestic reduction of approximately 30%. The analysis also explores the impact of offsets and LULUCF accounting, noting that these mechanisms could reduce the required domestic effort to between 17% and 22% while still nominally meeting a 30% target. The report concludes that a 25% to 30% domestic reduction is consistent with long-term goals of 80% to 95% reduction by 2050.

The document analyzes the transition from project-based mechanisms like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to sectoral-scale mechanisms. It evaluates three governance models for a Sectoral Crediting Mechanism (SCM): centralized (UN-led), hybrid (bilateral with UN minimum standards), and decentralized (independent of the UN). The authors argue that while decentralized models offer flexibility, they risk undermining environmental integrity and market credibility. The paper proposes a centralized SCM project cycle that improves upon the CDM by introducing more interactive baseline reviews, professionalizing the regulatory body, and utilizing biennial update reports for better verification.

The report analyzes the pulp, paper, and paperboard sectors, finding that while both are classified as at risk of carbon leakage under EU ETS criteria, the drivers of trade intensity are often related to biomass availability and market effects rather than carbon pricing. It highlights a trend of the EU importing raw pulp and low-quality paper while exporting high-quality products, and notes that the export of recovered paper to China may cause 'negative carbon leakage' by depriving EU producers of low-emission raw materials.

The document examines the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme, a market-based mechanism designed by the Indian government to improve energy efficiency across nine high-carbon sectors. It details the scheme's focus on energy intensity rather than absolute emissions, the use of Energy Savings Certificates (ESCerts) to incentivize performance, and the specific challenges and opportunities within the iron and steel industry. The author suggests that the PAT could help India meet its domestic GHG reduction targets and recommends a phased implementation, potentially starting with the iron and steel sector, to ensure technical and political feasibility.

The document details Climate Strategies' transition to a new research programme for 2011, focusing on eight themes including the low carbon economy and adaptation finance. It reviews 2010 projects on carbon pricing, power sector decarbonisation, and the EU's 2020 emissions targets. A significant portion of the text argues for a steel-specific negotiation forum within the UNFCCC to address carbon leakage and competitiveness, and proposes 'Climate Innovation Centres' (CICs) to facilitate technology transition in developing countries through multi-disciplinary coordination.

The report outlines a proposed sectoral approach for the Japanese steel industry to meet a projected 50% emission reduction by 2050. It presents two variants: one based on a fully-resourced research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) plan, and another based on regulating CO2 limits for steel plants. The document emphasizes that sustainable reductions require breakthrough technologies or CCS, noting that while the Japanese sector has the financial resources to scale up RDD&D, the high cost of full CCS implementation could lead to competitiveness issues and carbon leakage without international coordination or protective measures like border taxes.

The document advocates for a shift in the UNFCCC financial paradigm from centrally managed resources to 'devolution,' where National Funding Entities (NFEs) identify needs and manage funds to ensure alignment with national development strategies. It argues that global institutions cannot address the varied complexities of local financing requirements, such as the different needs for energy efficiency versus REDD+ investments. The report surveys approximately 12 established and several developing NFEs, highlighting diverse models: Brazil uses a 'virtual institution' for the Amazon Fund and a law-based National Fund on Climate Change; Bangladesh utilizes a government-chaired board for its Climate Change Resilience Fund; and China employs a state-operated CDM Fund. It concludes that while many countries have the basic fiduciary capacity to manage funds, they lack the specific expertise for climate finance, necessitating targeted capacity-building support from international institutions.

The report analyzes 11 international funding entities to determine the staffing intensity needed to manage climate finance. It finds that official staffing figures often underestimate actual needs due to the exclusion of contract workers and the channelling of funds through other agencies. Based on these findings, the authors estimate that administering US$ 30 billion in annual funds would require between 7,500 and 12,000 staff, while US$ 100 billion would require 25,000 to 40,000 staff. The report argues that to improve cost-effectiveness and country ownership, administrative capacity should be delegated to recipient nations, supported by capacity building via fast start finance.

The briefing analyzes the shift in U.S. climate policy from a focus on national cap-and-trade legislation toward regulatory agency actions, subnational initiatives, clean-tech funding, and international trade issues. It argues that while a national mandatory system is unlikely in the short term, climate action is diversifying across administrative, local, and trade-related channels.

The policy brief analyzes the staffing intensity of twelve major international development agencies to estimate the personnel needed to manage increased climate finance flows. It finds that agencies typically employ between 25 and 40 full-time equivalent staff per USD 100 million in disbursements. The authors conclude that administering USD 30 billion annually would require 7,500 to 12,000 new administrators, while USD 100 billion would require 25,000 to 40,000. The report argues against the existence of economies of scale for larger agencies and suggests delegating administrative duties to recipient countries to improve cost-effectiveness and local ownership.

