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International climate finance for Brazil grew by 84% between the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 biennia, reaching an average of US$ 5.1 billion per year. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and was characterized by a shift toward commercial financing instruments. While Western Europe, led by France, was the largest regional provider, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions—received only 11% of the total finance. Public institutions provided 58% of the funds, with multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) playing a dominant role, while private finance grew fourfold to reach 42% of the total.

Merchant BESS in India became financially viable in 2024 due to falling battery costs and increasing price volatility in the Day Ahead Market (DAM). The report finds that BESS can achieve internal rates of return (IRR) up to 24% by combining energy arbitrage with ancillary services, with shorter-duration systems (1-2 hours) currently offering better returns than 4-hour systems.

International climate finance for Brazil averaged US$ 5.1 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from the 2019–2020 period. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, particularly solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private capital from commercial financial institutions. While Western Europe was the largest regional provider, the report highlights a stark imbalance in sectoral allocation: the AFOLU sector, responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions, received only 11% of total finance. The majority of funds were earmarked for mitigation (80%) and delivered via commercial debt and equity, while grants and concessional finance declined by 43%.

International climate finance to Brazil averaged R$ 26.6 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from 2019–2020. Growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private commercial financing. While Western Europe, led by France, was the primary source, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's emissions—received only 11% of total funding, mostly through public multilateral sources.

The document outlines a framework for reporting on National Adaptation Plan (NAP) progress, categorising methods into three primary objectives: monitoring activity status, evaluating performance and impact, and learning and communication. It provides a menu of 17 specific tools—ranging from low-effort checklists and traffic-light systems to high-effort indicator tracking and digital platforms—supported by real-world examples from countries such as Saint Lucia, Burkina Faso, and Finland. The guide emphasizes an iterative 'learning by doing' approach, the integration of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI), and the alignment of national reporting with international commitments under the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework.

The document outlines a framework for reporting progress on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), categorizing methods into three primary objectives: monitoring status, evaluating performance, and learning/communication. It provides step-by-step instructions for 17 different methods, ranging from low-effort checklists to high-effort digital platforms and indicator tracking. The guide emphasizes a 'learn-by-doing' approach, encouraging countries to start with simple methods and increase complexity as capacities grow, while ensuring the integration of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI).

Two years after the COP28 agreement to triple global renewable capacity by 2030, national targets remain largely stagnant. As of July 2025, the global sum of national targets has increased by only 2% since COP28, reaching 7.4 TW, which is significantly below the 11 TW required to meet the tripling goal. Only 22 countries have updated their targets, with the majority of these being EU member states revising plans through the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) process. Most non-EU updates occurred through routine planning cycles rather than as a direct response to COP pledges. Major electricity markets, including the US, Russia, and Canada, have either not set explicit targets or are unlikely to update them in 2025.

The Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM), established in 2006, prevents the purchase of soy grown on land deforested after 2008 in the Amazon biome. Between 2009 and 2022, deforestation dropped by 69% in monitored municipalities. Signatories argue that dismantling the ASM would unlock 1.1 million hectares for soy cultivation, potentially releasing 300 million tonnes of CO₂ within 1 to 2 years and opening approximately 10 million hectares of deforested land to soybean cultivation. The pledge calls for continued adherence to the 2008 cut-off and urges Brazilian authorities to maintain the ASM to align economic development with environmental stewardship.

Europe's June 2025 was its 5th warmest on record, with record-high temperatures in England, France, Italy, and most of Spain, and record-low rainfall in the Balkans. Forecasts for August-September 2025 project temperatures 1-2°C above average across most of Europe, an increase of 1-5 warm days per month, and precipitation deficits of 10-40% in parts of southeastern and southwestern Europe.

The report finds that while a majority of respondents in Spain and the UK acknowledge human-caused climate change, a significant portion (70% in Spain and 60% in the UK) believed at least one false narrative regarding the causes of the April 2025 Iberian blackout. The most prevalent disinformation was that the blackout resulted from an 'over-reliance on renewable energy', a belief particularly strong among far-right voters. General attitudes toward energy sources are divided, with about half of respondents wrongly believing that net zero policies increase energy dependence or that abandoning oil and gas would cause extreme hardship for the poor. Despite this, over 70% of respondents in both countries believe preventing climate disinformation is necessary to protect freedom of speech. There is broad support for measures such as legally obligating social media companies to stop spreading misleading climate information, banning fossil fuel advertising, and increasing support for fact-checking organizations.

