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More than 100 civil society organizations express deep concern over the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) lack of adequate policies for financing high-risk activities. The statement argues that the GCF Board should not approve high-risk projects—including large hydropower and infrastructure—until it adopts a full Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) and a free-standing Indigenous Peoples' Policy aligned with international standards like UNDRIP. The groups demand more rigorous scrutiny for high-risk sub-projects, country-driven proposals, and strict adherence to public disclosure timelines for impact assessments.

The document evaluates the 25th Summit of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Nairobi, noting a renewed energy under new leadership but highlighting persistent challenges including poor attendance by heads of state, significant financial arrears, and the need for faster reporting cycles to maintain relevance.

The report argues that while cities are critical for climate action, they face significant barriers in accessing international climate finance due to limited institutional capacity and rigid funding requirements. It proposes three access modalities for the GCF: promoting unconventional implementing entities, accrediting cities as implementing entities themselves, and utilizing Enhanced Direct Access (EDA) through mechanisms like a National City Facility. The authors emphasize that GCF should prioritize secondary cities and provide a diverse range of financial instruments to unlock domestic and local funding.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) Secretariat reports progress in its public and private sector pipelines, the simplification of funding proposal templates, and the expansion of readiness support to 45 countries. Key achievements include the signing of contribution agreements with five additional countries and the launch of a new website to enhance stakeholder engagement. The Secretariat also operationalized its accreditation framework, moving 11 applicants to stage II, and provided substantive support for the development of the GCF Strategic Plan.

The report details two readiness requests: one for Vanuatu to develop Climate Information Services (CIS) to support adaptation and disaster risk reduction, and one for Senegal to establish a pipeline of privately funded, grid-connected solar projects to address an acute energy crisis.

The document examines the interaction between the G-20 and Africa, noting that while South Africa is the only permanent African member, the G-20's agenda significantly impacts the continent. It evaluates the G-20 Development Working Group's (DWG) progress on priorities such as infrastructure, domestic resource mobilisation, and financial inclusion. The author argues that while there is overlap with the AU's Agenda 2063, momentum has been lost in supporting African regional economic integration, and further efforts are needed to leverage G-20 resources for sustainable infrastructure and local capital markets.

The document argues that international aviation emissions grew by over 75% between 1990 and 2012 and could increase by 300% by 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario. It critiques the ICAO's proposed global market-based mechanism (GMBM), which aims for 'carbon neutral growth 2020' starting in 2021, citing concerns over lack of transparency, non-binding goals, and low environmental standards. Carbon Market Watch recommends that the GMBM include mandatory targets, a 'negative list' of ineligible project types (such as fossil fuel power plants and most LULUCF projects), and strict credit quality criteria to ensure real and permanent emission reductions.

The document contends that voluntary sustainability initiatives are fundamentally flawed and insufficient to curb the global land grabbing crisis. It provides evidence of the significant financial involvement of EU-based institutions in agribusinesses that cause environmental and social harm, particularly in developing countries. The authors argue that the lack of monitoring, sanctions, and accessibility in voluntary schemes allows irresponsible actors to continue harmful practices. To address this, the briefing recommends mandatory human rights due diligence, expanded reporting requirements under EU directives, and binding regulations for financial investors to ensure only legally compliant agribusiness concessions are eligible for investment.

Senegal is highly vulnerable to climate change due to its dependence on rain-fed agriculture and fisheries, and a population concentrated along a coastline exposed to sea level rise. While the government has established coordinating bodies like the National Climate Change Committee and identified priority sectors in its NAPA and INDC, the report finds that climate adaptation is not yet effectively mainstreamed into most national sectoral policies or subnational planning. Current adaptation projects primarily target agriculture, water resources, and disaster risk management, often using ecosystem-based approaches, but gaps remain in the health and tourism sectors.

