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The document examines the negotiations surrounding the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) ahead of COP-19, highlighting the tension between parties seeking minimal guidance and those calling for centralized oversight. It argues that for carbon markets to support a new climate deal, they must be predicated on ambitious mitigation targets, strict environmental integrity, and the prevention of double counting. The author specifically warns that a proposed FVA pilot phase, advocated by Poland, could set a dangerous precedent by allowing early action units to be recognized in a post-2020 regime before fundamental accounting rules are established.

The document outlines the transition from an Interim to an independent Secretariat, focusing on securing privileges and immunities, adopting administrative policies based on the Asian Development Bank's model, and preparing the headquarters in Songdo, Republic of Korea. It details a phased approach to implementing human resources and financial guidelines, the search for administrative service providers, and a comprehensive ICT service roadmap spanning 2013 to 2015.

Carbon Market Watch opposes a pilot phase for the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA), arguing that the lack of established rules on environmental integrity and accounting makes such a phase premature. The organization warns that recognizing "early action" from a pilot could undermine future post-2020 climate regime negotiations and set a dangerous precedent for low-quality market units. It suggests that the FVA process should instead be used to define rigorous standards for real, permanent, and additional mitigation and to resolve double-counting issues, particularly those seen in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

The report provides a comprehensive overview of nanotechnology's expansion across Asia-Pacific, detailing national initiatives in countries such as India, China, Japan, and Australia. It highlights a critical gap between rapid commercialization and the lack of specific regulatory frameworks to manage health and environmental risks. The document details potential hazards, including the asbestos-like pathogenicity of carbon nanotubes and the ecotoxicity of silver and zinc oxide nanoparticles. It further analyzes the potential for nanotechnology to displace employment through product multifunctionality and increased durability. Finally, it discusses the role of the Strategic Approach for International Chemical Management (SAICM) in establishing global guidance for the sound management of manufactured nanomaterials.

The report posits that national climate change legislation acts as an enabler for international agreements by building government confidence, knowledge, and a desire for competitive parity. Using examples like South Korea, Mexico, and the UK, the authors suggest that domestic targets inform a country's international position and create the political space necessary for a global deal.

The document warns that TTIP may prioritize trade interests over public health by promoting regulatory harmonization and mutual recognition that could lower chemical safety standards in the U.S. and EU. It specifically contrasts the EU's hazard-based REACH regulation with the U.S.'s risk-based TSCA approach, arguing that mutual recognition would effectively erase protections for chemicals restricted in only one jurisdiction. The author also cautions against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which could allow corporations to sue governments over public interest laws, and warns that TTIP could preempt protective sub-federal or sub-regional laws. Finally, the statement suggests that a low-standard TTIP could chill the development of stringent chemical regulations in other regions, such as the BRIICS countries.

The document warns that TTIP may prioritize trade over public health by promoting regulatory harmonization and mutual recognition that could weaken chemical safety standards. It highlights the divergence between the EU's hazard-based REACH approach and the US's risk-based TSCA approach, arguing that mutual recognition would effectively erase protections unique to one jurisdiction. The author also cautions against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and the preemption of sub-national laws, while noting that TTIP could negatively influence chemical regulations in non-member countries like the BRIICS nations.

The author contends that the TTIP will harm the Global South through the diversion of trade flows and the imposition of EU-US standards on other nations. Mexico is highlighted as particularly vulnerable, specifically in its garment industry. The text suggests the agreement is a strategic attempt by the US and EU to bolster their diminishing economic influence and sideline the BRICS nations, potentially undermining the multilateral trading system in favor of a non-transparent, power-driven trade regime.

The document argues that strong national climate legislation acts as an enabler for more ambitious international agreements by increasing competitiveness, confidence, and knowledge. It highlights that domestic laws can provide the 'legal force' required for future UNFCCC outcomes and recommends strengthening the role of legislators through capacity building and better engagement with executive negotiators.

The paper argues that South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 target of 5.4% average annual GDP growth is 'very ambitious' and unlikely to be met under current trends. Using the International Futures (IFs) model, the authors find a 'Base Case' average growth of 3.4% for 2014-2030, significantly lower than the NDP target and regional peers. While the 'Highway' scenario shows that combining aggressive interventions—such as reducing corruption, curbing HIV/AIDS, and increasing foreign direct investment—could push growth above 5%, such a path requires systemic structural change. Conversely, the analysis suggests that targets for education and infrastructure are 'eminently achievable' even with lower economic growth, indicating a potential lack of integration in the NDP's sectoral planning.