The document advocates for a shift in global climate finance from centrally managed models to a paradigm where national funding entities in developing countries identify needs and manage resources. It argues that local institutions are best equipped to handle the complex financial requirements of mitigation and adaptation and to mainstream these activities into national development strategies. The brief surveys various existing and emerging funds in countries such as Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, highlighting their diverse governance structures and funding sources. It concludes that while many countries are innovating, there is a significant need for capacity development to manage the intricacies of climate finance, and that international institutions should transition to a supportive role focused on technical assistance and risk mitigation.

The briefing argues that meeting climate mitigation and adaptation challenges in developing countries requires more than just technology transfer; it requires a 'systems of innovation' approach. It proposes Climate Innovation Centres (CICs) as multi-disciplinary, facilitating organisations located in developing countries to bridge gaps in the innovation chain, such as adapting technologies to local conditions, creating markets, and designing policy regimes. The document highlights that different technologies and countries have unique innovation needs, meaning no 'cookie-cutter' formula exists. It cites India's National Biomass Cookstove Initiative as an illustrative example of this innovation-centered approach.

The paper addresses the 'windfall' emissions permits (AAUs) held by countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. It analyzes the conflicting positions of Russia and the EU, noting that Russia views its surplus as a hedge against future emissions growth. To resolve this, the authors propose creating a non-tradable strategic compliance reserve for first-period surpluses and implementing 'optimized trading' for second-period over-allocations. This approach aims to maintain carbon market prices and recognize the 'early action' of transition economies while preventing the market saturation that would occur if all surpluses were traded.

The policy brief argues that the steel sector, responsible for 5% of global CO2 emissions, requires a dedicated international negotiation forum within the UNFCCC to overcome competitiveness fears and leakage. It proposes a 'bottom-up' approach where existing national policies—such as China's energy efficiency targets and India's 'Perform, Achieve and Trade'—serve as building blocks. The author identifies six abatement categories ranging from closing inefficient plants to developing breakthrough technologies, noting that carbon pricing alone is insufficient to realize these opportunities. The brief recommends that the UNFCCC establish a steel-specific forum involving both government and industry to coordinate technology transfers, minimum standards for new plants, and funding for Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS).

The document analyzes the gap between emission pledges and projected emissions for 2020, highlighting that the global economic recession likely reduced the actual effort required to meet these targets. It identifies significant uncertainties in calculating 'allowed emissions' due to varying LULUCF rules and the carry-over of Kyoto Protocol credits. Quantitative comparisons across different data sources (PBL, GAINS, and National Communications) show considerable variance in 2020 projections, suggesting that many official projections may overstate emissions by not fully accounting for the recession's impact.

The paper examines the likely balance of demand and supply for carbon units in 2020, analyzing the 'emissions anyway' projections for major developed nations against their pledges. It concludes that while a theoretical demand gap exists, actual market demand for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) may be low due to policy preferences for sectoral crediting in the US and EU, and a likely oversupply of CERs. The author warns that this suggests a potentially low-value international carbon market, which could hinder global efforts to peak emissions by 2020.

The report analyzes the CDM project pipeline as of April 2010, finding that procedural delays and operational risks significantly reduce the actual supply of CERs compared to original project estimates. It projects that CER supply up to 2012 may be less than half of planned amounts and evaluates scenarios for the 2013-2020 period, highlighting a heavy dependence on five dominating host countries.

The report examines carbon leakage—the migration of emissions to regions with laxer carbon pricing—specifically focusing on the EU ETS Phase III. It criticizes the European Commission's broad identification of 164 sectors at risk, arguing that the criteria used were too simplistic and failed to account for the 2008 economic recession or the actual auctioning rates. The authors suggest that leakage risk is actually concentrated in a few sectors, including steel, cement, and aluminium, and recommend tailored policy responses such as border adjustments for cement and investment subsidies for aluminium, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach of free allowance allocation.

The paper examines the complexity of comparing national emissions pledges due to inconsistent base years, varying scopes of greenhouse gases, and divergent accounting methods for LULUCF. It analyzes the specific pledges of Annex I countries (Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Russia, Kazakhstan) and non-Annex I countries (China, India), highlighting how 'cherry picking' accounting systems can make targets appear more ambitious than they are. The authors recommend a common accounting framework where countries provide scenarios showing how energy-related emissions, LULUCF, and international offsets contribute to their total commitments.