Search Climate Insights Directory

Climate Central's analysis reveals that the average person globally lost nearly 56 hours of sleep annually due to nighttime heat from 2020 to 2025, with approximately six hours attributed to climate change. The most significant climate-linked sleep losses occurred in Middle Eastern cities, where residents in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE lost between 12 and 16 hours of sleep per year due to climate change. Globally, the amount of temperature-related sleep loss linked to climate change has at least doubled since the early 1970s, increasing from about two hours to five hours per year. Vulnerable populations, including adults over 65 and those in lower-middle-income countries, face higher risks, and while air conditioning provides some protection, access remains unequal and tied to income.

The report evaluates three carbon price scenarios for Canada from 2030 to 2040: a flat price (CAD 130/t CO2e), a low price (rising to CAD 230/t CO2e), and a high price (rising to CAD 380/t CO2e). It concludes that a high-price trajectory is the most effective for driving investment in clean projects and achieving significant emissions reductions with minimal economic impact. However, the report emphasizes that carbon pricing alone is insufficient to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 and must be supported by robust complementary policies and differentiated tightening of performance standards, particularly in sectors like oil and gas production.

Since the 1970s, the global average number of dangerous humid heat days—defined as those with a maximum wet-bulb temperature of 25°C or higher—has more than doubled, rising from 10 to 23 days per year. Climate Central's analysis indicates that human-caused climate change is now the primary driver of this trend, accounting for 64% of all such days since 1970 and 83% of the 23 dangerous days recorded in 2025. The most significant increases are observed in tropical humid regions, including Southeast Asia, coastal West Africa, and tropical South America, though increases are also noted in drier areas like the Arabian Peninsula and the southwestern United States.

The waste sector contributes approximately 20% of global human-caused methane emissions, yet adoption of proven technologies like anaerobic digestion and landfill gas to energy remains slow in emerging economies due to a lack of bankable projects. RMI identifies São Paulo and Bangkok as prime opportunity hubs for near-term private investment. Scaling this finance requires de-risking through investment-ready project pipelines, concessional capital, grant funding, and strengthened carbon markets to improve returns.

The paper argues that the armed organization to which a person belongs is the most powerful predictor of whether they become a perpetrator of conflict-related sexual violence. Using datasets like SVAC and ACLED, it finds that while state forces have historically been more frequent perpetrators, there is a recent trend of increasing reports involving rebel groups. The author identifies key organizational risk factors, such as forced recruitment and child soldiering, which use sexual violence as a socialization tool for group cohesion. Conversely, restraint is linked to strong internal governance, such as electoral leader selection and ideological norms. The paper suggests that policy interventions should target organizational structures and use risk factors as early warning indicators rather than focusing solely on individual perpetrators.

Rooftop solar capacity in the Philippines has likely doubled between April 2025 and April 2026, reaching approximately 1,300 MW. This growth is driven by surging electricity prices, which have reduced payback periods for residential, commercial, and industrial users to between 2.3 and 3.1 years. The report highlights a massive influx of solar panel imports from China and the emergence of domestic manufacturing. To further scale rooftop solar to a target of 3,500 MW with 4,500 MWh of battery storage within 24 months, the author recommends expanding low-interest loan schemes, legalising 'plug-and-play' solar kits under 800 watts, and implementing a distributed grid-battery project.

The US electric grid faces severe supply chain constraints, with lead times for large power transformers reaching up to four years and prices for power line cables doubling since 2019. Domestic production is insufficient, meeting only 20% of demand for large power transformers in 2025. To address this, the document proposes a three-pronged federal strategy: easing near-term bottlenecks through allied partnerships and production ramps; expanding domestic capacity via manufacturing tax credits and low-cost scaling capital; and promoting innovation in next-generation grid hardware. It also highlights subnational opportunities for states to attract investment through tailored workforce training and industrial clustering.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The report identifies a recurring 'implementation gap' where adaptation policies increasingly use the language of systemic risk—interconnected hazards, cascading impacts, and deep uncertainty—but continue to operate through hazard- and sector-based routines. Through comparative analysis of the EU, ASEAN, and the US, it finds that mandates, funding, and monitoring systems remain fragmented, often ignoring policy trade-offs and distributional inequities. It concludes by proposing a framework based on systemic risk framing, policy interlinkages, and deep uncertainty management to help decision-makers stress-test investments and avoid maladaptation.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While the number of countries pursuing new coal projects dropped to 32, China and India continue massive expansions. In Indonesia, the growth of captive coal plants for nickel and aluminium processing contradicts national climate commitments, with the RUPTL 2025-2034 continuing to plan for on-grid coal investment despite a formal moratorium.

The report argues that electricity planning in Southeast Asia, specifically in Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and the Philippines, is overly focused on GDP and industrial growth, which masks a "well-being gap" in essential services. Using the Decent Living Standards framework, it estimates a sufficiency floor of 620–1,270 kWh per capita per year, finding that while aggregate generation often meets this threshold, poor allocation and affordability prevent basic needs from being met.

Reclaim Finance calls for the financial sector to stop funding fossil fuel projects in critical biodiversity areas, arguing that current biodiversity commitments are inadequate and that the fossil fuel industry is a primary driver of ecosystem collapse and climate change.

Reclaim Finance argues that the financial sector continues to drive biodiversity loss by funding fossil fuel exploitation, which causes deforestation, habitat fragmentation, and pollution. The organization criticizes current financial frameworks like the TNFD for focusing too much on transparency rather than concrete action. It demands that financial actors and regulators exclude all support for oil, gas, and coal projects in critical areas such as the Amazon, the Arctic, and the Coral Triangle, noting that the latter is threatened by over 450 offshore exploration blocks and 31 LNG terminals.

The briefing examines the surge in consumer demand for clean energy technologies in Germany, Italy, France, Poland, Spain, and the UK following the start of the Iran war. It highlights a strong correlation between fossil fuel price shocks and increased inquiries for solar PV and EVs, noting that supportive policies—such as feed-in tariffs, grants, and tax breaks—significantly bolster the economic case for adoption. Germany is identified as a leader in plug-in solar adoption due to its early policy interventions, while France and Germany are noted for social-based EV support models. The document also contains a disconnected section discussing the health and climate impacts of coal in Southeast Asia.

The briefing examines the impact of energy supply disruptions stemming from the US-Iran war, noting that the current crisis is larger than the 1970s oil embargo. It argues that while governments are using short-term fixes like strategic reserves and subsidies, the long-term solution lies in electrification, demand-side efficiency, and the scaling of 'green molecules' like hydrogen and ammonia. The text highlights specific vulnerabilities in Southeast Asia and the US, and suggests that mitigating methane leakage and flaring could recover energy volumes equivalent to approximately half of worldwide LNG trade.

The 2026 Middle East crisis, triggered by conflict in Iran, caused a spike in oil and gas prices and led some Southeast Asian nations to switch from gas to coal for electricity. However, the report argues that coal is not insulated from geopolitical shocks and carries high hidden health and climate costs. Analysis shows that replacing planned gas expansion with solar and storage would save ASEAN USD 4 billion by 2030, whereas replacing it with coal would increase costs. Despite this, ASEAN coal demand is projected to rise by 25% by 2030, driven largely by Indonesia and Vietnam, though Indonesia has committed to phasing out fossil fuels within 10 to 15 years.

The report examines the evolution of governance in the Global South, tracing the impact of colonial legacies, Cold War geopolitics, and structural adjustment programmes. It analyzes current governance performance using World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, noting a disconnect between political participation and institutional capacity in some regions, while others show improved state capacity despite limited democratic freedoms.