The policy brief examines the climate impact of aviation, which contributes between 5% and 14% of global climate emissions. It critiques the reliance on offsetting, arguing that only a cap-and-trade system with a strict cap can deliver real in-sector reductions. The document analyzes ICAO's proposed measures, including a 'basket of measures' and various market-based options, while warning that low-quality offsets from mechanisms like the CDM and JI undermine environmental integrity. It also details the EU's attempt to include international flights in the EU-ETS and the subsequent 'stop the clock' derogation to allow ICAO to find a global solution.

The report examines industrial policy as a tool for structural economic transformation, contrasting traditional methods—such as import substitution and export promotion—with 'green industrial policy' designed to address environmental externalities. It argues that while market forces are generally preferred, government intervention is justified by market failures like coordination gaps and credit imperfections. The author identifies best practices, including the use of performance-based 'sunset clauses' and close government-industry collaboration. Green industrial policy is presented as a 'second-best' alternative to carbon pricing, requiring larger-scale intervention to stimulate both supply and demand for environmentally friendly technologies.

Carbon Market Watch argues that existing carbon markets have collapsed due to oversupply and poor quality, specifically citing the CDM and JI. The briefing recommends strengthening additionality criteria, shortening crediting periods, and establishing mandatory human rights and sustainability safeguards. For new mechanisms like the FVA and NMM, it advocates for a binding international governance structure and a common transaction tracking mechanism to prevent double counting of emission reductions.

A coalition of civil society organizations (CSOs) argues that the current timeline for selecting permanent active observers for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is insufficient to ensure inclusivity and transparency. The groups cite a lack of disseminated requirements, incomplete accreditation, and uncertain financial support for Southern participants as primary barriers. They propose selecting temporary observers for the June 2013 board meeting in South Korea while calling for a formal, independent selection process—similar to that used by the Climate Investment Funds—to be established for permanent representatives.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) warns that TTIP's push for regulatory cooperation on chemicals may weaken environmental and health protections by favoring the U.S. risk-based approach over the EU's hazard-based REACH regulation. CIEL highlights that REACH drives innovation toward safer alternatives and that the externalized costs of chemical pollution far outweigh the costs of regulation. The statement also cautions against strengthening trade secret protections and calls for greater transparency and public participation in the TTIP negotiation process.

The report examines the challenges and mechanisms for attracting private capital to climate finance, noting that private funding is nearly three times larger than public funding but remains difficult to channel toward adaptation in developing countries. It identifies political, project-related, and financing barriers—particularly in Africa—and suggests a combination of policy reforms and financial instruments like loan guarantees and pledge funds to mitigate risk. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is highlighted as a central vehicle for achieving the $100 billion annual target by 2020, though it must address the funding gap between mitigation and adaptation.

The author critiques the European Union's lack of preparation for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, warning that the United States is likely to use GMO products as a 'make-it-or-break-it' condition. The text argues that the EU must protect its environmental, climate, and consumer standards, and suggests that the positive agenda for TTIP should focus on energy and resource efficiency to support a low-carbon economy. It further cautions against using TTIP as a strategic tool to contain China, suggesting instead a multilateral approach to global trade to avoid dividing the world into competing blocs.

The Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group has petitioned the Indian government to stop iron ore mining in the Khandadhar mountain range in Odisha. The group argues that mining by companies such as POSCO and Kalinga Commercial Corporation Limited (KCCL) is causing severe environmental damage, including the pollution of the Khandadhara waterfall and the destruction of vital elephant corridors. The petition highlights the threat to the Pauri Bhuiyan, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group, asserting that mining activities and forced displacement constitute 'ethnocide' and violate the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

The document examines the role of African states in the global nuclear security framework, specifically focusing on the transition from the Nuclear Security Summit process to the IAEA's leadership. It highlights the limited representation of African nations at summits but notes their substantive contributions through treaty ratification and regional cooperation. The brief recommends that African states develop a unified perspective for upcoming international conferences and strengthen domestic legislation to align with global safety and security standards.

The report identifies systemic failures within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), including the distraction of nuclear weapons and cleanup missions, a fragmented 'stovepipe' organizational structure, and a lack of objective program evaluation. It recommends consolidating energy and science programs under a single Under Secretary, shifting the focus of applied R&D from energy sources to end-uses, and restoring the Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) model for national laboratories. The authors advocate for structured public-private consortia to drive pre-commercial research and suggest that large-scale 'first-of-a-kind' commercial demonstrations be led by the private sector rather than the DOE. Additionally, the report proposes moving nuclear weapons and nonproliferation missions to the Department of Defense and environmental cleanup to the Army Corps of Engineers or the EPA to allow DOE leadership to focus exclusively on energy innovation.