The report argues that migration is driven by a complex chain of mechanisms—including aspirations and infrastructure—rather than simple 'root causes' like poverty. It finds that economic development often increases migration in the short term (the 'migration hump') and that poverty eradication has had marginal impact on reducing migration. The authors caution that reorienting humanitarian and development aid to meet migration-control objectives may reduce the primary effectiveness of those policies and risk serving donor self-interest over beneficiary needs.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF), an operating entity of the UNFCCC, aims to support low-emission and climate-resilient development in developing countries. It operates through a 24-member Board divided equally between developed and developing nations and distributes funds via 'Accredited Entities' rather than directly. The fund maintains a 50/50 aspirational split between adaptation and mitigation, with half of adaptation funds targeted at particularly vulnerable countries. However, the document highlights concerns regarding the lack of an explicit exclusion list for fossil fuels, the potential for funding 'false solutions', and the limited requirements for national designated authorities (NDAs) to engage with civil society and affected communities.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is the primary multilateral fund for climate adaptation and mitigation in developing countries. It operates through accredited entities and National Designated Authorities (NDAs), with a target of splitting funding equally between adaptation and mitigation. While it lacks a formal exclusion list for polluting technologies, it employs investment criteria to avoid high-emission infrastructure. Civil society organizations, including Friends of the Earth, act as observers and advocates to ensure transparency and community involvement.

The document evaluates the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) current standing by analyzing its strengths, such as its international credibility and USD 10 billion in pledges, against internal challenges like a lengthy decision-making cycle and a lack of defined portfolio targets. It draws comparative lessons from other climate funds (GEF, AF, CIFs) and global health funds (GAVI, Global Fund), suggesting that a 'vertical programmatic approach' could help mobilize stakeholders around tangible results. Key recommendations include strengthening country ownership through readiness support, standardizing investment criteria to improve comparability, and leveraging the Private Sector Facility to potentially become a leading green bond fund.

A coalition of 98 global entities argues that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) fails to comply with international human rights obligations, specifically those recognized in the 2010 Cancun Agreements. The letter calls for the establishment of an independent accountability mechanism, the adoption of international sustainable development safeguards, and the implementation of improved stakeholder consultation processes to prevent environmental and social harms.

The IMF's October 2015 Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa describes a 'gloomy picture' for the region driven by falling commodity and oil prices, high energy costs, and a weak global financial environment. South Africa is highlighted as having the worst growth projection among its middle-income peers, with its economic performance hindered by critical electricity supply failures, poor export growth despite currency depreciation, and social unrest. The IMF recommends fiscal adjustments, currency depreciation, and long-term investments in productivity-enhancing infrastructure and education to counter these trends.

The document analyzes the scarcity of agricultural financing in developing countries, where risks like natural hazards and high transaction costs deter lenders. It categorizes financial needs into four groups: farmers/entrepreneurs, value chain actors, rural infrastructure, and R&D. The brief details a range of instruments from informal savings and micro-finance to complex value-chain and infrastructure financing. It emphasizes the government's role in risk management through credit guarantees and insurance subsidies, and the importance of flexible regulatory frameworks to attract investment while protecting savings.

Civil society organizations gathered at the World Social Forum in Tunis in March 2015 to oppose the G8's New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa. They argue the initiative promotes corporate-led agriculture, facilitates land grabbing, and undermines the rights of small-scale farmers. The statement calls for a shift toward food sovereignty, agro-ecology, and the protection of peasant seed systems, demanding that governments suspend New Alliance commitments and prioritize human rights-based agricultural systems.

A statement by social movements and civil society organizations opposing the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa, arguing that it prioritizes corporate interests over small-scale producers and undermines food sovereignty.

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The document examines the AU Panel of the Wise (PoW) as a key pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), focusing on its use of preventive diplomacy in crisis-prone elections. It argues that while the PoW can attenuate violence and promote peaceful outcomes, such interventions often prioritize immediate peace over electoral legitimacy, potentially deferring structural conflicts to future cycles. The author emphasizes that the success of preventive diplomacy depends on the timing of 'early action' and the commitment of political stakeholders, noting that long-term governance transformation is necessary to resolve deep-rooted conflicts.