In June 2025, solar power became the largest source of electricity in the EU, generating 22.1% of the total supply. This milestone coincided with record-high wind generation for May and June and a record low for coal's share of electricity. However, the first half of 2025 saw an overall increase in fossil fuel generation, driven by higher gas use and lower hydropower output due to drought.

The document contends that the EU's decision to exempt international aviation from the ETS since 2012, largely due to US political and industry pressure, has failed to reduce emissions. It criticizes the ICAO's CORSIA framework as ineffective and calls for the EU to resume pricing international aviation emissions, proposing that the resulting revenue be directed toward global climate finance for vulnerable countries.

The June–July 2025 heatwave in Europe increased electricity demand by up to 14% and caused average daily power prices to double or triple in several countries. While record solar generation of 45 TWh in June 2025 helped maintain daytime stability, the heatwave triggered thermal power plant outages, particularly affecting France's nuclear fleet. The report argues for the deployment of battery storage, interconnection, and demand flexibility to mitigate future extreme weather risks.

The report details the expansion of 'Big Oil' companies like Shell and BP into the solar energy sector in Southern Europe. It highlights a pattern of using intermediary shell companies to acquire agricultural land and bypass environmental scrutiny and community participation. The authors argue that this 'extractive' model of the energy transition prioritizes corporate profit over food sovereignty and democratic engagement, while noting that Italy could meet its solar targets using rooftops and degraded land rather than fertile fields.

The report finds that expanding the World Cup to 48 teams will significantly increase GHG emissions, with air transport emissions estimated to rise by 160% to 325% for the 2026, 2030, and 2034 tournaments. It estimates the 2026 World Cup in North America will produce at least 9.0 million tCO2e, while the FIFA-Aramco sponsorship deal could induce an additional 30 million tCO2e. Furthermore, a risk assessment of the 16 stadiums for the 2026 event reveals that half require immediate environmental intervention, with six facing extreme heat stress.

The briefing highlights the failure of EU Member States to reach target fishing mortality by January 2025 under the Western Mediterranean multiannual plan (West Med MAP). It criticizes the lack of transparency in the 'compensation mechanism' used to reclaim fishing days and calls for robust actions, including strengthened fishing mortality reductions, safeguard measures for critically depleted stocks, and enhanced selectivity and control systems.

Carbon Market Watch critiques the EU Innovation Fund for disproportionately funding carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture and utilisation (CCU), particularly in the cement and lime sector. The organization argues that the fund should prioritize technologies that encourage material savings and explicitly include material saving as a mandatory assessment criterion for projects.

The Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor 2025 finds that none of the 20 assessed companies demonstrate a climate strategy of 'reasonable' or 'high' integrity. The report highlights that 2030 emission reduction targets are increasingly 'unfit for purpose' due to structural obstacles, including incomplete emissions disclosures and sector-specific accounting malpractices. In the tech sector, soaring energy demand from AI and a reliance on outdated market-based accounting for electricity undermine target credibility. The automotive sector shows inadequate progress in phasing out internal combustion engines, while the fashion sector lacks commitments to reduce overproduction. The agrifood sector is criticised for relying on undefined land-based carbon removals to obscure a lack of structural emission reductions. The report argues for the adoption of transition-specific alignment targets to complement general GHG targets.

The agreement between LA Referencia and the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research (IAI) focuses on strengthening open science capacities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The partnership aims to align IAI's 2024–2030 Strategic Plan—which includes developing a digital infrastructure for open data by 2026—with LA Referencia's existing digital infrastructure for scientific publications. Key areas of cooperation include joint capacity-building programs, collaborative funding proposals, and improved regional communication mechanisms.

The report argues that rapid declines in battery costs have made near-continuous solar power (24/365 generation) an economic reality in sunny regions. In cities like Las Vegas, achieving 97% reliability for a constant power supply is now cost-competitive at $104/MWh, which is cheaper than new coal and nuclear power. The analysis demonstrates that a relatively small amount of storage—approximately 17 kWh of battery for every 1 kW of stable 24-hour power—is sufficient for most sunny locations. This shift allows solar to support 24/7 clean energy contracts for energy-intensive industries and significantly reduces the need for expensive grid expansions by allowing more capacity to be installed behind existing connections.